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THE HIDDEN TRANSACTIONAL WISDOM 
OF MEDIA DISCRIMINATION IN PRE-AWCPA 
COPYRIGHT 
KEVIN EMERSON COLLINS 
ABSTRACT 
Media neutrality in copyright’s subject matter means that works of 
authorship are protected against copying, or not, regardless of the tangible 
medium in which they are fixed. For example, the same features of a 
sculptural work are protected regardless of whether they are fixed in a 
statue or a photograph of a statue. Media neutrality in subject matter is a 
fundamental and largely unquestioned copyright principle with a firm 
policy basis under copyright’s dominant incentive-to-create theory. Media 
discrimination in subject matter undermines in arbitrary ways authors’ 
ability to recoup their creativity costs over the sale of multiple copies. 
This Article identifies a situation in which departure from the copyright 
principle of media neutrality in subject matter is unexpectedly good policy. 
The rarely discussed transactional theory of copyright holds that 
copyright’s goal is to facilitate the market transactions through which 
authors refine works and commercialize them into the copies that 
consumers want. When transactional theory, rather than incentive-to-create 
theory, is copyright’s primary justification, maintaining protection for the 
medium in which authors develop works and eliminating it for the medium 
in which the public consumes them preserves copyright’s full benefits while 
reducing its access costs.  
To illustrate the argument, this Article looks to architecture as a case 
study. Copyright for building designs created before the enactment of the 
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (AWCPA) in 1990 employs 
media discrimination: it protects building designs when fixed in drawings 
but not when fixed in buildings. As a historical matter, the courts crafted 
this unusual rule of protected subject matter to accommodate concerns 
about copyright protection for the functionality of buildings. Yet, for 
architects who employ the custom design process at the core of the 
architectural profession, it has a sound transactional justification as well, 
and it would be good policy even if buildings were not functional artifacts. 
Copyright’s principal role in custom architectural design is to facilitate the 
architect–client transaction in which architects create building designs in 
return for fees that cover design costs. Pre-AWCPA copyright can perform 
this role just as well as full media-neutral copyright because it protects 











building designs fixed in architecture’s development medium (drawings). 
However, it reduces copyright’s access costs because competitor architects 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 1976 Copyright Act (the “1976 Act”) makes media neutrality a 
bedrock principle of contemporary copyright law. Section 102(a) codifies 
the facet of this principle that addresses copyright’s protected subject 
matter: copyright protects “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression.”1 Assuming that a sequence of fictitious 
events is a protected aspect of a literary work, for instance, media neutrality 
 
1. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018) (emphasis added). 











in subject matter means that copying that series of events from a hardcover 
book or an audio recording is just as unlawful as copying it from an e-book 
or microfiche. Media discrimination in subject matter—that is, copyright 
protection for a work fixed in a first medium but not a second medium—is 
rare.2 
This rarity is unsurprising because the policy justification for media 
neutrality in subject matter is intuitive and unchallenged. Copyright’s 
dominant utilitarian justification is what is commonly called the incentive-
to-create theory and what this Article terms the market-buffer theory.3 
Works of authorship are public goods, and copyright augments what are 
often inefficiently low incentives for their production. Copyright allows 
authors to restrict competition, earn supracompetitive profits in the market 
for multiple copies, and offset the sunk cost of creating the works. Under 
the market-buffer theory, media discrimination in subject matter is little 
better than no copyright protection at all because it does not provide an 
effective buffer from market competition. It allows competitors to freely 
copy from the unprotected medium, sapping copyright protection for the 
protected medium of its economic value and leaving the public goods 
problem untouched. 
This Article demonstrates that reducing copyright’s reach by introducing 
media discrimination in subject matter can preserve copyright’s benefits 
while reducing its costs. The argument involves two primary conceptual 
moves: the transactional theory sometimes provides copyright’s primary 
justification, and media discrimination in subject matter can optimize 
copyright for the transactional theory. 
The first move gets out of the deep rut in copyright thinking that has been 
worn by the repeated invocation of the market-buffer theory as copyright’s 
 
2. The only instance of longstanding media discrimination in copyright’s subject matter arose 
as a judicially crafted limitation on the reach of copyright’s denial of protection for three-dimensional, 
utilitarian articles. See infra Section II.C.  
3. See infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. The phrase “market-buffer theory” is meant 
to shift the focus away from the end goal of augmenting incentives for creative production and toward 
the mechanism through which copyright is presumed to generate those incentives. This focus on 
mechanism is important because competing justifications for copyright, such as the transactional theory, 
also sometimes provide incentives for creative production. See infra notes 310–313 and accompanying 
text. To draw an effective contrast between the conventional justification of copyright and the 
transactional justification, a new label for the incentive-to-create theory that highlights mechanism is 
essential. At least when applied to custom architecture, both theories are incentive-to-create theories. 
For a small sampling of scholarship addressing what this Article terms the market-buffer theory of 
copyright, see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 37–41 (2003); Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual 
Property Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1473, 1476–78 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell eds., 2007); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1577–81 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual 
Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993–1000 (1997); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s 













sole utilitarian justification.4 In some contexts, the transactional theory 
instead identifies copyright’s primary justification.5  
Under the transactional theory, copyright resolves the information 
paradox identified by Kenneth Arrow.6 Absent copyright, authors face 
disclosure dilemmas when they attempt sell their works as information 
commodities before their works have been commercialized. Authors 
hesitate to disclose their works to transactional partners because disclosure 
puts transactional partners in possession of their works and obviates the 
need to pay for them. Yet, transactional partners hesitate to pay authors for 
the works before disclosure occurs because they need the disclosure to 
determine how much they value the works.7 Copyright reduces the severity 
of authors’ disclosure dilemmas. Clients often cannot appropriate works 
without paying authors and, correspondingly, authors are more comfortable 
providing the disclosure needed for efficiency-enhancing, pre-
commercialization transactions to proceed. 
The second move recognizes that media discrimination in subject matter 
can sculpt copyright to fit the transactional theory. For some types of works, 
authors initially fix works in a development medium to refine and 
commercialize them and then in a consumption medium to market them in 
the form that the public demands. For example, authors refine and 
commercialize movies through specs, screenplays, and storyboards 
(development media), but audiences’ willingness to pay hinges on 
experiencing them as films or videos (consumption media). For works that 
have distinct development and consumption media, protection for the 
development medium but not the consumption medium—that is, a 
 
4. This Article looks beyond the market-buffer theory, but not beyond utilitarian theory. It does 
not address the labor or personality theories of copyright that underly moral rights. See generally Justin 
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988). 
5. See infra Section III.A. For a sampling of the legal scholarship on the transactional theory of 
copyright and patent, with patent being the more common topic, see Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual 
Property as a Law of Organization, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 800–02 (2011); Dan L. Burk & Brett H. 
McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the 
Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575; Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual 
Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 241–45 (2012); Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent 
Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473 (2005); F. Scott Kieff, IP Transactions: On the Theory & Practice of 
Commercializing Innovation, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 727, 735–36 (2005) [hereinafter Kieff, IP 
Transactions]; F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265, 277–78 (1977); Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1477 (2005); Stephen Yelderman, Coordination-Focused Patent Policy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 
1565 (2016).  
6. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE 
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962).  
7. See infra notes 195–197 and accompanying text.  











consumption-medium/development-medium dichotomy8 — transforms 
copyright into a two-phase right that is economically strong prior to 
consumption-medium copies being available to the public and weak 
thereafter. In the first phase, only development-medium copies exist, so 
copyists must copy from the protected medium if they are to copy at all. In 
the second phase, copyists can freely copy from consumption-medium 
copies, diminishing the economic relevance of the drawing-medium 
protection that persists as a legal matter for copyright’s lengthy term. 
Copyright scope does not shift as a legal matter upon transition from the 
strong phase to the weak phase, but its economic impact shrinks due to the 
public availability of the work fixed in a medium from which copies can be 
lawfully made. 
In turn, this two-phase structure optimizes copyright for the transactional 
theory. In the first phase, protection for only the development medium is 
strong enough to defuse disclosure dilemmas because only development-
medium copies exist and transactional partners must copy from protected 
development-medium copies if they are to copy at all.9 In the second phase, 
copyright’s weakness does not undermine any transactional benefits 
because there are no more disclosure dilemmas once the public has access 
to consumption-medium copies.10 Yet, it does reduce copyright’s access 
costs because competitors can freely borrow from works that have been 
fixed in the consumption medium. A consumption-medium/development-
medium dichotomy thus leads to a “win–tie” result under the transactional 
theory’s cost–benefit tradeoff. It slims copyright down to a smaller bundle 
of sticks that imposes fewer costs (the win) yet still enables copyright to do 
all of the work that the transactional theory scripts for it (the tie). 
To work through this insight in a concrete context, this Article presents 
a case study on media discrimination in subject matter in architectural 
copyright. Architecture provides a compelling case study for two reasons. 
First, building designs are one of the few subject matters in which copyright 
has actually enforced media discrimination in subject matter. Second, there 
 
8. Using the term “dichotomy” is, obviously, a play on copyright’s well-known idea/expression 
dichotomy. See infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. However, where the idea/expression 
dichotomy draws a line on a continuous spectrum of abstraction, the dichotomy introduced in this Article 
marks a categorical distinction between different kinds of media. 
9. Furthermore, this phase will last long enough to achieve copyright’s transactional benefits. 
Authors will not authorize development-medium copies until they have contracts in place ensuring 
payment, and the creation of unauthorized development-medium copies entails infringement, giving the 
author a remedy to make her whole. See infra notes 329–331 and accompanying text.  
10. Assuming that consumption-medium copies are self-disclosing, the public availability of 
consumption-medium copies means that transactional partners already possess knowledge of the works 













is a reasonable, although far from airtight, case to be made that media 
discrimination in subject matter is good policy for architectural copyright.11 
In order to comply with its new treaty obligations under the Berne 
Copyright Convention (“Berne”), Congress enacted revisions to 
architectural copyright in the form of the Architectural Works Copyright 
Protection Act (“AWCPA”) in 1990.12 For building designs created on or 
after December 1, 1990,13 the AWCPA governs architects’ copyrights, and 
it provides media-neutral protection for building designs as a subject 
matter.14 However, for building designs created before that date, the pre-
AWCPA regime still governs architects’ copyrights, and it imposes media 
discrimination in subject matter in the form of a building/drawing 
dichotomy. The building/drawing dichotomy protects features of building 
designs when they are fixed in drawings but not when they are fixed in 
constructed buildings. Any given feature of a building design, such as the 
spatial flow through a series of rooms or a window pattern on a façade, can 
only be reproduced from plans or elevations with the author’s permission, 
but it can be freely copied from buildings.  
The building/drawing dichotomy and its media discrimination in subject 
matter are underappreciated aspects of pre-AWCPA copyright. This Article 
departs from prior commentary of pre-AWCPA copyright in two ways by 
structuring its analysis around them.15 First, the principal focus of prior 
 
11. The transactional justification explored in this Article is not the reason why the courts 
originally endorsed media discrimination in pre-AWCPA protection for building designs. Rather, 
concerns about copyright protection for the broader class of functional artifacts, which includes, but is 
not limited to, buildings, prevented protection for buildings and made conditions ripe for courts to 
implement media discrimination in subject matter. See infra Section II.C. 
12. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5133 
(1990).  
13. For a more detailed definition of the timing requirement for AWCPA protection, see Pub. L. 
No. 101-650, tit. 7, 104 Stat. 5133 § 706 (1990); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION 
OF ARCHITECTURAL WORKS 1 (May 2019).  
14. See infra Section II.D. But cf. infra notes 186–189 and accompanying text (noting that a 
small amount of media discrimination in the subject matter of architectural copyright may persist under 
the AWCPA). 
15. No commentators have focused on pre-AWCPA copyright since the enactment of the 
AWCPA. For commentary on pre-AWCPA copyright before the enactment of the AWCPA, see 
Elizabeth A. Brainard, Innovation and Imitation: Artistic Advance and the Legal Protection of 
Architectural Works, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 81 (1984); James Bingham Bucher, Comment, Reinforcing 
the Foundation: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Works of Architecture, 39 EMORY L.J. 1261 
(1990); Joseph M. Cahn, Comment, The Protection of Architectural Plans as Intellectual Property, 6 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 97 (1973); John F. Gisla, Comment, Copyright Protection for Architectural 
Structures, 2 U.S.F. L. REV. 320 (1968); Theodore Hellmuth, Obsolescence Ab Initio: The New Act and 
Architectural Copyright, 22 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 169 (1975); Arthur S. Katz, Copyright 
Protection of Architectural Plans, Drawings, and Designs, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 224 (1954); 
Brian Edmund Leonard, Comment, Copyright Protection for the Architect: Leaks in a Legal Lean-To, 
8 CAL. W. L. REV. 458 (1972); David E. Shipley, Copyright Protection for Architectural Works, 37 S.C. 
L. REV. 393 (1986); Michael G. Voorhees, Note, Protecting Architectural Plans and Structures with 











commentary has been pre-AWCPA copyright’s lack of a right to construct 
the building depicted in a drawing. This issue is tangential, at best, to the 
building/drawing dichotomy. The drawing side of the building/drawing 
dichotomy arises from pre-AWCPA copyright’s exclusive rights to 
drawing-to-drawing copying; its failure to grant exclusive rights to drawing-
to-building copying is entirely beside the point.16 Second, where prior 
commentary focuses squarely on the weaknesses of pre-AWCPA copyright, 
the building/drawing dichotomy also highlights an overlooked strength. On 
the drawing side of the dichotomy, pre-AWCPA copyright generates media 
discrimination in subject matter because its protection in cases alleging 
drawing-to-drawing copying is expansive enough in scope to encompass the 
very features of building designs that are unprotected when they are fixed 
in buildings.17  
The point of the architecture case study is not simply the descriptive 
enterprise of providing a clearer view of the media discrimination in subject 
matter that exists in pre-AWCPA copyright. The point is also to suggest that 
the building/drawing dichotomy may be good policy for the custom 
architecture that is the mainstay of the architectural profession.18 This 
argument rests on two pillars.  
First, the transactional theory, not the market-buffer theory, provides the 
principal normative ground for copyright in custom architectural design. All 
custom architecture arises out of architect–client transactions. Absent 
copyright, architects would face disclosure dilemmas in these transactions. 
Copyright reduces the severity of architects’ disclosure dilemmas, deterring 
clients from appropriating works without providing compensation to 
architects and, correspondingly, making architects more willing to provide 
needed disclosures.19 In contrast, copyright in custom architecture does not 
 
Design Patents and Copyrights, 17 DRAKE L. REV. 79 (1967); Natalie Wargo, Note, Copyright 
Protection for Architecture and the Berne Convention, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 403 (1990); Erika White, 
Standing on Shaky Ground: Copyright Protection for Works of Architecture, 6 ART & L. 70 (1981).  
16. The absence of an exclusive right to drawing-to-building copying actually reduces the 
starkness of the difference between the drawing and building sides of the dichotomy. The dichotomy 
would be yet more marked if pre-AWCPA copyright were, counterfactually, to grant exclusive rights to 
drawing-to-building copying. See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
17. The prior literature seems to either ignore this expansive scope or take it for granted, perhaps 
on the erroneous assumption that it is a necessary artifact of providing any drawing protection at all. 
However, an alternative, narrower scope of protection that maintains media neutrality in subject matter 
is also feasible. See infra Section II.B (introducing the distinction between rendition expression and 
representational content in architectural drawings).  
18. The normative argument only addresses custom architecture; it does not extend to stock 
architecture. This limitation is reasonable insofar as custom architecture dominates the architectural 
profession. However, the existence of stock design, principally in the market for developer-driven 
single-family homes, complicates the argument for a return to the pre-AWCPA building/drawing 
dichotomy for architecture in general. See infra Section III.E. 
19. Understanding copyright as a tool that is primarily useful for facilitating the architect–client 













generate significant social value under the market-buffer theory.20 Custom 
architects receive client fees on the front end that fund their creative 
production, so whatever free riding exists on the back end does not deprive 
them of significant financial incentives to create.21 
Second, pre-AWCPA copyright sculpts copyright for custom 
architecture to fit the transactional theory because it is an example of a 
consumption-medium/development-medium dichotomy in action.22 It 
protects building designs fixed in the development medium (drawings) but 
not the consumption medium (buildings). Protection for building designs 
fixed in drawings alone generates all of the transactional benefits that full, 
media-neutral protection does (the tie). Custom architectural works are only 
fixed in drawings when architects face disclosure dilemmas. Buildings that 
can be freely copied do not exist until clients are contractually bound to pay 
architects for the full, agreed-upon price of the work, and thus after the 
window for profitable client appropriation has closed. In addition, the 
absence of building protection reduces copyright’s access costs (the win). It 
gives competitor architects a robust, if time-delayed, public domain of 
works that they can use as inputs into the creative process.  
To be clear, the transactional justification for the building/drawing 
dichotomy explored in this Article is not intended to map neatly onto the 
reasoning that the courts offered when they crafted the dichotomy. As a 
historical matter, the exclusion of buildings from protected subject matter 
developed out of concerns under the market-buffer theory about copyright 
protection for functional, utilitarian goods,23 and the expansive drawing 
protection in cases alleging drawing-to-drawing copying then arose as a way 
of limiting that exclusion and bolstering architects’ weak copyrights at the 
 
However, it accurately captures the value that professional architects derive from their copyrights before 
the AWCPA. Pre-AWCPA copyright “primarily helped . . . those architects whose clients have wanted 
to retain the use of plans while switching to a second architect.” Joseph Giovannini, Architectural 
Imitation: Is it Plagiarism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1983, at C6. In fact, it arguably remains the primary 
reason why custom architects use their stronger AWCPA copyrights today. Even though AWCPA 
protection makes it much easier for architects to prevail in infringement suits against parties other than 
their clients than pre-AWCPA protection does, architects doing custom work nonetheless still file the 
vast majority of AWCPA infringement suits against their clients. Kevin Emerson Collins, Copyright and 
Customized Creativity (Sept. 13, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Washington 
University Law Review).  
20. See infra Section III.D.  
21. In addition, protection for drawings provides some incentive through the competition-
restriction mechanism that animates the market-buffer theory: it enforces a first-mover advantage and 
increases the cost of slavish copying. See infra notes 305–309 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra Section III.C.  
23. See infra Section II.C.2. Copyright would encroach upon the proper domain of patent law 
and upset the balance of public and private rights that patent strikes to promote technological innovation 
were it to protect the functional aspects of utilitarian goods. See infra Section II.C.1.  











margin.24 In contrast, from a transactional perspective, the building/drawing 
dichotomy is a means of reducing access costs in situations where copyright 
does not generate significant benefits, and it would be good policy even if 
buildings were not functional articles.25 Nor is the hidden transactional 
wisdom of the dichotomy put forward as a revisionist history that proposes 
to rewrite the courts’ motivations for creating the dichotomy.26 It is merely 
a policy overlay: a new justification that is independent of the functionality-
related reasoning presented in historical cases and commentary and that can 
be layered on top of that reasoning.27  
By zooming in on a particular creative discipline, the custom architecture 
case study adds to the literature on copyright tailoring.28 Creative endeavors 
in different fields have different appropriability mechanisms, business 
models, and cost structures, and they unfold in different professional 
cultures. These differences raise the specter of uniformity costs when a 
single copyright rule applies in all contexts, and they suggest that different 
copyright rules may be optimal for different works, creators, or markets. 
The in-the-weeds perspective on professional architectural practice in this 
Article lends some support to enacting architecture-specific copyright 
 
24. See infra Section II.C.3.a. 
25. See infra notes 332–335 and accompanying text (noting that the transactional template for 
justified media discrimination does not require any consideration of the functionality of the subject 
matter protected). Functionality is relevant to a transactional justification of the building/drawing 
dichotomy in an indirect manner. It helps to explain why architects performing custom work can recoup 
their sunk costs upon the realization of the first building copy in the form of client fees, and it therefore 
contributes to the weak justification for building protection under the market-buffer theory. See Collins, 
supra note 19, at 31–33. 
26. The transactional justification likely had little direct influence on the development of the 
dichotomy in the courts. It is specific to custom architecture, see infra Section III.E, and the cases in 
which the dichotomy arose involved stock architecture. See infra Section II.C.3.a.  
27. At the extreme, the transactional justification of the building/drawing dichotomy might be 
thought of as a serendipitous coincidence—a doctrine developed for one reason that just felicitously 
happens to be good policy for a different reason. However, the truth is likely more complicated. The 
transactional virtues of the building/drawing dichotomy may very well have been what made 
professional architects, who earn their livings largely from custom design, content enough with the status 
quo of pre-AWCPA copyright that they did not fight for copyright reform. See infra notes 302–304 
(noting that the AWCPA was not driven by architects lobbying for stronger rights). That is, the 
transactional rationality of the building/drawing dichotomy may help to explain why the dichotomy 
stuck and became a stable equilibrium, even if it does not explain why the courts initially adopted the 
dichotomy. This reasoning suggests a variant of the efficiency of the common law thesis. See RICHARD 
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 98 (1st ed. 1972). Here, efficiency does not guide judges 
when they craft law. At the limit, the courts could generate law randomly. Once produced, efficient rules 
lead the affected parties to not lobby Congress for change. This thesis only works, of course, if an 
efficient rule does not have clear losers with political power.  
28. See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual 
Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2009); cf. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT 
CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (arguing in favor of judicial tailoring on an 













rules.29 However, whereas tailoring is usually conceived as an alteration to 
copyright’s duration or the reach of its substantial similarity infringement 
standard, tailoring here is accomplished through media discrimination in 
subject matter.30  
The architecture case study also provides an opportunity to zoom out and 
think about tailoring copyright law in other subject matters.31 The hidden 
transactional wisdom of the building/drawing dichotomy applies in 
situations that extend beyond custom architecture. More specifically, a 
three-condition template identifies the situations in which a consumption-
medium/development-medium dichotomy is both viable and, perhaps, 
justified.32 First, the work’s development and consumption media must be 
distinct. Second, copyright must have transactional value: authors must face 
disclosure dilemmas, and copyright must be capable of resolving those 
dilemmas. Third, the cost of protection for the consumption medium must 
outweigh the benefit under the market-buffer theory. Under these 
conditions, media discrimination in subject matter can lead to a well-
 
29. There are two important caveats on this support. First, the administrative costs of tailoring 
need to be considered. See infra note 319. Second, unless the tailoring is to focus on custom architecture 
to the exclusion of stock architecture (which would be quite costly), the full welfare calculus for 
architectural copyright requires consideration of the impact of the building/drawing dichotomy on stock 
works—and single-family home designs in developer-driven subdivisions in particular—in addition to 
custom works. See infra notes 314–320 and accompanying text.  
30. In addition, the architecture case study suggests that the AWCPA may have sacrificed right-
sized protection to achieve international harmonization through Berne compliance. Chris Sprigman 
makes a similar argument concerning the elimination of formalities needed for Berne compliance. 
Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004).  
31. This Article also provides lessons with implications that extend beyond architecture because 
it pushes scholarship on intellectual property as a solution to Arrow’s information paradox forward on 
three fronts. First, information paradoxes exist in more places than scholars have to date looked for them. 
The literature assumes that a contract requiring payment to an author closes the time window during 
which authors face disclosure dilemmas, but custom architects routinely face not only pre-contract 
disclosure dilemmas but post-contract disclosure dilemmas as well. See infra Section III.B.2. Second, 
resolving information paradoxes can sometimes generate an unexpected kind of social value, namely an 
incentive to create. Because the architect–client transaction funds the production of new works, 
copyright generates incentives for creativity by playing the transaction-facilitating role that the 
transactional theory scripts for it, not the competition-restricting role that the market-buffer theory 
scripts for it. See infra note 313 and accompanying text. Third, copyright can be optimized for the 
transactional theory. Whether implicitly or explicitly, the literature usually assesses the merits of using 
intellectual property to resolve Arrow’s information paradox by weighing the costs and benefits of the 
intellectual property rights that exist today and that are shaped by the market-buffer theory. See Burstein, 
supra note 5, at 229–30; Heald, supra note 5, at 475–77; Kitch, supra note 5, at 265; Merges, supra note 
5, at 1479. In contrast, this Article investigates the minimum set of rights needed for copyright to achieve 
transactional benefits. This exploration of tailored copyright highlights the analytical shortcut involved 
in jumping from a lack of need for copyright under the market-buffer theory to a lack of need for any 
copyright and, inversely, from the need for copyright under the transactional theory to a need for full-
fledged copyright. Stephen Yelderman undertakes a similar optimization exercise, but his focus is on 
patent law, and the normative theory for which he considers optimizing rights is more expansive than 
the transactional theory as defined in this Article. Yelderman, supra note 5, at 1598–613.  
32. See infra Section IV.  











engineered copyright regime. It can transform copyright into a disclosure-
resistant form of trade secret protection for self-informing goods that 
resolves pre-commercialization disclosure dilemmas but that places only 
limited restrictions on post-commercialization competition.33  
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I presents the conventional 
wisdom on media neutrality in copyright’s subject matter. It is a bedrock 
principle of the 1976 Act, and it is good policy under copyright’s dominant 
market-buffer theory. The middle two parts focus on the custom architecture 
case study. Part II explores the building/drawing dichotomy of pre-AWCPA 
copyright, highlighting its historical origins in concerns about copyright 
protection for functionality and its media-discriminatory rule of protected 
subject matter. Part III reveals the dichotomy’s hidden transactional 
wisdom. Custom architects face significant disclosure dilemmas in 
transactions with their clients, and copyright can defuse those dilemmas. 
The building/drawing dichotomy tailors architectural copyright to the 
transactional theory, and this tailoring is good policy because protection for 
buildings provides only minimal benefits under the market-buffer theory. 
Part IV presents a three-condition template for generalizing the dichotomy’s 
hidden wisdom. 
I. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON MEDIA NEUTRALITY 
This Part reviews the conventional wisdom on media neutrality in 
copyright’s subject matter. Part I.A distinguishes media neutrality in subject 
matter from media neutrality in rights. Part I.B highlights the importance of 
media neutrality in subject matter when the market-buffer theory provides 
copyright’s justification. 
A. Media Neutrality in Subject Matter and Rights 
Media neutrality is a basic principle of copyright as we know it,34 but an 
ambiguity clouds its significance. The principle can invoke neutrality in 
either subject matter or rights, and these two concepts are often elided.35  
Section 102(a) of the 1976 Act codifies media neutrality in subject 
matter. “Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship 
 
33. See infra notes 337–342 and accompanying text.  
34. Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 105-846, at 62 (1999) (noting that, in enacting copyright laws, “Congress 
has historically . . . regulat[ed] the use of information—not the devices or means by which the 
information is delivered or used by information consumers”). 
35. A second ambiguity in the concept of media neutrality is the distinction between technical 
and functional neutrality. See Carys J. Craig, Technological Neutrality: Recalibrating Copyright in the 
Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 601, 606–15 (2016) (distinguishing “formal 
nondiscrimination” from “functional equivalence”); Brad A. Greenberg, Rethinking Technology 













fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, 
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”36 Two entities 
invoked in § 102—works and their tangible embodiments—are important 
to distinguish. Works of authorship, such as literary works, musical works, 
and audiovisual works, are the intellectual entities that copyright protects. 
Tangible media of expression are the physical materials in which works of 
authorship must be fixed to trigger protection. Books, sheet music, and 
celluloid are all tangible media of expression; fixations of works in these 
media are all copies of the work.37 Media neutrality in subject matter means 
that protection exists when a work—whatever it is—is fixed in any medium. 
For example, a literary work is protected when fixed in ink on paper (a 
book), magnetic charges on a hard drive (an e-book), or, eventually through 
adaptation, light and dark patches in celluloid (a film).  
The mandate for media neutrality in subject matter was not always clear 
before the 1976 Act. For example, the 1909 Copyright Act (the “1909 Act”) 
listed “books” as protected subject matter.38 The legislative history of the 
1976 Act clearly evinces Congress’s intent to reject media discrimination in 
subject matter:  
This broad language [of § 102(a)] is intended to avoid the artificial 
and largely unjustifiable distinctions . . . under which statutory 
copyrightability in certain cases has been made to depend upon the 
 
“behavioral” perspectives on media neutrality). Where technical neutrality treats material instantiations 
of a work identically in all media, functional neutrality ensures that authors’ rights and users’ privileges 
remain consistent in all media. These two concepts of neutrality are not interchangeable. Achieving one 
sometimes requires violating the other. For example, if I find a hard-copy book in a Little Free Library 
by the side of a road, see LITTLE FREE LIBR., https://littlefreelibrary.org/, I can take the book home and 
read it without making a copy. However, I must make copies when I “take” an e-book from an online 
book-exchange website to read it. Technical neutrality views the offline and online scenarios as 
meaningfully different. The former does not create copies and the latter does. If the goal of functional 
neutrality were to grant readers the same privileges to lend books in the online world that they have in 
the offline world, the copies in the online scenario would need to be overlooked. Cf. Disney Enters., Inc. 
v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856–57 (9th Cir. 2017) (adopting technological neutrality for online, 
second-hand markets); Capitol Records, LLC v. Redigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(same). Whatever the normative merits of functional neutrality in some contexts, this Article focuses 
exclusively on technical neutrality. 
36. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018).  
37. Works fixed in tangible media are frequently called “copies.” See infra note 41 and 
accompanying text. While the term “copies” only appears in statutes defining authors’ rights, it is 
commonly used to discuss protected subject matter. For example, the legislative history of the 1976 Act 
refers to “all of the material objects in which copyrightable works are capable of being fixed” as “copies” 
(or “phonorecords,” see infra note 41). H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976). 
38. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 5(a), 35 Stat. 1075, 1076, repealed by Copyright 
Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2541. But cf. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 89 (1899) (adopting an expansive 
definition of “book” that is “not to be understood in its technical sense of a bound volume” but rather as 
“any species of publication which the author selects to embody his literary product”).  











form or medium in which the work is fixed. . . . [I]t makes no 
difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation may be—
whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other 
graphic or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical object 
in written, printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or 
any other stable form, and whether it is capable of perception directly 
or by means of any machine or device “now known or later 
developed.”39 
Media neutrality in rights turns the focus away from the tangible medium 
of the existing copy from which an alleged infringer copies and toward the 
medium that she uses to produce a new copy. Section 106 grants copyright 
owners rights to reproduce and distribute their works.40 More specifically, 
these rights control the reproduction and distribution of “copies,” which are 
“material objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any method now known 
or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, 
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device.”41 This media-neutral definition means that parties who reproduce 
or distribute protected literary works are infringers, regardless of whether 
the copies that they make or sell are photocopies, audiobooks, or notebooks 
filled with hand-written, scribbled text.42 Authors’ reproduction and 
distribution rights are thus media neutral: “The fact that a work in one 
medium has been copied from a work in another medium does not render it 
any less a ‘copy.’”43 
Media neutrality in subject matter and rights are often elided, with rights 
getting most of the attention.44 For example, consider White-Smith Music 
 
39. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52.  
40. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2018). This Article focuses on media neutrality in the reproduction 
and distribution rights. But cf. infra note 43 (discussing neutrality in the display and performance rights). 
Its focus could also easily encompass the derivative work right, 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), but it puts that right 
to one side on the assumption that infringement of the derivative work right is usually also infringement 
of reproduction right. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.09[A][1] 
(2018). 
41. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). Section 106 also includes rights to reproduce and distribute works 
in the form of “phonorecords.” Id. § 106(1), (3). Phonorecords are copies of works when the works are 
fixed as sounds and do not accompany a motion picture or other audiovisual work. Id. § 101. 
Phonorecords, too, are defined in a media-neutral manner. Id. Privileging simplicity over accuracy, this 
Article subsumes phonorecords within copies.  
42. Audiobooks are technically phonorecords rather than copies. See supra note 41.  
43. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 40, § 8.01[B]. The broad principle that copyright owners’ 
rights should not turn on technological niceties of form also extends to the display and performance 
rights. The display right applies to “copies.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(5); id. § 101 (defining “display”). The 
performance right is drafted in an expansive, technologically neutral manner. Id. § 106(4); id. § 101 
(defining “perform” and “publicly”). But see id. § 106(6) (limiting the performance right for sound 
recordings to performances “by means of a digital audio transmission”).  
44. The term “media neutrality” was introduced into contemporary copyright discourse in a 













Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., the preeminent example of media 
discrimination in historical copyright law.45 Holding that pianola rolls were 
not infringing copies of musical compositions, the Court drew a media-
discriminatory line between actionable copies that were, like sheet music, 
“in a form which others can see and read,” and unactionable copies, like 
pianola rolls, that were not readily legible to a human reader because they 
were “parts of a machine which . . . produce musical tones in harmonious 
combination.”46 White-Smith is clearly a case about rights discrimination, 
not subject matter discrimination. It did not hold that pianola rolls were 
unprotected subject matter and that they could therefore be freely copied 
back into sheet music. Yet, the legislative history of the 1976 Act cites 
White-Smith as the case that Congress rejected when enacting the media-
neutral subject matter provision in § 102(a).47  
Both subject matter and rights neutrality frequently arise in discussions 
about the inevitability of technological change and the need to future-proof 
the copyright regime against technological obsolescence.48 The history of 
copyright over the twentieth century reveals a long list of new technologies 
of dissemination as, for example, vinyl records gave way to audiotapes 
(which then gave way to digital formats), and film made room for video. 
Congress could have addressed this technological change by continually 
updating technology-specific provisions, but it instead adopted a media-
neutral approach to rights and subject matter that encompassed yet-to-be-
developed technologies within copyright’s ambit. While this future-
proofing is an important policy concern that motivates media neutrality, the 
more fundamental point that media neutrality also prevents discrimination 
among known media should not be overlooked.  
 
court cases citing Tasini for media neutrality all involve rights, too. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Nat'l 
Geographic Soc'y, 533 F.3d 1244, 1257 (11th Cir. 2008); Faulkner v. Nat'l Geographic Enters., Inc., 409 
F.3d 26, 40 (2d Cir. 2005); Peter Mayer Publishers, Inc. v. Shilovskaya, 11 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427–28 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
45. 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
46. Id. at 17–18. The 1909 Act overruled White-Smith by creating a mechanical license for 
nondramatic musical works that still exists today. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2018); cf. infra note 60 (discussing 
media discrimination in copyright’s limitations and exceptions). 
47. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52–53 (1976); cf. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 40, 
§ 2.03[B][1] (stating that the language of § 102(a) means that White-Smith “at long last reaches its 
deserved burial”). 
48. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (2001); I. Trotter Hardy, Copyright and “New-Use” Technologies, 23 NOVA L. 
REV. 659 (1999); Deborah Tussey, Technology Matters: The Courts, Media Neutrality, and New 
Technologies, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 427 (2005).  











B. Media Neutrality and the Market-Buffer Theory 
Both subject-matter and rights neutrality have policy underpinnings that 
rest on copyright’s dominant market-buffer theory. However, those 
underpinnings are not as equally foundational. There are good reasons to 
depart from rights neutrality under limited circumstances, but the virtues of 
subject-matter neutrality have never been questioned.49  
Copyright generates a social benefit under the market-buffer theory by 
creating a buffer for authors from market competition as a means to the end 
of alleviating a public goods problem.50 Creating a work of authorship often 
requires time and money. That is, creation entails “creativity costs.” Absent 
copyright, authors cannot recoup their creativity costs by selling multiple 
copies of their works as commodities in a market. Works are non-
excludable, so competitors can become free riders by reproducing the copies 
that the authors have marketed. Without any creativity costs to recoup, 
competitors can drive the price for copies down to the marginal cost of 
production. Foreseeing the difficulty of recouping their creativity costs if 
they must compete with free-riding competitors, potential authors may 
choose not to become actual authors.51 By making works excludable as a 
legal matter, copyright enables authors to tamp down on free riding, restrict 
competition, and charge supracompetitive prices in the market for copies. 
Copyright thus augments incentives to create by giving authors a buffer 
from market competition and a reasonable expectation that they can recoup 
their creativity costs.52  
Of course, stronger copyright is not always better under the market-
buffer theory. The flip side of the copyright incentives that restrictions on 
competition generate is increased access costs. Copyright raises the price of 
 
49. The one historical exception to media neutrality in copyright’s subject matter did not arise 
because media discrimination was viewed as affirmatively good policy on its own. Rather, the exception 
arose as a limit on the reach of the exclusion of three-dimensional, utilitarian articles from copyright 
protection. See infra Section II.C.  
50. See supra note 3 (citing sources). The following two paragraphs recount the well-rehearsed 
explanation of market-buffer theory. 
51. This decision not to author works is the public goods problem that copyright seeks to solve. 
Although it often has a pejorative connotation, free riding is only a social problem when it leads to 
suboptimal incentives to create. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005).  
52. This Article considers any theory under which copyright overcomes a public goods problem 
as a market-buffer theory. Most commonly, as described in the text, the public good is the information 
that constitutes a new work of authorship. However, the public good may also be the information needed 
to transform an existing work of authorship into a commercially viable copy, meaning that certain 
strands of commercialization theory fall under the umbrella of the market-buffer theory as defined here. 
Burstein, supra note 5, at 237–41; cf. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for 
Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 138 (2004) (noting that some theories of intellectual 
property that locate social benefits in behavior occurring after a work has been developed still position 













the copies of works that consumers desire and leaves some consumers out 
of the market altogether.53 In addition, copyright taxes future creativity as 
second-generation creators face more financial and legal obstacles to use 
existing works as inputs.54 Thus, the incentives/access tradeoff provides the 
normative framework for justifying copyright under the market-buffer 
theory: copyright makes sense when the benefits of its incentives outweigh 
the costs of its restrictions on access.55  
Given copyright’s access costs, copyright scope should clearly be limited 
under the market-buffer theory. Not all subject matter should be protected, 
and not all copying of protected subject matter should violate copyright 
owners’ rights. The case against media discrimination lies in the effects of 
using it to limit copyright’s reach. The limits on contemporary copyright 
sculpt copyright’s reach to fit the market-buffer theory. In contrast, media 
discrimination in rights rarely accomplishes this goal, and media 
discrimination in subject matter never accomplishes it.  
Initially, consider rights. Copyrights are today infringed only when a 
defendant reproduces or distributes a copy of a work that is substantially 
similar to the copyrighted work.56 The substantial similarity analysis creates 
a direct correlation between the likelihood of infringement liability and the 
extent to which a defendant free rides on the copyrighted work.57 The more 
heavily the defendant leans on the copyrighted work, the more convincingly 
the defendant’s commercial success can be attributed to the copyright 
owner’s work, and the greater the need for the defendant to be liable under 
the market-buffer theory to avoid a public goods problem.58  
In contrast, consider an infringement analysis that turns on the nature of 
the medium of the copy that the defendant produces or sells. In most 
situations, such an infringement analysis would not make any sense under 
 
53. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at 66–70; Balganesh, supra note 3, at 1578; Lemley, supra 
note 3, at 996–97; Lunney, supra note 3, at 497–98. 
54. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 132 (2004); LANDES & POSNER, 
supra note 3, at 66–70; Balganesh, supra note 3, at 1578; Lemley, supra note 3, at 997–1000; Lunney, 
supra note 3, at 495–97. 
55. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at 20–21. Copyright’s administrative costs also need to be 
considered. Id. at 18–19. 
56. See generally Kevin J. Hickey, Reframing Similarity Analysis in Copyright, 93 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 681 (2016) (reviewing the uncertainties in copyright’s substantial similarity analysis). Copyright 
infringement also requires a showing of copying-in-fact. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 40, § 8.01. 
57. The layperson serves as the arbiter of substantial similarity in order to bring concerns about 
market substitution into the infringement analysis. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 472–73 (2d Cir. 
1946). 
58. There are, of course, provisions in copyright’s limitations and exceptions that weaken this 
correlation when society wants to promote a particular defendant’s use. For example, the fair use defense 
requires consideration of “the purpose and character of the use.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2018); cf. infra 
note 60 (discussing media discrimination in copyright’s limitations and exceptions). 











the market-buffer theory. First, assume that copies in different media are 
substitutes for consumers. Here, media discrimination in rights vitiates 
incentives altogether. If a consumer is indifferent between paper-book and 
e-book copies of a work, and if paper copies, but not electronic copies, 
infringe, why would anyone ever make or distribute paper copies and opt 
into the copyright tax that provides authors with incentives? Second, assume 
that the copies in different media are not substitutes for consumers. Here, 
media discrimination in rights does not vitiate incentives altogether. If some 
consumers want paper books and other consumers want e-books, the author 
can still charge supracompetitive prices for paper books even though 
making and selling e-books does not infringe. However, without an 
additional explanation of why a copyright owner should not profit from the 
sale of e-books, the infringement is limited by a formalistic line. Why ignore 
a segment of the demand for a work and deprive authors of rewards that are 
proportional to its social value?59  
However, the “without an additional explanation” implies that some 
media discrimination in rights is good policy, at least provided that copies 
fixed in different media are not substitutes for consumers. Targeted media 
discrimination in rights can eliminate rights that generate small incentives 
or large access costs. Rights neutrality is thus not an absolute rule but rather 
a default rule that can be modified with good cause. Deviations from media 
neutrality in rights exist throughout the limitations and exceptions to 
authors’ rights codified in the 1976 Act,60 and copyright scholars sometimes 
propose targeted rules of media discrimination in rights to further specific 
policy goals.61  
 
59. Tussey, supra note 48, at 428, 432. Under the market-buffer theory, an author’s profits should 
be proportional to the commercial value of the work. The proportionality results in stronger incentives 
to create works that generate more social value, at least when value is measured by willingness to pay. 
See Lunney, supra note 3, at 490. 
60. While § 106 of the 1976 Act specifies rights in a largely media-neutral manner, §§ 107–122 
codify a host of limitations and exceptions on those rights. Many of these limitations and exceptions 
violate media neutrality in rights to achieve policy goals. Libraries have use privileges that are specific 
to digital copies. 17 U.S.C. § 108(c)(2) (2018). The owners of copies of computer programs have lending 
privileges that are specific to computer programs “embodied in a machine or product and which cannot 
be copied during the ordinary operation or use of the machine or product.” Id. § 109(b)(1)(B)(i). The 
owners of copyrights in useful articles have only limited rights to control the reproduction of their works 
in “pictures or photographs.” Id. § 113(c). 
61. See, e.g., supra note 35 (considering the need to reject technical media neutrality in order to 
achieve functional media neutrality). Shyamkrishna Balganesh argues that unforeseeable copies do not 
motivate authors to generate works and that discriminating against unforeseeable copies in copyright’s 
exclusive rights would therefore reduce copyright’s access costs without reducing its incentive benefits. 
Balganesh, supra note 3, at 1574–75. Balganesh’s proposal highlights that media discrimination in rights 
only makes sense when copies in different media are not substitutes for consumers. The proffered 
definition of an unforeseeable copy requires unforseeability in both medium and use. Id. at 1604–09. 
The unforseeability of the medium alone is not enough because copies involving unforeseeable media 
and foreseeable uses are likely to be market substitutes for copies that are foreseeable in both medium 













Now, consider subject matter. Again, the contemporary doctrine for 
determining the reach of protected subject matter sculpts copyright 
protection to fit the market-buffer theory. For example, consider copyright’s 
well-known idea/expression dichotomy that caps the level of generality at 
which a work can be protected by treating generalities as unprotected ideas 
and more specific ways of stating those generalities as protected 
expression.62 The idea/expression dichotomy is a reasonable way to curtail 
protected subject matter under the market-buffer theory because it denies 
protection to the subject matter that, if protected, would be more likely to 
generate larger dynamic costs. The generalities in today’s works are more 
important source material for tomorrow’s authors than the particularities 
are. The more essential the copied aspects of the work are to next-generation 
creators, the more costly copyright’s restraint on next-generation authors, 
and the less likely those aspects are to be protected.63  
In contrast, consider the consequences of making protectable subject 
matter turn on the medium in which a work is fixed and thus making 
infringement contingent on the medium from which an alleged infringer 
copies. Here, media discrimination almost always vitiates copyright 
incentives in much the same way that media discrimination in rights does if 
copies in different media are substitutes. Free riders can copy from the 
unprotected medium and generate new copies in any medium, meaning that 
even robust copyright in the protected medium cannot resolve any public 
goods problem that exists.64 Media neutrality in subject matter is a 
foundational principle under the market-buffer theory of copyright. The 
constrained leeway that exists for policy-sensitive media discrimination is 
yet further curtailed when the focus shifts from rights to subject matter. As 
the following Part illustrates, the only situation in which courts have ever 
embraced media discrimination in subject matter involves what they 
 
neutrality in rights and subject matter. While he argues that unforeseeable copies should be noninfringing 
(media discrimination in rights), he appears to presume that unforeseeable copies should still be 
protected and that copying from unforeseeable copies could constitute infringement (media neutrality in 
subject matter).  
62. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). The legal dichotomy 
draws a line on a continuous spectrum from the specific to the general; it does not mark a dichotomous 
fact in the world. Id. The precise point at which specific, protected expression transitions into general, 
unprotected ideas is difficult to identify with certainty in advance. Id.  
63. Lunney, supra note 3, at 517–25.  
64. The privilege to copy from the unprotected medium only leads to a public goods problem 
when two conditions are satisfied. First, the cost of copying from the unprotected medium must not be 
significantly greater than the cost of copying from the protected medium. Cf. infra notes 308–309 and 
accompanying text (discussing the high cost of producing slavish copies by copying a building). Second, 
the public must have access to a copy in the unprotected medium. Cf. infra notes 283–285 and 
accompanying text (discussing the economic effect of protection for drawings but not buildings before 
buildings have been constructed).  











perceived to be something approximating a Hobbson’s choice—a choice 
between a media-neutral rule of subject matter that grants almost no 
protection at all or a media-discriminatory rule that at least allowed authors 
to protect works fixed in particular media. 
II. THE BUILDING/DRAWING DICHOTOMY 
This Part examines a rare example of subject-matter discrimination in 
copyright law: the building/drawing dichotomy of pre-AWCPA copyright. 
Section II.A lays out the dichotomy as a legal rule, contextualizes it within 
pre-AWCPA copyright more broadly, and identifies the media 
discrimination in subject matter that it enforces. Section II.B highlights the 
media discrimination in subject matter that the building/drawing dichotomy 
creates by identifying a counterfactual, media-neutral rule that pre-AWCPA 
copyright could alternatively employ to provide protection to drawings but 
not buildings. Section II.C explores the dichotomy’s common law origin in 
Baker v. Selden and its scattered, and perhaps partial, statutory codification. 
Section II.D briefly discusses the dichotomy’s likely demise for works 
protected by the AWCPA.  
A. The Doctrine 
The building/drawing dichotomy refers to the protection that pre-
AWCPA copyright grants to a particular type of copyrightable subject 
matter, namely building designs.65 Broadly speaking, building designs can 
be fixed in either one of two media. They can be fixed in the steel, concrete, 
glass, and wood that are the components of constructed, habitable buildings. 
For convenience, this tangible medium of expression is called a building. 
Building designs can also be fixed in drawings. As used here, drawings 
encompass all two-dimensional representations of building designs. 
Electronic CAD files, computer printouts, blueprints of construction 
documents, and napkin sketches are all drawings.66 
The two-by-two matrix in Figure 1 illustrates that the distinction between 
buildings and drawings is critical in pre-AWCPA copyright. The two rows 
identify buildings and drawings as the possible media of the copies of a 
 
65. Under the AWCPA, a building design is the design of a structure intended for human 
occupancy. Cf. 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(b)(2) (1997) (defining a building). This Article carries the same 
definition back into pre-AWCPA copyright.  
66. The building/drawing dichotomy leaves out a third medium in which designs can be fixed, 
namely three-dimensional models, whether virtual or physical. There is no case law on point, but pre-
AWCPA copyright likely protects scale models in the same way that it protects drawings. See 37 C.F.R. 
§ 202.12(b) (1959) (identifying engineers’ scale models as protected under § 5(i) of the 1909 Act); 













building design from which an alleged infringer could appropriate to make 
a reproduction. The two columns identify buildings and drawings as the 
possible media of the copies that an alleged infringer can produce when she 
reproduces a building design.  
FIGURE 1. ARE (MOST) FEATURES OF BUILDING DESIGNS PROTECTED 
UNDER PRE-AWCPA COPYRIGHT? 
 Copying to Building Copying to Drawing 
Copying from Building 
(2) No  (1) No 
 Copying from Drawing 
(3) No (4) Yes 
 
The top row establishes that buildings (or, at least, most features of most 
buildings) are not protected subject matter.67 Pre-AWCPA copyright 
provides protection against neither building-to-drawing copying (Box 1) 
nor building-to-building copying (Box 2).68 The absence of building 
protection means that “an individual may take photographs or draw sketches 
of [a structure] and, coupled with innate ability, seek to reproduce that 
structure” without concerns about copyright infringement.69 In other words, 
an architect who makes “measured drawings” of a building and reverse 
engineers the building into an elevation or plan does not infringe, even if 
she then proceeds to use the plans to construct an identical building.70  
The bottom row captures the partial nature of pre-AWCPA drawing 
protection for building designs. Architects do not have exclusive rights to 
drawing-to-building copying (Box 3).71 That is, the owners of copyrights in 
 
67. Under the 1976 Act, the useful articles doctrine permits building protection for, first, add-on 
embellishments, such as gargoyles, and, second, monumental, nonfunctional structures, such as the 
Statue of Liberty. See infra notes 108–116 and accompanying text.  
68. Box 2 has little economic import. Only the most rudimentary of building designs can be 
copied directly from one building to another without the creation of drawings as an intermediate step.  
69. Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also DeSilva Constr. 
Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184, 197–98 (M.D. Fla. 1962) (“[E]ven the plaintiff concedes that the 
model house was not protected by any copyright; consequently the defendants could imitate or reproduce 
said model house without incurring any liability for so doing.”). 
70. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS: COPYRIGHT IN 
WORKS OF ARCHITECTURE app. C, page 4 of the Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn letter on behalf 
of the American Institute of Architects (1989) [hereinafter 1989 COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT]. But see 
Katz, supra note 15, at 245 (suggesting that building-to-drawing copying constitutes infringement under 
pre-AWCPA copyright). 
71. Some courts applying pre-AWCPA copyright reject the notion that constructing a building 
involves making a copy of a building design fixed in a plan. See Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 











architectural drawings do not have an exclusive right to construct the 
building depicted in plans72—a right which is sometimes called an 
“execution right.”73 However, they do have exclusive rights to drawing-to-
drawing copying (Box 4).74 Tracing plans on vellum, sending them through 
blueprint machines, and making derivative works based on the building 
designs they embody can amount to infringement. 
The building/drawing dichotomy arises from the juxtaposition of the two 
rows in Figure 1. The features of a building design are protected subject 
 
F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972) (“The exclusive right to copy what is copyrighted belongs to the architect, 
even though the plans give him no unique claim on any feature of the structure they detail.”). This 
rejection was influenced by courts’ concern that, if a building were a copy of the building design in a 
drawing, constructing a building could constitute publication of a work that terminated common law 
copyright and invalidated statutory copyright if notice formalities were not satisfied. See NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 40, § 2A.09[A][1][a] n.66 (opining that the “assumption . . . that a structure is a 
‘copy’ of its underlying plans[ ]leads to the fanciful conclusion that copyright notice strictures . . . apply 
to buildings”); cf. infra note 117 (discussing publication and common law copyright). This Article 
accepts that constructing a building from plans creates a copy of a building design, but this acceptance 
is not intended to imply that the construction of a building constitutes a publication under common law 
copyright. 
72. Pre-AWCPA copyright likely does grant exclusive rights to drawing-to-building copying for 
the add-on embellishments and monumental structures that are protected subject matter under the useful 
articles doctrine when they are fixed in constructed buildings. Cf. infra notes 108–116 and 
accompanying text (noting that the useful articles doctrine permits protection for add-on embellishments 
when fixed in buildings). There is no architectural case law directly on point. In cases addressing 
drawings of non-architectural useful articles, courts frequently ask whether the useful articles have 
protected features and recognize the absence of an exclusive right to drawing-to-useful-article copying 
only when they do not. See, e.g., Gusler v. Fischer, 580 F. Supp. 2d 309, 314–16 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Eliya, 
Inc. v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, No. 06 Civ. 195(GEL), 2006 WL 2645196, at *8–12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 
2006). Courts also, of course, recognize exclusive rights to drawing-to-article reproduction for articles 
without any unprotected functional features. Winfield Collection, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 147 F. 
App’x 547 (6th Cir. 2005) (crashing witch Halloween decoration); Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. 
Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934) (dolls made from Betty Boop cartoons); King Features 
Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924) (toys made based on the cartoon characters Barney 
Google and Spark Plug).  
73. DeSilva Constr. Corp., 213 F. Supp. at 198 (stating that architects lack rights that parallel the 
“performance or execution rights granted to authors of musical compositions and dramatic works”). The 
term “execution right” may have originated with the statutory explanation for the absence of an exclusive 
right to drawing-to-building copying under the 1909 Act. See infra note 132. 
74. There is some controversy concerning the public’s right to engage in drawing-to-building 
copying under pre-AWCPA copyright when the drawings at issue are unauthorized, infringing copies. 
See Herman Frankel Org. v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (“A person should . . . 
be able to prevent another from copying copyrighted houseplans and using them to build [a] house.” 
(emphasis added)); Demetriades, 680 F. Supp. at 664–66 (enjoining defendants from “relying on any 
infringing copies of . . . plans” in the construction of a house yet refusing to enjoin the continuing 
construction based solely on alleged infringement of copyrighted plans). Cases involving non-
architectural useful articles suggest that the construction of useful articles from an infringing copy of a 
drawing does not provide an independent hook for liability. Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational 
Vehicles, LLC, 753 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758–60 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (citing additional cases). On a related 
note, some pre-AWCPA copyright cases allow lost profits for drawing-to-drawing copying to consider 
the number of buildings built using the infringing drawings. See Robert R. Jones Assocs., Inc. v. Nino 
Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 280 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that “where someone makes infringing copies of 
another’s copyrighted architectural plans, the damages recoverable by the copyright owner include the 













matter when they are fixed in drawings—there can be liability when the 
copier engages in drawing-to-drawing copying—but those same features are 
not protected subject matter when they are fixed in buildings.  
The building/drawing dichotomy can perhaps most readily be grasped by 
examining the holding in Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont.75 The 
defendants, the Lamonts, had a home built for themselves. The copyright 
owner, Imperial Homes, alleged that the Lamonts had copied the design of 
its Chateau home from schematic plans in an Imperial Homes advertising 
brochure. The district court held that Imperial had abandoned its copyright 
in the plans by publishing the plans in the brochure without proper notice, 
but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and upheld the 
validity of Imperial Homes’ copyright.76 The Fifth Circuit remanded to the 
district court to resolve a factual question: Had the Lamonts actually copied 
the Chateau home plan from the brochure? If they had engaged in such 
drawing-to-drawing copying (Box 4), they could be liable.77 However, the 
Lamonts had also “visited and measured” a model Chateau home that 
Imperial had built to aid its sales.78 If they had engaged in this building-to-
drawing(-to-building) copying (Box 1), they were not liable. Liability does 
not depend on which features of the house design were reproduced, as is 
frequently the case when courts employ the originality requirement or the 
levels-of-abstraction test that structures copyright’s famous idea/expression 
dichotomy to limit copyright’s reach.79 Rather, liability turns on the medium 
of the copy of the copyrighted work from which the Lamonts made their 
reproduction. Features of a building design are protected in one medium 
(drawings), but not in another (buildings). To reach this conclusion, 
Imperial Homes assumes drawing protection to be expansive enough to 
encompass the features of house design that are not protected when they are 
fixed in the model home. That is, Imperial Homes presumes media 
discrimination in subject matter. 
For readers who are familiar with prior commentary on pre-AWCPA 
copyright, it is perhaps helpful to note one way in which focusing on the 
building/drawing dichotomy shifts the conventional analysis: it reduces the 
importance of the absence of an exclusive right to drawing-to-building 
copying in Box 3. The common approach to analyzing pre-AWCPA 
copyright has been to focus on the media discrimination in rights created by 
 
75. 458 F.2d 895. 
76. Id. at 898–900. 
77. Id. at 899. 
78. Id. at 897. 
79. Under the idea/expression dichotomy, a feature is protected if it is expression (a specific 
feature) but not if it is an idea (a general feature). See infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text 
(discussing the levels of abstraction test for distinguishing expression from ideas). 











the contrast between the two boxes of the bottom row: given a building 
design fixed in a drawing, pre-AWCPA copyright protects against 
reproduction into a new drawing-copy (Box 4) but not against reproduction 
into a new building-copy (Box 3).80 In contrast, the building/drawing 
dichotomy highlights the difference between the two rows. A building 
design is not protected when it is fixed in a building (Boxes 1 and 2), but it 
is protected, and authors have some exclusive rights against copying, when 
it is fixed in a drawing (Box 4).81 This comparison of the rows means that 
the absence of an exclusive right to construct the building depicted in 
drawings under pre-AWCPA copyright is not part of the law that forms the 
building/drawing dichotomy. Because there is protection in Box 4, the 
dichotomy exists regardless of whether there is protection in Box 3.82  
B. A Counterfactual, Media-Neutral Alternative for Drawings 
When referring to the building/drawing dichotomy in pre-AWCPA 
copyright, opinions and commentary use general language such as: “while 
it may be a violation of copyright law to copy architectural plans and 
drawings [into new drawings] . . . there is no prohibition against copying 
architectural structures.”83 This statement is a correct statement of the law 
of pre-AWCPA copyright, but it does not get to the core of the matter on 
the drawing side of the dichotomy. Pre-AWCPA copyright could 
counterfactually provide protection to drawings but not buildings with a 
narrower, media-neutral rule of subject matter that denies protection to 
 
80. See supra note 15 (citing commentary on pre-AWCPA copyright). In one way, the 
dominance of this approach is understandable. It tracks the use/explanation distinction in authors’ rights 
articulated in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), and thus the historical path along which pre-AWCPA 
copyright developed. See infra Section II.C.3.a. In another way, however, this intense focus on the 
absence of an exclusive right to drawing-to-building copying is odd. This exclusive right is rarely 
important as a practical matter. Most defendants who use an architect’s plans to construct a building 
must engage in drawing-to-drawing copying in the course of doing so, providing a hook for liability. See 
infra notes 289–290 and accompanying text.  
81.  In other words, the analysis here shifts the conceptual framework from media discrimination 
in authors’ rights to media discrimination in subject matter. See supra Section I.A.  
82.  Altering pre-AWCPA copyright to grant an exclusive right to drawing-to-building copying 
would only further accentuate the media discrimination in subject matter that currently generates the 
building/drawing dichotomy. The difference between the rows would be yet starker. Cf. infra notes 290–
291 (arguing that granting an exclusive right to drawing-to-building copying in Box 3 is a viable 
proposal under the transactional justification of the building/drawing dichotomy).  
83. Richmond Homes Mgmt., Inc. v. Raintree, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1517, 1524 (W.D. Va. 1994), 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 66 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 1995); see also, e.g., Fotomat Corp. v. Photo Drive-
Thru, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 693, 707 n.14 (D.N.J. 1977) (“[T]he law of copyright makes a sharp distinction 
between the need for protecting plans and drawings of buildings . . . and the absence of such protection 
for structures derived from those plans.”); NEIL BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW 77 (1981); PAUL 














building designs in all media. That is, it could protect only drawing-specific 
expression in drawings. 
To grasp this media-neutral alternative, it is essential to recognize that 
all representational drawings contain two different types of features. First, 
some features are representational content because they depict what the 
drawing represents.84 For example, the features of a drawing illustrating the 
cut of a dress, the shape of the back of a chair, or the depth of a balcony are 
all representational content. Second, other features are rendition expression 
because they are wound up with how an object is depicted.85 The line 
weights in a drawing of a dress pattern, the hatching patterns used for 
shading in a rendering of a chair, the perspective from which an object is 
depicted, and the location of explanatory texts on architectural plans are all 
examples of rendition expression.  
Representational content and rendition expression are different in a 
fundamental way. The features that constitute representational content are 
present in both a drawing of the article and the article itself; the features that 
constitute rendition expression are drawing-specific in that they are present 
only in the drawing and not in any real-world copy of the article. The curves 
that constitute the cut of a dress or the back of a chair are present in both a 
drawing of the articles and the articles themselves, but there are no line 
weights, hatching patterns, or perspectival points of view in the articles 
themselves. The word “Living Room” may appear in a particular spot and 
font on a plan of a single-family home. It may be a protected feature in the 
drawing (albeit one that receives only thin protection). This feature does not 
exist in the building that the drawing represents. There is never a giant word 
embroidered on a rug or stained into the building’s floor. 
The building-drawing dichotomy and media discrimination exist only 
because drawing protection in cases alleging drawing-to-drawing copying 
(Box 4 of Figure 1) is expansive enough to encompass not only rendition 
expression but representational content, as well. Drawing protection that 
only encompasses rendition expression offers an alternative to the 
building/drawing dichotomy that provides some protection to drawings 
while remaining media-neutral with respect to protected subject matter. 
Under this alternative, the features of building designs are never protected, 
 
84. In Peircean semiotics, signs have representational content when interpreters understand them 
to refer or point to an “object” outside of the sign. See DANIEL CHANDLER, SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS 29–
31 (2002). Representational drawings are iconic signs in which the relationship between the sign’s 
visually perceptible form and its content is not arbitrary but is instead based on physical resemblance of 
some kind. Id. at 36–37.  
85. Cf. Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (defining 
“rendition” expression in a photograph as “not what is depicted, but rather how it is depicted”). 











regardless of whether they are fixed in drawings or buildings.86 What cannot 
be copied from drawings is only rendition expression, and rendition 
expression does not exist in buildings. 
Recognizing the existence of a media-neutral alternative to the 
building/drawing dichotomy that protects drawings but not buildings leads 
to a novel question: Do the cases applying pre-AWCPA copyright really 
enforce the building/drawing dichotomy or do they employ the media-
neutral alternative? Pre-AWCPA copyright cases do not expressly state one 
rule or the other. They use generic language that does not provide enough 
detail to reach a conclusion.87 However, evidence that pre-AWPCA 
copyright employs the building/drawing dichotomy does exist in the 
holdings of pre-AWCPA copyright cases. Courts have found liability in 
three fact patterns that strongly suggest media discrimination in protected 
subject matter. 
First, some pre-AWCPA cases, such as Imperial Homes, make liability 
turn on whether the defendant copies from buildings or drawings.88 This 
holding only makes sense if copyright protects representational content in 
drawings. Otherwise, the same expression could not be copied from either 
medium.  
Second, some pre-AWCPA cases mention unprotected building features 
when explaining why the copyrighted and allegedly infringing drawings are, 
or are not, substantially similar. For example, one case discusses “a long 
front porch, no double-gabled roof, and a significantly different 
arrangement of front windows” when assessing substantial similarity.89 If 
drawing protection did not extend to representational content, then this 
comparison would be irrelevant.  
Third, some pre-AWCPA cases find liability based on the copying of the 
copyright owner’s highly schematic drawings of house designs, often 
published in advertising brochures.90 Such highly schematic plans contain 
little rendition expression; they use simple graphics to convey the 
configuration of the rooms within the house. Furthermore, the defendants in 
these cases used the schematic plans to create derivative works in the form 
 
86. Technically, drawing protection remains media neutral if it extends to both rendition 
expression and representations of the non-functional features of designs that are protected when 
embodied in three-dimensional objects under the useful articles doctrine. See infra notes 108–116 and 
accompanying text (noting that the useful articles doctrine permits protection for monumental structures 
and add-on embellishments when they are fixed in buildings). 
87. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
88. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text (discussing Imperial Homes). 
89. Richmond Homes Mgmt., Inc. v. Raintree, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1517, 1527 (W.D. Va. 1994), 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 66 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 1995). 
90. See Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 896 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding liability 
based on copying a plan “in a sales promotion brochure”); Herman Frankel Org. v. Tegman, 367 F. 













of detailed working drawings,91 meaning that whatever rendition expression 
does exist in schematic plans is unlikely to have been copied.92 In contrast, 
when copyright owners allege that defendants copy working drawings, 
rendition expression may well be at least part of what is copied.93 
C. Common Law Origin and Statutory Codification 
The historical origins of the building/drawing dichotomy of pre-
AWCPA copyright are deeply enmeshed with policy concerns about 
copyright reaching too far by protecting functional artifacts and thereby 
encroaching into patent law’s proper domain. Section II.C.1 presents these 
concerns. However, the concerns play out differently on each side of the 
dichotomy. As discussed in Section II.C.2, the building side responds to 
those concerns directly: denying building protection prevents copyright 
from extending to the functional features of a useful article. Section II.C.3 
turns to the more complicated drawing side of the dichotomy that pushes 
back against those concerns, at least in cases involving drawing-to-drawing 
copying.94 The expansive drawing protection in pre-AWCPA copyright for 
not only rendition expression but also representational content actually 
expands the control over the functional features of a building design that 
copyright grants to architects. The latter two sections also discuss the 
statutory basis for each side of the building/drawing dichotomy.95  
 
91. Imperial Homes, 458 F.2d at 897; Tegman, 367 F. Supp. at 1052.  
92. In contrast, if the alleged copying involves photocopying or scanning plans for use in 
comparative advertising, the defendant likely does copy whatever minimal amount of rendition 
expression is present in schematic plans. See Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 
753 F. Supp. 2d 753, 760–66 (N.D. Ind. 2010). 
93. See Herman Frankel Org. v. Wolfe, No. 4-70132, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5994, at *4–5 (E.D. 
Mich. Nov. 1, 1974) (noting that “defendant . . . copied between 70% and 80%” of “plaintiff’s 
copyrighted architectural working floor plans and elevations”). 
94.  In cases alleging drawing-to-building copying, pre-AWCPA copyright again responds 
directly to those concerns by refusing to grant architects exclusive rights. See infra notes 132–135 and 
accompanying text. However, the absence of exclusive rights to drawing-to-building copying is not a 
part of pre-AWCPA copyright that contributes to the building/drawing dichotomy. See supra notes 80–
82 and accompanying text. 
95.  Technically, a discussion of the origins and statutory bases of the building/drawing 
dichotomy in pre-AWCPA copyright is a bit of a detour from this Article’s thesis. The dichotomy’s 
hidden transactional wisdom is intended as a policy overlay that is unrelated to the dichotomy’s actual 
history. See supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text. The line of precedent from which the dichotomy 
evolved and its eventual statutory codification are largely irrelevant to the fact that the dichotomy tailors 
copyright to a transactional justification. Nonetheless, this Section offers a close look at the 
building/drawing dichotomy in pre-AWCPA copyright on the terms established by the opinions and 
statutes from which it arises. This close look reveals that the dichotomy’s basis in case law is more 
contested, and its statutory grounding is more tenuous, than prior commentary has recognized. 











1. Copyright and Functionality 
As the Supreme Court explained over a century ago in Baker v. Selden, 
copyright protection for functionality involves a category mismatch.96 
Selden, the plaintiff, wrote and copyrighted a book with a textual 
explanation of a supposedly novel method of bookkeeping and examples of 
forms that could be used to perform the method. He alleged that Baker 
infringed his copyright by publishing a book with text that described a 
similar method and forms that could be used to structure the entry of data 
when performing the method. The Court held that whatever copyright 
Selden had in his book and forms did not grant him exclusive rights to 
practice the functional bookkeeping method.97 Patent law, with its robust 
validity requirements and short duration, is supposed to set the terms on 
which the inventor of a functional method or artifact can obtain exclusive 
rights. If the laxer validity requirements of copyright law were all that 
needed to be satisfied to obtain copyright’s longer protection, inventors 
could use copyright as an end-run around the patent regime’s limitations 
that safeguard the public domain. “To give to the author of [a] book an 
exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examination of its 
novelty has ever officially been made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon 
the public. That is the province of letters-patent . . . .”98  
Baker clearly establishes that copyright should not allow authors to 
control functional articles, but the doctrinal means that Baker employs to 
achieve this end are open to debate. Baker is most frequently understood to 
limit the reach of the subject matter that copyright protects.99 This subject-
matter interpretation resonates with the various “functionality screens” that 
copyright employs to keep functional subject matter out of the subject 
matter that copyright protects.100 Alternatively, a more controversial 
interpretation views Baker as accepting functional works as copyrightable 
subject matter and limiting the exclusive rights that authors have with 
respect to that subject matter. This rights-centered interpretation gives rise 
 
96. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).  
97. Id. at 101–05.  
98. Id. at 102.  
99. Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between 
Authorship and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 159, 181–92 (Jane C. Ginsburg & 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006); Pamela Samuelson, Frontiers of Intellectual Property: Why 
Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 
1928–36 (2007) [hereinafter Samuelson, Frontiers].  
100. For discussions of functionality screens in copyright law and intellectual property more 
broadly, see Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Functionality Screens, 103 VA. L. REV. 1293 
(2017); Mark P. McKenna & Christopher Jon Sprigman, What’s in, and What’s out: How IP’s Boundary 













to what is commonly called the use/explanation distinction in copyright 
owners’ rights.101 
These two interpretations of Baker lie at the doctrinal foundations of two 
different aspects of pre-AWCPA copyright. As discussed in Section II.B.2, 
the subject-matter interpretation leads directly to the absence of building 
protection. As discussed in Section II.B.3, the rights-centered interpretation 
played a critical, although contested, role in establishing the scope of 
drawing protection.102 
2. The Absence of Building Protection 
The reason for the absence of building protection under pre-AWCPA 
copyright follows directly from the subject-matter interpretation of Baker. 
Buildings are utilitarian objects: they resist gravity, provide shelter from the 
elements, and enable a range of human activities within their spatial 
confines.103 Their functionality makes them akin to other functional objects 
such as furniture, clothing, and shovels. Protection for the functional 
features of a building would make copyright encroach into patent’s proper 
domain. Pre-AWCPA copyright therefore used a functionality screen to 
keep the functionality of buildings out of the subject matter of copyright. 
On a doctrinal level, the functionality screen that excludes buildings 
from protected subject matter evolved over the twentieth century. For at 
least the first several decades after the enactment of the 1909 Act, the 
absence of building protection was enforced by an “exclusion screen.”104 
Buildings were categorically excluded from copyright protection because 
they did not fall within the categories of subject matter that the statute listed 
as eligible for protection. The only statutory category that could encompass 
 
101. For discussions of Baker’s use/explanation distinction, see ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? 85–100 (2015); Wendy J. Gordon, How Oracle Erred: The 
"Use/Explanation Distinction" and the Future of Computer Copyright, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE 
OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 375, 386–88 (Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2017). 
102. One theme that runs through both sections is the relationship between pre-AWCPA copyright 
for building designs and copyright for designs of non-architectural, functional utilitarian artifacts. Most 
of the law is unsurprisingly identical given that the building/drawing dichotomy is akin to a 
garment/drawing or furniture/drawing dichotomy: it is just one example of a broader useful-
article/drawing dichotomy. However, there are also points of departure that make the building/drawing 
dichotomy more pronounced than the useful-article/drawing dichotomy in non-architecture cases. See 
infra notes 114–116 and accompanying text (suggesting that fewer features of buildings may have been 
protected); infra Section II.C.3.b (noting that there are no historical cases clearly establishing that 
drawing protection for designs of non-architectural useful articles extends to design features that are not 
protected when fixed in the useful articles themselves). 
103. Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Authorship Screen, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1603, 1646–51 
(2017). 
104. Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 100, at 1310–11.  











three-dimensional objects was “works of art.”105 While monuments and 
other structures not intended for occupation could qualify as works of art,106 
habitable buildings could not.107 However, by the time the 1976 Act was 
enacted, the functionality screen for buildings had, in theory at least, 
evolved into a “filtering screen” that requires a feature-by-feature 
determination of functionality and thus protectability.108 The 1976 Act 
changes the relevant category of copyrightable subject matter from works 
of art to “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” (PGS works), which is 
easily expansive enough to encompass buildings.109 It then identifies a 
subset of PGS works as “useful articles”—articles “having an intrinsic 
utilitarian function,” including buildings, furniture, clothing, and 
shovels110—and creates the useful articles doctrine to limit the protection 
granted useful articles. The design of a useful article is protected only “to 
the extent that[] such design incorporates . . . features that can be identified 
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian 
aspects of the article.”111  
The test for determining when features can be separately identified and 
are capable of independent existence from an object’s utility has proven 
maddeningly evasive.112 However, the potential for more liberal protection 
for utilitarian artifacts under the 1976 Act than they initially received under 
the 1909 Act is clear.113 A utilitarian object that is categorically excluded 
 
105. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 5(g), 35 Stat. 1075, 1076, repealed by Copyright 
Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2541.  
106. See Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729, 731 (M.D. Pa. 1936). 
107. See HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 396–98 (1944); 
Note, Protection for the Artistic Aspects of Articles of Utility, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1520, 1524 (1959); 
Walter J. Derenberg, Copyright No-Man’s Land: Fringe Rights in Literary and Artistic Property, 35 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 627, 646 (1953). The 1870 Copyright Act, which was the first to embrace three-
dimensional works, only protected the “fine arts.” Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212. 
For the first several decades after its enactment, the 1909 Act’s liberalization of copyright’s subject 
matter from “fine arts” to “works of art” was largely ignored. 37 C.F.R. § 201.4(7) (1939); Note, supra, 
at 1524; Derenberg, supra, at 646.  
108. Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 100, at 1311–12. But cf. id. at 1313–14 (noting that the 
useful articles doctrine also has some qualities of a “threshold” screen). 
109. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2018). 
110. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining a useful article); cf. infra note 172 and accompanying text 
(discussing an additional limitation on the definition of a useful article). Although the useful articles 
doctrine was only added to the statute with the 1976 Act, this Article sometimes uses the term “useful 
article” anachronistically to describe works with intrinsic utilitarian functions whose protectability is 
determined by the 1909 Act. 
111. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
112. For the Supreme Court’s recent articulation of the test, see Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity 
Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017). 
113. The transition to the filtering screen of the useful articles doctrine actually occurred before 
the enactment of the 1976 Act. The Copyright Office moved in this direction in 1949. 37 C.F.R. § 
202.8(a) (1949); Derenberg, supra note 107, at 646–47. The Supreme Court cited the Copyright Office’s 
position approvingly in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 211–14 (1954), and the Copyright Office then 













from the copyright regime under the 1909 Act could have select non-
utilitarian features protected under the 1976 Act.  
While this liberalizing shift in copyright’s functionality screen applied to 
architectural works as a legal matter, it was a non-event as a practical matter 
because the shift did not alter the protection actually granted to buildings. 
The doctrine changed, but the extent of protection for buildings only budged 
a small bit, if at all. Pre-AWCPA copyright deems most all building features 
to be incapable of being identified separately from and existing 
independently of the building’s functionality.114 There are two lone 
exceptions to this per se rule. First, protection exists for monumental 
structures, such as the Statue of Liberty.115 Second, pre-AWCPA copyright 
protects a building’s add-on decoration—“artistic sculpture or decorative 
ornamentation or embellishment added to a structure”—such as stained 
glass windows and gargoyles on neo-gothic academic campuses.116  
3. The Expansive Scope of Drawing Protection 
The existence of drawing protection in pre-AWCPA copyright is well 
established.117 The statutes require it. Under the 1909 Act, architectural 
plans and elevations are protected as “[d]rawings or plastic works of a 
 
114. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., STUDY NO. 27 ON THE COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, COPYRIGHT IN 
ARCHITECTURAL WORKS 71 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter STUDY NO. 27].  
115. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976).  
116. Id. at 55–59; Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2000) (suggesting, in 
dicta, that gargoyles and stained glass windows would be protectable features of building designs under 
pre-AWCPA copyright). Most copyright owners in pre-AWCPA cases concede that buildings are not 
protected subject matter, so the courts have not had the opportunity to address the issue of which features 
are protected, add-on embellishment. See, e.g., DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184, 197–
98 (M.D. Fla. 1962). 
117. The gap between common law and statutory copyright under the 1909 Act frequently 
undermined drawing protection. Common law copyright only protected unpublished works. Statutory 
copyright vested upon publication, but only if the published copies followed the 1909 Act’s notice 
formalities. A permissive definition of publication that included constructing a building or filing plans 
with the municipal building department, combined with architects’ failure to comply with the statutory 
notice formalities, often left architects without protection for their drawings in early cases. See Cahn, 
supra note 15, at 101–09; Katz, supra note 15, at 229–37; Architects—Protection of Plans as Intellectual 
Property—Loss of Right by Publication, 24 WASH. U. L.Q. 418, 418–20 (1939). More recent cases often 
held that constructing a building and filing required plans did not constitute a publication that divested 
architects of their common law copyrights. See, e.g., Krahmer v. Luing, 317 A.2d 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. 1974); Wallace v. Helm, No. 867 177, 1969 WL 9567, at *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 3, 1969); 
Edgar H. Wood Assocs., Inc. v. Skene, 197 N.E.2d 886, 894 (Mass. 1964). In its transactional 
justification of pre-AWCPA copyright in Part III, this Article does not defend this gap in pre-AWCPA 
protection for architectural drawings. It presumes that statutory copyright vests upon fixation, as it does 
under the 1976 Act.  











scientific or technical character.”118 Artistic renderings of buildings are 
protected as “[w]orks of art.”119 Under the 1976 Act, building designs 
remain PGS works when they are fixed in drawings.120  
This Section moves beyond the existence of this statutory mandate for 
drawing protection and focuses on the scope of drawing protection in cases 
alleging drawing-to-drawing copying. The building/drawing dichotomy 
exists, and pre-AWCPA copyright involves media discrimination in subject 
matter, only because the scope of this drawing protection is expansive 
enough to encompass features of building designs that are not protected 
when fixed in buildings.121 Section II.C.3.a examines how courts used the 
explanation side of Baker’s use/explanation distinction in authors’ rights to 
craft this expansive scope of protection for drawings of building designs. In 
a brief detour, Section II.C.3.b examines the evolution of drawing protection 
in cases alleging drawing-to-drawing copying of non-architectural useful 
articles. Finally, Section II.C.3.c considers the argument that the 1976 Act 
codified the building/drawing dichotomy as part of a larger useful-
article/drawing dichotomy.  
a. Architecture and the Use/Explanation Distinction 
The most common interpretation of Baker denies protection to the 
functional features of building designs and places them categorically 
beyond copyright’s reach.122 The application of this subject-matter 
interpretation of Baker to architectural drawings would yield the media-
neutral alternative to the building/drawing dichotomy introduced above: the 
features of building designs would not be protected either when they are 
fixed in buildings or when they are fixed as representational content in 
drawings.123 To support the drawing side of the building/drawing dichotomy 
and its media discrimination in subject matter, Imperial Homes and other 
 
118. 17 U.S.C. § 5(i) (1909); 35 C.F.R. § 202.12(a) (1959) (including “an architect’s blueprint” 
within § 5(i)); ARTHUR W. WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 218 (1917) (citing Copyright Office rules 
stating that “architects’ or engineers’ plans or designs” are protected under § 5(i)). 
119. 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) (1909).  
120. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2018). The 1976 Act did not initially specify that architectural plans 
were PGS works, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976), but its legislative history 
clearly indicated that they were. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52, 55 (1976). Architectural plans were 
expressly added to the definition of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works in 1988 shortly before the 
enactment of the AWCPA. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 
§ 4(a)(1)(A), 102 Stat. 2853, 2854 (1988); S. REP. NO. 100-352 (1988).  
121.  Drawing protection under pre-AWCPA copyright is widely recognized as narrow in a 
different way: architects do not have an exclusive right to drawing-to-building copying. See infra notes 
132–135 and accompanying text. However, the existence of an exclusive right to drawing-to-building 
copying vel non does not contribute to the building/drawing dichotomy. See supra notes 80–82 and 
accompanying text. 
122. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 













pre-AWCPA copyright cases ground the scope of protection that they offer 
to architectural drawings in a more controversial interpretation of Baker: the 
use/explanation distinction in copyright owners’ rights.124  
Focusing on the allegation of infringement of the forms, rather than the 
text, in Selden’s book, some language in Baker suggests that liability hinged 
on the way in which the public obtained value from the allegedly infringing 
copies. The forms could be used “for the purpose of practical application” 
as a bookkeeper fills a ledger with numbers and keeps the books of a 
company.125 Here, the forms are functional tools with extra-linguistic, 
technological affordances:126 they physically structure the placement of 
numbers and guide the data entry required to perform the bookkeeping 
method. This functional use of the forms is like the use of a shovel to dig a 
hole in the ground. Alternatively, the forms could be made “for the purpose 
of publication in . . . works explanatory of the art.”127 Here, the forms are 
teaching tools, informing the public about how to perform the method. 
Baker suggests that this use/explanation distinction determines whether 
copying constitutes a violation of Selden’s rights. Copyright does not grant 
a copyright owner the right to control the making and distributing of the 
former copies that are intended for “practi[c]e and use [of] the [functional] 
art itself,” but it does allow an author to control the making and distributing 
of the latter copies that are “intended to convey instruction in the art.”128  
Interpreting Baker to generate the use/explanation distinction in authors’ 
rights grants copyright protection to subject matter with functional 
properties, but then limits the reach of authors’ exclusive rights with respect 
to that subject matter. Infringement becomes contingent on the purpose for 
which a copy is made.129 Copiers infringe when they make copies only to 
exploit their explanatory, expressive, or aesthetic qualities, but copiers do 
not infringe when they make copies to take advantage of their functional 
attributes and extract their utilitarian value. When Baker is interpreted to 
yield the use/explanation distinction, the defendant “escaped copyright 
liability because [those who] used the forms [used them] as tools and not as 
[communicative] works.”130  
 
124. See supra note 101. 
125. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879). 
126. Technological affordances are action possibilities offered by an object, or more broadly the 
environment, to organisms. See JAMES J. GIBSON, THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO VISUAL PERCEPTION 
119 (2015). 
127. Baker, 101 U.S. at 103. 
128. Id. at 104. 
129. Whether it is the intention of the copier when creating the copy or the actual way in which 
someone eventually extracts value from the copy that is important remains unclear. 
130. DRASSINOWER, supra note 101, at 93. The “use/explanation” terminology is far from ideal. 
“Use” is presumed to be a functional use, so the common turn of phrase, “a copy is used to explain,” 











Pre-AWCPA copyright cases regularly invoke the use/explanation 
distinction in Baker to shape the contours of architects’ exclusive rights to 
their drawings.131 In doing so, however, they extend what was already a 
controversial interpretation of Baker by adding a new, not-so-
straightforward twist. In Baker, the distinction turned on the non-
reproductive way in which a defendant obtained value from an existing 
copy. Putting the form to a functional use excused the earlier copying, but 
employing it for explanatory purposes did not. The exact same copy of the 
forms, without any additional reproduction, could thus be noninfringing or 
infringing depending upon whether it was put to a functional use or 
employed in an expressive act, respectively. To craft the drawing protection 
granted by pre-AWCPA copyright, the courts morphed the use/explanation 
distinction into media discrimination in rights. They transformed a rule that 
hinges liability for infringement on how the public derives benefit from a 
copy (use v. explanation) into a rule that hinges liability on the medium of 
the copy that a defendant makes (building v. drawing). 
Pre-AWCPA copyright deems constructing the building depicted in 
drawings to be a noninfringing “use” of the building design (at least 
assuming that the building lacks protectable, add-on embellishment).132 
DeSilva Construction Corp. v. Herrald appears to have been the first 
 
must be abandoned. On the other side, “explanation” is not the only expressive purpose that legitimately 
lies within the copyright owner’s control. Presumptively, copies made for the purpose of aesthetic 
enjoyment should be noninfringing, as well. The distinction might be more precisely drawn by 
contrasting functional and expressive uses of copies, but even these terms need further refinement. See 
Gordon, supra note 101, at 339–45.  
131. Robert R. Jones Assocs., Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 278–81 (6th Cir. 1988); Imperial 
Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 898–99 (5th Cir. 1972); Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379 
F.2d 84, 85–86 (6th Cir. 1967); Richmond Homes Mgmt., Inc. v. Raintree, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1517, 
1524–25 (W.D. Va. 1994), rev’d in part on other grounds, 66 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 1995); Demetriades v. 
Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 663–66 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 657 F. Supp. 
70, 75 (W.D. Va. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 846 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988); Herman Frankel Org. v. 
Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051, 1053–54 (E.D. Mich. 1973); DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 
184, 195–96, 198 (M.D. Fla. 1962).  
132. Although pre-AWCPA cases do not dwell on it, the absence of a right to control drawing-to-
building copying also has independent statutory origins in the 1909 Act. The 1909 Act granted authors 
of “models or designs for works of art” exclusive rights not only to copy but also “to complete, execute, 
and finish” the works of art. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(b), 5(g), 35 Stat. 1075, 1076, 
repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2541. In contrast, copyright in “[d]rawings or plastic works 
of a scientific or technical character,” including architectural plans, gave authors the exclusive right to 
copy but was silent on the exclusive right to execute their works. Id. §§ 1(b), 5(i). By negative 
implication, the 1909 Act did not grant an execution right to these authors. STUDY NO. 27, supra note 
114, at 70. One small puzzle is why most pre-AWCPA copyright cases trace the absence of an exclusive 
right to drawing-to-building copying to Baker rather than to the statutory structure of the 1909 Act. The 
answer appears to lie in the fact that cases involving drawing-to-useful-article copying arose outside of 
architecture decades before the courts had to grapple with the issue in the architecture context. See infra 
note 134 and accompanying text. Many of the non-architecture cases involve artistic drawings (“works 
of art”) rather than technical drawings. This made the absence of a statutory execution right for technical 
drawings in the 1909 Act irrelevant. These non-architecture cases relied instead on Baker, and they then 













architecture case to expressly state this rule.133 It notes that “the architect 
does not have the exclusive right to build structures embodied in his 
technical writings,” and, based on earlier cases involving drawings of non-
architectural useful articles, it even presents the “legal principle that the 
building of a structure from copyrighted architectural plans is not an 
infringement of the [copyright in the] architectural plans themselves” as 
already “established.”134 An exclusive right to drawing-to-building copying 
would create a de facto monopoly on the functional building depicted in the 
drawing, at least until a building that can be freely reverse-engineered 
exists. To ensure that patent law sets the requirements for protection of 
functional innovation, constructing a functional building is the kind of 
activity to which only a patent should be able to grant an exclusive right. As 
Imperial Homes later noted, “no copyrighted architectural plans . . . may 
clothe their author with the exclusive right to reproduce the dwelling 
pictured” in a drawing because “copyright privileges” in drawings should 
not “vest[] exclusive use rights which only a patent could confer.”135  
More critically to the drawing side of the building/drawing dichotomy, 
most courts interpreting pre-AWCPA copyright deem drawing-to-drawing 
copying to be a per se communicative act. This means that architects can 
have an exclusive right to drawing-to-drawing copying without copyright 
encroaching on the proper domain of patent law even when the copying only 
implicates features of building designs that are not protected when fixed in 
buildings. As one court applying the building/drawing dichotomy noted, 
 
133. DeSilva Constr. Corp., 213 F. Supp. at 195–98. DeSilva addresses the question of what 
constitutes a publication under common law copyright. Id. at 194; see also Donald Frederick Evans & 
Assocs., Inc. v. Cont’l Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897, 901 n.7 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[W]e do not consider the 
public display of a model home to constitute a publication of the architectural drawings from which it 
was constructed.”). It is worth noting that the absence of an execution right benefits, rather than 
disadvantages, architects in this context: if architects cannot control the construction of a building from 
plans, then a building cannot amount to a publication of the plans that divests common-law copyright. 
Cf. supra note 117 (discussing the gap between common-law and statutory copyright under the 1909 
Act). 
134. DeSilva Constr. Corp., 213 F. Supp. at 195–98. To support the “established” description, 
DeSilva cites “the unanimous view of respected text writers,” and these writers, in turn, cite cases 
involving drawings of non-architectural useful articles. Id. at 195–96; see also STUDY NO. 27, supra 
note 114, at 69–70 (reviewing case law involving non-architectural useful articles and reaching the same 
conclusion). Many of these cases, some of which are also directly cited in DeSilva, rely on Baker to 
support their analyses. See Fulmer v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1021, 1022 (Ct. Cl. 1952); Muller v. 
Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners & 
Gordon, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 187, 188–89 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); Nat’l Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189 F. 
215, 217, 219 (M.D. Pa. 1911); Nat’l Cloak & Suit Co. v. Standard Mail Order Co., 191 F. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 
1911); Lamb v. Grand Rapids Sch. Furniture Co., 39 F. 474 (W.D. Mich. 1889).  
135. Imperial Homes, 458 F.2d at 899; see also Tegman, 367 F. Supp. at 1053 (“A person cannot, 
by copyrighting plans, prevent the building of a house similar to that taught by the copyrighted plans. 
One does not gain a monopoly on the ideas expressed [i.e., functional features contained] in the 
copyrighted material by the act of registering them for copyright.”). 











copyright in cases alleging drawing-to-drawing copying of building designs 
“protects against copying of copyrighted material, yet does not change the 
copyright act into a patent act and give the person holding the copyright a 
monopoly on the [functional] ideas there expressed.”136 The theory at work 
here is that, unlike a building (or apparel, furniture, shovels, or even the 
bookkeeping ledger at issue in Baker), a representational drawing has no 
technological affordances.137 It is never a tool;138 it performs only in the 
linguistic sense that it explains through language and symbols to a human 
reader.139 Copying an architectural drawing into a new drawing is thus 
always an expressive act that is done for the purpose of explaining how to 
construct a building. This is true even when a builder makes drawing-copies 
of plans for use on a job site to guide construction: the plans do nothing but 
convey information to the builder.140 Representations of functional features 
are not functional in the patent sense, meaning that a copyright that allows 
an author to control the reproduction and distribution of representations 
does not grant patent-like rights. 
Not all courts, however, read Baker in this manner to support the 
expansive scope of drawing protection that leads to the building/drawing 
dichotomy. In Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit focuses on a passage in Baker that hints at the eventual 
development of the merger doctrine.141 Baker states that when the functional 
art a book “teaches cannot be used without employing the . . . diagrams [i.e., 
forms] used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such . . . 
diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given 
therewith to the public.”142 Scholz Homes relies on this passage to argue that 
 
136. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. at 1054 (citing Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)); see also Imperial 
Homes, 458 F.2d at 899 (“[N]othing in Baker v. Selden prevents . . . a copyright from vesting the law’s 
grant of an exclusive right to make copies of the copyrighted plans so as to instruct a would-be builder 
on how to proceed to construct the dwelling pictured.”). 
137. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.  
138. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.  
139. This semiotic performance is central to copyright’s conception of authorship and antithetical 
to patent law’s conception of usefulness, utility, or functionality. See Collins, supra note 103, at 1640–
42; Kevin Emerson Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine Seriously, 85 IND. L.J. 
1379 (2010). 
140. The result might be different if a drawing were a self-executing file for a house-sized 3D 
printer. Such a file would both represent in a semiotic sense and have the technological affordances of a 
tool. 
141. Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84, 85–86 (6th Cir. 1967). The merger doctrine is 
a refinement to the idea/expression dichotomy. If the public’s use of an unprotected idea requires use of 
what would normally be protected expression, then the idea and expression have merged, and the 
expression is not protected to ensure that the public has free access to the unprotected idea. See Morrissey 
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967). Baker is sometimes cited as the genesis of the 
merger doctrine, but it arguably has little to do with the idea/expression dichotomy (and thus the merger 
doctrine). See Samuelson, Frontiers, supra note 99, at 1953–61. 
142. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879). This refines rather than supplants the 













true fidelity to Baker would deny copyright owners an exclusive right to 
control most drawing-to-drawing copying:  
Baker would seem to go farther than [denying only an exclusive right 
to drawing-to-building copying] by permitting the copying of the 
plans themselves. . . . [I]f architectural plans are to be treated in the 
same way as “a book on science or the useful arts,” then Baker would 
seem to permit the making of plans [to be used in construction] as 
well as the construction of buildings.143 
Scholz Homes thus reads Baker to require drawing-to-drawing copies 
made for the purpose of constructing a building to be functional “uses” that 
lie beyond the reach of architects’ exclusive rights.144 Only drawing-to-
drawing copying performed for the enjoyment or edification of the non-
building-constructing public, such as for publication in coffee-table books 
and perhaps advertising brochures, would lie within the architect’s 
control.145  
Although Scholz Homes puts forward this narrow protection as the 
proper interpretation of the use/explanation distinction in Baker, it does not 
embrace the narrow protection as a policy matter.146 To the contrary, it 
expounds on how this result would eviscerate the economic value of 
 
purpose of publication in other works explanatory of the art, but for the purpose of practical application.” 
Id. 
143. Scholz Homes, 379 F.2d at 85–86.  
144. The holdings of some outlier pre-AWCPA copyright cases echo this view. Acorn Structures, 
Inc. v. Swantz, 657 F. Supp. 70, 75 (W.D. Va. 1987) (“[P]reparing a derivative work and filing such 
plans with the Building and Permits Office is simply a necessary incident to building the structure 
depicted in the plans, and does not constitute a copyright infringement.”), rev’d on other grounds, 846 
F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988). Some non-architectural useful articles cases, too, echo the Scholz Homes dicta. 
See RJ Control Consultants, Inc. v. Mutltiject, LLC, No. 16-10728, 2018 WL 5840736, at *3–5 (E.D. 
Mich. Nov. 11, 2018) (finding no liability for copying technical drawings when those drawings are 
subsequently used to manufacture the useful articles depicted in the drawings). Other cases involving 
non-architectural useful articles conclude that there is no liability for drawing-to-useful-article copying 
without addressing the drawing-to-drawing copying that very likely had to occur to manufacture the 
useful article. See, e.g., Fulmer v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1021 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (camouflage 
parachute); Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (automotive bridge 
approach). Although they are ambiguous, these cases can also be read as consistent with the Scholz 
Homes dicta. 
145. Even the advertising brochure could be beyond copyright’s proper reach. At least one early 
case held that illustrations that depict a useful article are necessary incidents to the manufacture and sale 
of the useful article. Lamb v. Grand Rapids Sch. Furniture Co., 39 F. 474, 475 (W.D. Mich. 1889) (“To 
say that the defendant has not the right to publish correct illustrations of its goods must practically result 
in creating a monopoly, in goods modeled on those designs, in the complainants, and thus give all the 
benefits of a patent upon unpatented and unpatentable articles.”). Scholz Homes also suggests that the 
sale of copies could give rise to infringement. Scholz Homes, 379 F.2d at 86. 
146. Scholz Homes held that publication without notice invalidated the copyright in the plaintiff’s 
drawings, making the entire discussion of the scope of copyright in the drawings dicta. Scholz Homes, 
379 F.2d at 86–87.   











architectural copyright,147 and it then muses on what preferable alternatives 
could be adopted instead by departing from Baker.148 One of these 
alternatives should sound familiar: “if Baker is followed to the extent of 
holding that the possession of the copyright in the plans gives no exclusive 
right to construct the building, then protection could be provided by 
[departing from Baker and] declaring the making of unauthorized copies of 
the plans to be an infringement.”149 Scholz Homes suggests adopting the 
building/drawing dichotomy not because of Baker but rather despite Baker.  
The building/drawing dichotomy re-emerges here not as an outgrowth of 
the doctrinal logic of copyright but rather as a form of rough economic 
justice. Given that the absence of building protection and an exclusive right 
to drawing-to-building copying significantly diminishes the value of 
architectural copyright, media discrimination in subject matter is a 
pragmatic, if conceptually awkward, way of strengthening architects’ weak 
position.150  
The Scholz Homes dicta also emphasizes that subsuming the 
building/drawing dichotomy within the literature addressing copyright’s 
weakness in the face of functionality would mischaracterize the 
dichotomy’s true nature.151 Drawing protection is actually quite expansive 
under pre-AWCPA copyright (at least in cases alleging drawing-to-drawing 
copying); copyright would steer yet farther away from protection for 
 
147. Id. at 86. Other courts also reject the Scholz Homes interpretation in favor of the 
building/drawing dichotomy on normative grounds. See, e.g., Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 
658, 665–66 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“The Scholz Homes dictum, if adopted, would literally render plaintiffs’ 
copyright in this case a nullity. Such a holding would subvert Congress’s express and unequivocal intent 
to include architectural plans as proper subjects for copyright . . . . This court cannot countenance such 
a result . . . .”). The Scholz Homes interpretation would come close to answering in the affirmative a 
question that some pre-AWCPA copyright cases quote from the Nimmer treatise: “[A]re there some 
works . . . which by their very nature may be copied only for purposes of use and not for purposes of 
explanation, so that to deny liability by reason of copying [for use] is in effect if not in theory to deny 
copyrightability?” Robert R. Jones Assocs., Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 279 n.3 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(quoting NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 40, § 2.08[D][1]); see also Demetriades, 680 F. Supp. at 665. 
148. One possibility mentioned, and apparently championed by the Nimmer treatise at the time, 
was to grant architects an exclusive right to drawing-to-building copying and thereby further heighten 
the building/drawing dichotomy. Scholz Homes, 379 F.2d at 86 & n.2. 
149. Id. at 86.  
150. Market-buffer theory here plays a role that is turned on its head from the role it usually plays 
in discussions of media discrimination in subject matter. Media discrimination in subject matter is 
usually perceived as a threat to the sufficient incentives. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. This 
argument takes protection for a work in all media as the media-neutral baseline. The historical evolution 
of the building/drawing dichotomy starts with almost the opposite media-neutral baseline—close to no 
effective protection for architectural works in any medium. Thus, Scholz Homes suggests adopting 
media discrimination in subject matter in order to ensure that architects have at least some incentives to 
create. 
151. The dimension on which drawing protection is expansive is not a necessary corollary of 
copyright’s refusal to protect functional articles; the building/drawing dichotomy is not simply a rule 













functionality if pre-AWCPA copyright had followed the Scholz Homes 
dicta.152 
b. Non-Architectural Useful Articles 
The historical origins of the building/drawing dichotomy of pre-
AWCPA copyright are deeply enmeshed with policy concerns about 
copyright protection for functionality. One might therefore reasonably 
expect the dichotomy to be a particular example of a broader useful-
article/drawing dichotomy, no different in kind from a clothing/drawing, 
furniture/drawing, or shovel/drawing dichotomy. In many respects, 
copyright law bears out this expectation. With respect to building 
protection, buildings are useful articles, so the statutory regime governs both 
buildings and non-building useful articles.153 With respect to drawing 
protection, the logic of Baker’s use/explanation distinction applies with 
equal force to drawings of all useful articles.154 In fact, the early cases 
establishing the absence of an exclusive right to drawing-to-building 
copying rely on non-architectural useful articles cases as guiding 
precedent.155 
However, looking specifically at the historical non-architecture cases 
that address drawing-to-drawing copying, it is interesting to note that they 
can all be explained by the narrower, media-neutral rule discussed above 
under which protection extends only to rendition expression.156 None 
provide strong support for media discrimination in subject matter or a 
useful-article/drawing dichotomy.157  
 
152. The same point can be made with respect to the alternative, media-neutral path that 
architectural copyright could have followed by not protecting the features of building designs in any 
medium. See supra Section II.B. 
153. See supra Section II.C.2.  
154. See supra Section II.B.3.a. Furthermore, if the 1976 Act codifies the drawing side of the 
dichotomy, it speaks with equal force to all useful articles. See infra Section II.C.3.c. 
155. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
156. Nat’l Cloak & Suit Co. v. Standard Mail Order Co., 191 F. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); Nat’l Cloak 
& Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189 F. 215 (M.D. Pa. 1911); Lamb v. Grand Rapids Sch. Furniture Co., 39 F. 
474 (W.D. Mich. 1889).  
157. None allege that copying could have been accomplished through useful-article-to-drawing 
copying rather than drawing-to-drawing copying. Cf. supra note 88 and accompanying text. None 
discuss a useful article’s unprotected features when assessing substantial similarity between drawings. 
Cf. supra note 89 and accompanying text. None involve highly schematic drawings rather than artistic 
renderings. Cf. supra note 90 and accompanying text. However, a more recent case that leaves open the 
possibility of liability based on drawing-to-drawing copying of a highly schematic drawing of a non-
architectural useful article is Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753 F. Supp. 
2d 753, 760 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (refusing to grant summary judgment to defendants based on an allegation 
of drawing-to-drawing copying of the schematic floor plans of recreational vehicles into a derivative 
work). 











For example, consider National Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman, a case that 
lies near the beginning of the line of cases delineating authors’ rights in 
drawings of useful articles.158 National Cloak & Suit produced a periodical 
“portraying original conceptions and creations relating to wearing apparel” 
in order to market said apparel.159 The illustrations involved “large outlays 
and expenditures” for “artists and authors of peculiar skill and ability;” they 
“embodied the personal reaction of artists of recognized skill in their calling, 
and were pictures of artistic merit.”160 Kaufman was alleged to have copied 
these illustrations in the course of establishing a competing business 
offering the same or similar clothes for sale. The court made clear that 
copyright did not extend to the apparel itself,161 but it granted National 
Cloak & Suit exclusive rights to their drawings depicting the apparel. 
National Cloak & Suit is “entitled” to “the right . . . to prevent others from 
copying [into new drawing-copies] and appropriating its exclusive property 
in such pictures.”162  
National Cloak & Suit resonates more with the restrictive, media-neutral 
rule of drawing protection that only extends to rendition expression than it 
does with the expansive, media-discriminatory rule of drawing protection 
of pre-AWCPA copyright that protects rendition expression as well. The 
fact that the copied drawings “embodied the personal reaction of artists of 
recognized skill in their calling, and were pictures of artistic merit”163 
suggests that the illustrations contained significant amounts of original 
rendition expression. Liability for drawing-to-drawing copying could easily 
exist even if copyright did not protect any representational content at all. 
National Cloak & Suit’s “exclusive property in such pictures”164 could 
easily reside not in copying what the drawings portrayed (the articles as 
representational content) but rather how the articles were portrayed 
(rendition expression).165 National Cloak & Suit may invoke Baker not to 
support a use/explanation distinction in authors’ rights but rather a 
categorical exclusion of the useful features of clothing from protected 
 
158. Kaufman, 189 F. 215. 
159. Id. at 216. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 219 (“The complainant does not claim to monopolize the manufacture and sale of the 
wearing apparel depicted by reason of its copyright.”). 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 216. 
164. Id. at 219. 
165. For a more contemporary case in which it is clear that liability could also hang on the copying 
of rendition expression alone, see Habersham Plantation Corp. v. Country Concepts, No. C80-14G, 
1980 WL 1161 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 14, 1980). In Habersham Plantation, the allegedly infringing furniture 
drawings “depict the furniture positioned in precisely the same arrangement and set at precisely the same 
angle to the viewer as those in plaintiff’s catalog.” Id. at *1. The plaintiff’s photographs were taken with 
a lens that distorts the perspective, and the same distortion is present in the defendant’s drawings. Id. 













subject matter with a functionality screen.166 National Cloak & Suit states it 
is important to avoid “confusion of the pictures with the things they depict 
in a particular way; that is, the wearing apparel which appears in the 
illustration as part of the pictures.”167 The unprotected design of the apparel, 
which exists in copies both outside of the pictures (the articles of clothing 
themselves) and within the pictures as representational content, needs to be 
kept distinct from protection for the “particular way” in which the apparel 
is shown in the pictures. Recast in the terms used here, National Cloak & 
Suit can most readily be read to state that copyright protects only the 
rendition expression wound up with how the design of apparel is shown in 
drawings. The case need not be read to establish protection for the design 
of apparel itself, regardless of whether it is fixed in clothing that can be worn 
or a drawing’s representational content.  
c. Possible Statutory Codification in the 1976 Act 
Many aspects of pre-AWCPA copyright eventually obtain clear statutory 
bases in the 1976 Act. Returning to Figure 1, the exclusion of buildings from 
protected subject matter in the top row arises from the useful articles 
doctrine.168 The absence of an exclusive right to drawing-to-building 
copying in Box 3, too, has a textual basis in a grandfather clause.169 Yet, 
while the 1976 Act clearly requires some protection for drawings in Box 
4,170 the codification of the expansive scope of drawing protection in cases 
alleging drawing-to-drawing copying that protects features of building 
designs that are unprotected when fixed in buildings is more tenuous.  
Prominent copyright treatises argue that the statutory definition of a 
useful article requires the media discrimination in subject matter imposed 
 
166. Cf. supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text (discussing the subject-matter interpretation 
of Baker).  
167. Kaufman, 189 F. at 219. 
168. See supra notes 108–116 and accompanying text. In the 1909 Act, the absence of building 
protection is grounded in the Act’s narrowly defined categories of works of authorship. See supra notes 
104–107 and accompanying text. 
169. The 1976 Act codifies the absence of an exclusive right to drawing-to-building copying with 
a grandfather clause in Section 113(b). 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2018) (“This title does not afford, to the 
owner of copyright in a work that portrays a useful article as such, any greater or lesser rights with 
respect to the making, distribution, or display of the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to 
such works under the law . . . in effect on December 31, 1977 . . . .”). Section 113(b) does not codify the 
drawing side of the building/drawing dichotomy; it says nothing about the scope of drawing protection 
in cases involving drawing-to-drawing copying. For the basis of the absence of an exclusive right to 
drawing-to-building copying in the 1909 Act, see supra note 132. 
170. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. The 1909 Act, too, requires drawing protection 
of some kind for building designs. See supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text. 











by the building/drawing dichotomy.171 Useful articles are “article[s] having 
an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance 
of the article or to convey information.”172 Under this definition, buildings 
are useful articles, but drawings that represent buildings are not. A 
drawing’s utility lies entirely in its “function” of portraying the appearance 
of the building and conveying information about the building.173 Assuming 
that the useful articles doctrine only applies to useful articles, the argument 
concludes that the scope of copyright in architectural drawings is 
“immunized from attack on the basis of [the drawings’ representation of] 
utilitarian content” under the useful articles doctrine because drawings are 
not useful articles.174 Following this reasoning, copyright does not protect 
features of pre-AWCPA building designs when they are fixed in buildings 
because buildings are useful articles, but it does protect those same features 
when they are fixed in drawings because drawings are not useful articles. 
This codification argument, however, does not track the actual text of the 
useful articles doctrine in the 1976 Act. The assumption that the useful 
articles doctrine only limits the copyright protection granted to three-
dimensional, useful articles is suspect. According to the statutory text, the 
useful articles doctrine applies to the design of a useful article—that is, as a 
work—not to a useful article as a particular type of copy of a design. The 
Act states: “the design of a useful article . . . shall be considered a [PGS] 
work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates [PGS] 
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”175 The design of a 
useful article exists both in three-dimensional, functional articles and 
drawings that represent those three-dimensional, functional articles, 
meaning that the useful articles doctrine should apply in a media-neutral 
manner. If Congress had intended to codify the expansive protection for 
drawings that courts granted in cases alleging drawing-to-drawing copying 
such as Imperial Homes, the text should have stated more simply that “a 
useful article . . . shall be considered a [PGS] work if, and only to the extent 
that, such useful article incorporates [PGS] features that can be identified 
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian 
 
171. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 83, § 2.15.1.2; see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 40, 
§ 2A.09[A][1][a]. Judicial opinions also interpret the definition of a useful article in this manner. See 
Eales v. Envtl. Lifestyles, Inc., 958 F.2d 876, 879–80 (9th Cir. 1992). 
172. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).  
173. This point mirrors the argument explaining why engaging in drawing-to-drawing copying of 
architectural drawings is a per se explanatory or communicative act and is thus within the copyright 
owner’s exclusive rights under the media-dependent interpretation of Baker’s use/explanation 
distinction in pre-AWCPA copyright cases. See supra notes 136–140 and accompanying text. 
174. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 83, § 2.15.1.2.  













aspects of the article.” Whether the 1976 Act codifies the drawing side of 
the building/drawing dichotomy thus remains, at best, an open question.176  
D. The AWCPA 
The AWCPA altered copyright protection for the designs of buildings 
created on or after December 1, 1990 from the pre-AWCPA baseline in a 
number of ways. Most importantly for the argument here, the AWCPA 
eliminates the building/drawing dichotomy and its media discrimination in 
subject matter.177 It adds “architectural works” as a new category of works 
of authorship.178 It expressly defines architectural works in a media-neutral 
manner to include both buildings and drawings of buildings,179 and it 
subjects them to a sui generis functionality screen that precludes protection 
for the features of architectural works that are “functionally required” in 
buildings.180 The AWCPA thus identifies a single set of features of an 
architectural work that cannot be protected, regardless of whether they are 
fixed in buildings or drawings.181  
 
176. Even if it does not, the pre-AWCPA cases that gave rise to the drawing side of the 
building/drawing dichotomy likely remain good law. 
177. But see infra notes 186–189 and accompanying text (suggesting that media discrimination 
may persist even after the enactment of the AWCPA).  
178. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2018).  
179. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018); cf. Shine v. Childs, 382 F. Supp. 2d 602, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(holding that a three-dimensional model embodies an architectural work). An earlier bill only referred 
to architectural works as embodied in buildings. H.R. REP. No. 101-735, at 19 (1990). 
180. The functionally-required functionality screen is not codified in the copyright statute. It only 
appears in the AWCPA’s legislative history. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20–21. It is, like the useful 
articles doctrine, a filtering screen. Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 100, at 1338–41.  
181. The AWCPA does codify one form of media discrimination in subject matter. Architects lack 
exclusive rights to transform architectural works fixed in buildings into derivative works through 
renovation, destruction, and addition. 17 U.S.C. § 120(b) (2018). The statute says nothing about denying 
architects exclusive rights to transform architectural works fixed in drawings into derivative works.  
The AWCPA also has a provision that codifies media discrimination in rights rather than subject 
matter. Cf. supra Section I.A (distinguishing media discrimination in rights and subject matter). The 
AWCPA provides that architects lack exclusive rights to prevent the reproduction, distribution, or public 
display of photographs of architectural works, provided “the building in which the work is embodied is 
located in or ordinarily visible from a public place.” 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (2019). Making building-copies 
is not permitted without the copyright owner’s permission, but making photograph-copies from public 
places is. This provision raises an interesting question at the intersection between rights and subject-
matter discrimination: Is the architectural work still protected subject matter in a noninfringing 
photograph? Cf. supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing this same conceptual difficulty at the 
boundary of media discrimination in rights and subject matter). A basic principle of copyright 
infringement holds that “[t]here is a transitive property to actual copying: if work A is an actual copy of 
work B, and work B is an actual copy of work C, then work A is deemed an actual copy of work C.” 
Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int'l Corp., 210 F. Supp. 2d 147, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). This 
principle is generally applied in situations in which work B infringes the copyright in work A (or would, 
at least, if it were not licensed). On the assumption that it also applies when work B lies beyond the 
rights of the owner of the copyright in work A, then it implies that § 120(a) creates media discrimination 
in rights without media discrimination in subject matter. Someone can be held liable for creating a 











The media-neutral protection available for the design of buildings as 
AWCPA architectural works is in some ways stronger than the protection 
available for them under pre-AWCPA copyright. By shifting the 
functionality screen for buildings from the separability test of the useful 
articles doctrine to the functionally required test, the AWCPA expands the 
set of protected features of a building design fixed in a building.182 It also 
grants architects the exclusive rights to drawing-to-building copying that 
they lacked under pre-AWCPA copyright.183 
While these increases in the strength of architectural copyright rightly 
receive top billing in most commentary on the AWCPA,184 it is also 
important to note an underappreciated way in which the AWCPA provides 
weaker protection than pre-AWCPA copyright does. The scope of 
protection granted to drawings in drawing-to-drawing copying cases has, in 
theory, shrunk. The drawing side of the building/drawing dichotomy 
protects all of a drawing’s representational content, including illustrations 
of the features of building designs that are not protected when they are fixed 
in buildings. In other words, functionality is not a limit on the scope of 
protection of pre-AWCPA architectural drawings. In contrast, functionality 
does limit the protection that the AWCPA grants to drawings: functionally 
required features of building designs are not protected when fixed in either 
buildings or drawings.185  
This would be a tidy place to wrap up the discussion of AWCPA 
copyright, but there is one last wrinkle to acknowledge. The AWCPA 
clearly creates the new subject-matter category of architectural works and 
institutes media-neutral protection for it. However, architects designing 
today may still be able to benefit from the expansive scope of drawing 
 
duplicate of a copyrighted building (work C) even though they copy a copyrighted building design (work 
A) from photographs (work B) that are noninfringing because of § 120(a).  
182. Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 100, at 1339 (noting that “works that never would have 
passed the separability test will be protected” under the AWCPA). The shift in the scope of building 
protection appears to be large. Courts applying the AWCPA rarely cite functionality as a stand-alone 
justification for refusing to protect features of architectural works. However, the shift could alternatively 
be small. Courts do regularly limit the scope of protection granted by the AWCPA to architectural 
designs by using copyright doctrines other than the functionally required test, such as originality, the 
idea/expression dichotomy, and scenes-a-faire. See, e.g., Design Basics, LLC v. Lexington Homes, Inc., 
858 F.3d 1093, 1100–05 (7th Cir. 2017); Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 105–06 
(2d Cir. 2014). These other conventional doctrines could be the functionally required test dressed up in 
different rhetorical guises. 
183. See supra notes 71–73, 132–135 and accompanying text. 
184. The AWCPA is often understood to create the “full” rights that other authors receive rather 
than the atypically meager rights of pre-AWCPA copyright. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING 
COPYRIGHT LAW 130 (5th ed. 2010). 
185. Because it is inversely related to the increase in the scope of building protection, the decrease 
in the scope of drawing protection in cases alleging drawing-to-drawing copying upon the shift from 
pre-AWCPA copyright to the AWCPA appears to have been small (although there is some doubt on the 













protection in cases alleging drawing-to-drawing copying available under 
pre-AWCPA copyright. The AWCPA did not remove building designs 
fixed in architectural drawings from the category of PGS works.186 If an 
architect registers a technical drawing of a building design as a PGS work, 
they receive the equivalent of pre-AWCPA copyright protection.187 Because 
architects can concurrently register their building designs both as 
architectural works and PGS works,188 they can, in theory, get protection for 
features of building designs that are functionally necessary when those 
features are fixed in drawings through the PGS registration, even though 
they cannot get protection for those features when they are fixed in buildings 
through either registration.189  
III. THE DICHOTOMY’S TRANSACTIONAL VIRTUES  
This Part examines copyright for custom architectural design in a novel 
normative framework, taking the transactional theory, not the market-buffer 
theory, to be the polestar guiding the reach of copyright protection. It argues 
 
186. See T-Peg, Inc. v. Vt. Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 109–10 (1st Cir. 2006). The 
legislative history states that the AWCPA does not affect the previously available protection for building 
designs fixed in drawings under § 102(a)(5). H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 19 (1990). Whether the AWCPA 
eliminates protection as a PGS work for portions of a building design that are conceptually separable 
under the useful articles doctrine presents a difficult question. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit fractured into three separate opinions on this issue in Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 
1212 (2000).  
187. The AWCPA’s legislative history notes one exception to this general rule: the monumental, 
nonfunctional structures that had been separable under the useful articles doctrine and thus protected 
under § 102(a)(5) are “architectural works, and as such, will no[w] be protected exclusively under 
section 102(a)(8).” H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20 n.43. The report uses the word “not,” but it is a typo 
that should read “now.” Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1224 (Tashima, J., concurring); id. at 1231 n.10 (Fisher, 
J., dissenting). 
188. The legislative history of the AWCPA recognizes the possibility of two separate copyrights 
in a single work. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 19. The Register of Copyright allows dual registration. U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 13, at 3.  
189. The media discrimination that persists under the AWCPA applies to fewer features of 
building designs—only those that are functionally necessary—so it is not as economically significant as 
the media discrimination that exists under pre-AWCPA copyright. Cf. supra note 182 (noting that almost 
no features of a building design have been explicitly identified as functionally necessary).  
Paul Goldstein suggests that dual registration of a building design in an architectural drawing as 
both an architectural work and a PGS work should not permit expansive protection that encompasses 
representations of the building’s functional features. The argument is that there are limitations on 
copyright protection other than the useful articles doctrine that prevent protection for architectural 
drawings from extending to functionally necessary features. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 83, § 2.15.1.2. The 
most logical candidate is § 102(b), which states that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018); cf. Samuelson, Frontiers, supra note 99, 
at 1974–77 (discussing many possible applications of § 102(b)). This theory, however, may prove too 
much. Its logical conclusion seems to be that the expansive drawing protection in cases alleging drawing-
to-drawing copying that constitutes the drawing side of the building/drawing dichotomy of pre-AWCPA 
copyright is, and always has been, legal error, at least since the 1976 Act enacted § 102(b).  











that the building/drawing dichotomy and its media discrimination in subject 
matter are good policy when copyright’s principal task is to facilitate the 
architect–client transaction, rather than to provide ex ante incentives by 
tamping down on copying by strangers. In a more abbreviated argument, it 
also suggests that this transactional goal should be the primary objective of 
copyright in custom architecture. 
One ramification of reframing the building/drawing dichotomy as a way 
of optimizing copyright to the demands of transactional theory is important 
to note at the outset. Concerns about copyright protection for functional 
artifacts made the conditions ripe for the development of the 
building/drawing dichotomy as a historical matter,190 but these concerns are 
largely irrelevant to why the building/drawing dichotomy is good policy 
from a transactional perspective.191  
The argument proceeds in four steps. Section III.A introduces the 
transactional theory as a normative ground for copyright. Copyright can 
facilitate transactions between willing market partners by overcoming the 
disclosure dilemmas caused by Arrow’s information paradox. Section III.B 
demonstrates that copyright in custom architecture has significant social 
value under the transactional theory. The architect–client transaction that 
lies at the heart of the architectural profession creates disclosure dilemmas, 
and copyright helps to resolve them. Section III.C argues that the 
building/drawing dichotomy and its media discrimination in subject matter 
tailor copyright to the transactional theory. Eliminating building protection 
while preserving drawing protection leads to a win–tie scenario under the 
transactional theory’s cost–benefit calculus: it reduces copyright’s access 
costs without reducing copyright’s transactional benefits. Section III.D 
argues that tailoring architectural copyright to the transactional theory is 
likely a good idea because building protection does not generate significant 
benefits under the market-buffer theory. Combined, these two sections 
demonstrate that the building/drawing dichotomy is good policy under a 
pluralistic utilitarian justification of copyright that takes both the 
transactional and incentive theories into account.192 Finally, Section III.E 
 
190. See supra Section II.C.  
191. The template for justified media discrimination in subject matter that the building/drawing 
dichotomy provides is not limited to fields in which the articles sold to consumers have functional 
properties. See infra notes 332–335 and accompanying text. But cf. supra note 25 (noting how the 
functionality of buildings makes an indirect contribution to the transactional justification of the 
building/drawing dichotomy). 
192. Prospect theory offers a third utilitarian justification for copyright. Giving a single entity 
rights to coordinate the development of a nascent work (a “prospect”) into a diverse array of derivative 
works and commercialized goods eliminates the waste that inheres in competitive development. See 
Kitch, supra note 5, at 266 (developing prospect theory in the context of patents); Lemley, supra note 














sounds a note of caution about returning to pre-AWCPA copyright because 
architectural copyright governs both custom and stock building designs. 
A. The Transactional Theory 
Copyright produces a social benefit under the transactional theory 
because it facilitates transactions in which authors sell their works when 
knowledge of the work is not widely known or easily ascertained. These 
transactions are sales of works as information commodities. Sales of works 
as information commodities help authors to bring works that have already 
reached their earliest stage of conception through the development and 
commercialization processes required to produce the marketable copies of 
works that consumers desire. Authors may require capital to refine and 
commercialize a work.193 They may need to outsource particular functions 
or inputs in the supply chain to efficiently refine and commercialize works 
because bringing them in house is costly.194 They may want to sell the entire 
work to a more efficient commercializer.  
Sales of works as information commodities can be delicate affairs in a 
world without copyright, and Arrow’s information paradox captures the 
trickiness involved.195 Consider a doll designer who wants to sell a doll 
design to a doll manufacturer. The manufacturer (an information purchaser) 
may understandably insist on early disclosure by the author (an information 
seller) to accurately value the work before promising payment.196 But, as 
soon as the author reveals the information, the manufacturer possesses it 
and can appropriate it without paying for it at all.197 Authors seeking to sell 
works as information commodities thus face disclosure dilemmas: they 
either risk giving their information away by disclosing, or they forgo the 
sale and the allocative efficiency that it generates by not disclosing. The 
paradox is unique to the sale of information because, unlike with tangible 
goods, the commodity being exchanged is the very resource needed to put 
a value on the commodity.  
Importantly, disclosure dilemmas only exist when the purchaser does not 
initially know, or cannot easily obtain knowledge of, the information that it 
seeks to purchase. When works are already widely known, the appropriation 
could occur even without the author’s disclosure. Authors’ disclosures are 
 
193. See Burstein, supra note 5, at 241–42. 
194. Barnett, supra note 5, at 796–97.  
195. Arrow, supra note 6, at 615. The information paradox is also known as a “double trust 
dilemma.” ROBERT D. COOTER & HANS-BERND SCHÄFER, SOLOMON’S KNOT: HOW LAW CAN END THE 
POVERTY OF NATIONS 27 (2012). 
196. Arrow, supra note 6, at 615. 
197. Id. 











not what enables the appropriation, so authors do not hesitate to provide the 
disclosure needed to propose a transaction due to appropriation concerns.198 
For example, once self-informing copies of works are available on the 
commercial market, there are no more disclosure dilemmas concerning the 
work fixed in those copies.199 
Copyright can defuse disclosure dilemmas and resolve Arrow’s 
information paradox.200 When copyright impedes purchasers’ ability to 
commercially exploit disclosed works without permission, authors are less 
hesitant to disclose their works. Implicit in this statement, however, is a 
limiting principle: copyright does not make authors more comfortable with 
disclosure when commercial exploitation of their works does not require 
infringement.201 For example, copyright is notoriously ineffective at 
preventing movie producers and studios from appropriating the highly 
general pitches for movies and TV shows that authors need to disclose in 
order to sell their works as information commodities.202 Much of the value 
of treatments lies in the ideas that they convey, and the lack of protection 
for ideas under the idea/expression dichotomy means that copyright does 
not make authors more comfortable providing their disclosures.203 
As was true for its utilitarian cousin, the market-buffer theory, the 
transactional theory does not suggest that stronger rights are always better. 
Copyright still imposes the exact same access costs on end users and 
second-generation creators identified above.204 Thus, copyright’s 
justification under the transactional theory also involves a tradeoff: the 
social benefits of contractual exchanges that might not otherwise occur must 
be balanced against the costs of access restrictions and administrative costs.  
 
198. Thus, the grant of a license to make a copyrighted work is not a sale of a work as an 
information commodity if the licensee already had knowledge of the nature of the copyrighted work 
before approaching the author for a license. The author’s disclosure could, however, still create some 
value for the transactional partner by identifying which of many works that are publicly available are 
best suited to the transactional partner’s needs.  
199. Barnett, supra note 5, at 794. A copy is self-informing when an examination of the copy 
reveals the work. Cf. Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the 
Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 83 (defining self-disclosing goods in patent law). In copyright, 
most copies are self-informing.  
200. See supra note 6 (citing sources). But cf. infra Section III.E (noting that copyright is not the 
only way to resolve disclosure dilemmas and exploring alternatives). 
201. Cf. Burstein, supra note 5, at 259–60 (making this point with respect to patents). 
202. Julie A. Byren, When the Million-Dollar Pitch Doesn’t Pay a Dime: Why Idea Submission 
Claims Should Survive Copyright Preemption, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1037, 1067–70 (2013). 
203. Id. at 1040–42.  













B. Architectural Copyright’s Transactional Benefits 
Copyright in custom architecture produces significant social value under 
the transactional theory. Architects rarely produce custom works on their 
own on a speculative basis.205 Rather, in what this Article terms the 
architect–client transaction, clients pay architects to produce creative 
works that are customized to their tastes and needs.206 The architect–client 
transaction is a classic example of the sale of an information commodity, so 
architects face disclosure dilemmas that can derail the custom design 
process before it gets started.207 Copyright can often help to resolve these 
dilemmas.208 Furthermore, although there are also other legal tools for 
resolving disclosure dilemmas, copyright is likely the best tool for the job 
in the context of custom architectural design.209 
1. The Design-Bid-Build Process 
The most common method for project delivery in custom architecture—
i.e., for the process of designing a custom architectural work and 
constructing a building in which it is fixed—is design-bid-build.210 Design-
bid-build involves a strict sequence of five phases: schematic design, design 
development, bid documentation, bid oversight (or procurement services), 
and construction management.211 Client approval to continue is required at 
the end of each phase.212 
 
205. Cf. ROBERT GUTMAN, ARCHITECTURAL PRACTICE: A CRITICAL VIEW 71 (1988) (noting that 
custom architects are heavily dependent on clients to realize their ambitions).  
206. See infra Section III.B.1. The conventional trade terminology is the “owner–architect” 
transaction because clients are future building owners. See Am. Inst. of Architects, Document B101-
2017, Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Architect (2007) [hereinafter AIA Document 
B101-2017]. This Article avoids using the term “owner” to refer to clients to avoid confusion. In 
copyright scholarship, the architect might be intuitively considered to be the owner because architects 
usually own the copyrights in their works. 
207. See infra Section III.B.2. 
208. See infra Section III.B.3. 
209. See infra Section III.B.4. 
210. WILLIAM ALLENSWORTH ET AL. , CONSTRUCTION LAW 64 (2009).  
211. See AIA Document B101-2017, supra note 206, §§ 3.2–3.6; Defining the Architect’s Basic 
Services, AIA BEST PRACTICES 15.01.01, http://www.aia.org/aiaucmp/groups/secure/documents/pdf/aia 
p026834.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN62-2DX7]; ROGER K. LEWIS, ARCHITECT? A CANDID GUIDE TO THE 
PROFESSION 224–26 (3d ed. 2013). In contrast, a fast-track project telescopes the phases. See GAIL S. 
KELLEY, CONSTRUCTION LAW: AN INTRODUCTION FOR ENGINEERS, ARCHITECTS, AND CONTRACTORS 
47–48 (2013).  
212. THE AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, THE ARCHITECT’S HANDBOOK OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 
526 (14th ed. 2008) [hereinafter AIA HANDBOOK].   











During schematic design, architects develop a parti or the general 
concept that informs the design.213 “A parti diagram can describe massing, 
entrance, spatial hierarchy, site relationship, core location, interior 
circulation, public/private zoning, solidity/transparency, and many other 
concerns.”214 The development of a parti is the phase at which architects’ 
design sensibilities have the greatest freedom, and it produces the quick, 
rough, and (sometimes) inspired drawings, such as the napkin sketches that 
are ingrained in architectural lore.215 The final work product of schematic 
design is a set of highly generalized drawings illustrating only the most 
basic principles of the project’s spatial relationships, scale, and form.216  
In design development, architects begin to accommodate the many 
practical realities of a successful building. They conceive and document the 
basic principles of the structural, mechanical, electrical, and plumbing 
systems; they specify the materials that they plan to use with greater 
precision.217 Some of this refinement simply fills in detail to the parti, but 
some demands modification of the parti itself. A tenacious grasp on the 
holistic vision of the project is essential to the synthetic thought that goes 
into design development.218 By the end of design development, the architect 
should be confident that the design can be built, even though its details have 
not yet been fully specified.219  
In bid documentation, architects create a voluminous set of construction 
documents. Construction documents include not only detailed drawings 
illustrating how different building components fit together but also 
extensive texts or specifications explaining the different building 
systems.220 Although there are unquestionably creative choices required to 
flesh out the details of building features such as exterior cladding systems 
and interior finishes, generating construction documents demands a 
different skill set than either schematic design or design development does. 
Here, deep familiarity with the construction industry and an ability to keep 
the larger project in mind when working on the smallest of details are 
 
213. MATTHEW FREDERICK, 101 THINGS I LEARNED IN ARCHITECTURE SCHOOL 15–16, 25 
(2007); see also id. at 28 (“Think of a parti as an author employs a thesis, or as a composer employs a 
musical theme . . . .”). 
214. Id. at 15. 
215. DINNER FOR ARCHITECTS: A COLLECTION OF NAPKIN SKETCHES (Winfried Nerdinger ed., 
2004). 
216. ALLENSWORTH ET AL., supra note 210, at 157. 
217. Id. at 158.  
218. Understanding that design decisions are contingent and deciding when to stick with or 
abandon prior decisions are some of the most difficult skills for architects to develop. See FREDERICK, 
supra note 213, at 29, 81.  
219. ALLENSWORTH ET AL., supra note 210, at 158. 













critical. In gross, practical knowledge, thorough execution, and 
perseverance grow more important in relation to creative vision. 
Under design-bid-build, architects do not construct buildings, hire the 
builders who construct buildings, or even hire the general contractors who 
hire the builders. Rather, clients hire builders or general contractors and task 
them with constructing the buildings described in architects’ construction 
documents.221 In the final two stages of design-bid-build, architects thus 
advise their clients on which contractors to hire, and they oversee the 
contractors’ work. During bid oversight, clients send the bid documents out 
to competing general contractors for bids that specify the construction 
methods that they would use and the price they would charge to realize the 
building.222 Architects help clients evaluate these bids and select a 
contractor. During construction management, architects represent their 
clients.223 They visit the job site to examine the contractors’ work; attend 
progress meetings with contractors, clients, and other interested parties; 
review “shop drawings” submitted by the contractor, subcontractors, and 
suppliers; and prepare construction observation reports that enable 
contractors to be paid.224 Construction documents are almost always 
updated and modified during the course of construction management 
through “change orders,” as foreseeing all of the complex details of fitting 
the different building systems constructed by different building trades 
together would be an impossible undertaking.225 Construction documents 
are thus classic examples of incomplete contracts.226 The client and the 
contractor sign a contract to build a building, but many of the details about 
exactly how the building will be built are not fully specified before the 
contract is signed. They are filled in, and the occasional error in the 
construction documents is rectified, in real time as the construction process 
proceeds.  
 
221. There is no direct contractual relationship between architects and contractors. Clients hire 
contractors under a client-contractor contract that is distinct from the architect–client contract. See Am. 
Inst. of Architects, Document A101-2017, Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor 
(2017). Under the less common design-build method of project delivery, architects also serve as general 
contractors, so they do hire builders. LEWIS, supra note 211, at 278; ALLENSWORTH ET AL., supra note 
210, at 75–78. 
222. AIA HANDBOOK, supra note 212, at 562–73.  
223. Id. at 574–92. 
224. LEWIS, supra note 211, at 250. 
225. ALLENSWORTH ET AL., supra note 210, at 431; LEWIS, supra note 211, at 252; JUSTIN SWEET 
& MARC M. SCHNEIER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION 
PROCESS 330 (9th ed. 2013).   
226. Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115 
(1999). 











2. The Disclosure Dilemmas 
Given that the architect–client transaction entails a classic sale of a work 
as an information commodity (the work fixed in construction documents) 
for valuable consideration (client fees), it should be unsurprising that the 
transaction implicates Arrow’s information paradox. What is perhaps 
surprising, however, is that custom architects face disclosure dilemmas not 
only before a contract has been signed but after, as well.  
The pre-contract disclosure dilemma is a familiar variant of the scenarios 
commonly considered in the literature on Arrow’s information paradox. A 
client walks into an architect’s office. The client is unlikely to have a well-
developed image of what her building should look like or what its interior 
spatial configuration should be.227 The client does not want to pay the 
architect for design services until she has an idea of whether or not she will 
like the project that the architect designs. So, to determine whether she 
values the architect’s services enough to pay for them, she asks to see some 
rough sketches of what the architect envisions.228 The architect, however, 
does not want to do any design work before a contract promising payment 
is in place. She does not like to give away her services, and she is concerned 
that the client will take the sketch to another architect for refinement and 
execution. In other words, the architect faces a disclosure dilemma. Absent 
copyright, should she disclose the information and risk giving it away, or 
should she threaten to walk away from the project?229  
In the literature on Arrow’s information paradox, a binding contract is 
often taken as a sign that disclosure dilemmas have been successfully 
defused. That is, with contracts in place, information sellers are presumed 
to have secured full payment for the disclosed information.230 However, the 
custom architect’s disclosure dilemma introduces a twist into the classic 
paradox because it does not end when architects and clients sign a design-
bid-build contract. A combination of three industry-specific features creates 
a post-contract disclosure dilemma: the multi-phase design-bid-build 
 
227. ALLENSWORTH ET AL., supra note 210, at 156.  
228. See LEWIS, supra note 211, at 283–84 (discussing the calculus of giving away early-stage 
work for free as a “loss leader”). Firms’ reputations and their portfolios of earlier projects can reduce 
the owner’s unease about signing a contract without any project-specific disclosure by the architect. 
However, small firms often lack the necessary reputations and portfolios.  
229. Today, architects commonly forge ahead and disclose preliminary design information 
without securing a legally binding promise for payment. They work for extended periods of time, 
anticipating contracts that never get executed; they provide the owner with free sketches as a “loss 
leader” or a “come-on to attract the client’s business.” LEWIS, supra note 211, at 283–84. This disclosure, 
however, should not be taken to suggest that there is no disclosure dilemma. A professional norm of 
disclosure may exist precisely because copyright protects drawings and prevents the most egregious 
forms of client appropriation.  













process, the backloaded architectural fees, and the client’s right to terminate 
for convenience.  
Architects’ fees are spread out across the five phases of the design-bid-
build process, with a specified percentage of the fees being delivered in each 
phase.231 The percentages are not fixed in stone, and information about 
industry norms concerning architectural fees is difficult to come by.232 
Nonetheless, one recurring estimate is 15 percent for schematic design, 20 
percent for design development, 40 percent for construction documents, 5 
percent for bid oversight, and 20 percent for construction administration.233 
This division means that roughly two-thirds of the fees are paid after 
completion of both schematic design and design development. 
This percentage breakdown backloads architects’ fees. Extending the 
notion of pre-contractual, loss-leader work into the early phases of the 
contract, they do work on the cheap up front with the expectation of earning 
more on the back end. Firms openly acknowledge this underweighting of 
the early phases of the design process in the fee structure. When it offers its 
services on an à-la-carte basis, one architectural firm increases the cost of 
schematic design as a stand-alone service:  
To make the overall numbers work[, the firm] rebalanced its fee 
structure. The 15 percent of construction cost it used to charge for 
schematic design in a soup-to-nuts scenario has been raised to 25 
percent. “Before, the design fee was spread throughout the project, 
and sometimes we were short,” [the architect] explains. “We always 
 
231. WERNER SABO, LEGAL GUIDE TO AIA DOCUMENTS 191 (5th ed. 2008). The total payment is 
most commonly a fixed fee for smaller projects or a percentage of construction costs for larger projects. 
SWEET & SCHNEIER, supra note 225, at 185–89, 190–91. Hourly billing is also occasionally used. Id. at 
189–90. 
232. As one commentator notes, “[t]he first rule of architecture fees is that you don’t talk about 
architecture fees.” Elizabeth Evitts Dickinson, A Better Value, ARCHITECT MAG. (Jan. 1, 2014), https://w 
ww.architectmagazine.com/practice/a-better-value_o [https://perma.cc/TKB7-HYVE]. The lack of 
information on fees is often attributed to antitrust actions that the government brought against the 
American Institute of Architects (“AIA”). These actions resulted in consent decrees in June of 1972 and 
October of 1990 that prohibited the AIA from adopting a standard or policy concerning the fees that 
architects should charge. Id. “[T]he most lasting effect of the antitrust litigation may well be the silence 
that ensued. Architects have been afraid to talk shop, in part because they don’t fully understand the 
scope of the law as it relates to fees.” Id. 
233. See, e.g., Tracy Kaler, NYC Renovation Questions: How Much Do Architects Charge?, 
BRICK UNDERGROUND (Jan. 16, 2013, 8:58 AM), http://www.brickunderground.com/blog/2013/01/the_ 
real_scoop_on_architectural_fees_they_can_be_negotiated [https://perma.cc/5GZT-JL7B]. The Royal 
Architectural Institute of Canada, which is not bound by the AIA antitrust decrees, offers a similar 
breakdown of architects’ fees across the phases of the design-bid-build process. See A GUIDE TO 
DETERMINING APPROPRIATE FEES FOR THE SERVICES OF AN ARCHITECT, ROYAL ARCHITECTURAL INST. 
CAN. (2009), http://www.mbarchitects.org/docs/guide_architectservicefees(e).pdf [https://perma.cc/2A 
F6-VLKM]. 











spent more time up front; now we’re just charging for it. It’s a way 
to get our fees at the front rather than at the end.”234 
Furthermore, the earlier stages of schematic design and design 
development are where the creative faculties of talented architects get the 
most exercise.235 The final phases are where good, creative architectural 
design can go bad, but they are rarely where good, creative design 
originates. For this reason, one could argue that the hourly rate should be 
higher, rather than lower, in the earlier phases that are, today, 
underweighted in the distribution of architects’ fees. 
If the execution of a contract for design services were to require clients 
to hire architects for all five design phases, backloaded fees would not create 
post-contract disclosure dilemmas. However, the industry-standard contract 
allows clients to terminate for convenience.236 The numerous contingencies 
involved in financing and getting approval for a building mean that the 
parties do not attempt to identify all situations in which the client can 
terminate.237  
Together, the multiple phases of the design-bid-build process, the 
backloaded fees, and the client’s right to terminate for convenience create 
the post-contract disclosure dilemma. Clients may see advantages in 
changing horses (i.e., architects) mid-stream. They may obtain an early-
stage architectural work from a first architect renown for creativity and who, 
as a consequence, charges higher fees. They may then terminate that 
architect for convenience and take the work to another architect for 
refinement and execution. The other firm may not have been capable of 
generating the creative design, but it may be well equipped—perhaps even 
better equipped—to perform the more managerial tasks that are required 
during the construction document, bid oversight, and construction 
management phases. Furthermore, because the second firm is not as design-
minded, it is likely to charge lower fees. Absent copyright, should the 
 
234. Right-Sizing Your Price, ARCHITECT MAG. (Aug. 9, 2010), https://www.architectmagazine.c 
om/practice/right-sizing-your-price_o [https://perma.cc/24SJ-S478]. 
235. See supra notes 213–219 and accompanying text. 
236. AIA Document B101-2017, supra note 206, § 9.5; SABO, supra note 231, at 177–78. When 
the client terminates the agreement for convenience, the architect can collect compensation for services 
performed prior to termination plus termination expenses. AIA Document B101-2017, supra note 206, 
§ 9.6; SABO, supra note 231, at 178.  
237. Clients frequently start the design process before knowing whether they will be able to realize 
the design as a building. See SWEET & SCHNEIER, supra note 225, at 239 (“Because of the uncertainties 
inherent in the construction process, project abandonment is not rare.”). The purchase of the parcel of 
land on which the design is sited may fall through. Clients often need the design to obtain regulatory 
approval (e.g., a zoning variance), and they may fail to get the approval. Clients may use schematic-
design or design-development documents to raise money needed for the project or convince essential 
constituencies, such as a board of governors, of the value of the building project, and they may fail to 
obtain the needed capital or green light. Changing business plans, interest rates, or other market 













architect fully disclose design information to a client in the early, post-
contract phases of the design process and risk not being properly 
compensated, or should she withhold information that the client should 
ideally know to approve the early-stage design work? 
3. Copyright Defuses the Dilemmas 
When it plays the role scripted by the transactional theory, copyright 
gives architects more confidence to disclose their works to their clients and 
thereby helps to resolve architects’ disclosure dilemmas. If a client 
terminates for convenience and takes an early-phase work designed by a 
first architect to a second architect for refinement and execution, the second 
architect must make copies of the work to pick up where the first architect 
left off.238 Thus, a client cannot appropriate protected material from an 
architect’s copyrighted design without committing infringement, and the 
architect is more comfortable disclosing first and getting a binding 
commitment for payment in place later. 
Copyright, however, is a more effective tool for defusing disclosure 
dilemmas when the appropriation occurs later in the design-bid-build 
process. As the architect’s work becomes more detailed, the likelihood that 
the copying constitutes infringement under the idea/expression dichotomy 
increases.239 If the appropriation occurs early—for example, if the 
appropriated work is a napkin-sketch parti240—the inherent generality of the 
work means that the bulk of the work’s value lies in unprotected ideas.241 
Even close copying may not amount to infringement. If appropriation 
occurs later—for example, after design development—the work is full of 
protectable expression illustrating how the parti should be realized, and 
close copying is more likely to amount to infringement.242  
Copyright can function as a tool for defusing disclosure dilemmas at all 
only because architects possess the relevant copyright interests. Architects 
are the authors, and thus initial owners, of the copyrights in the building 
 
238. Actual copying is an element of copyright infringement. See Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, 
Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169–70 (7th Cir. 1997). Copyright only deters clients from terminating a first 
architect and asking a second architect to complete the first architect’s work. It does not deter them from 
firing a first architect and starting the design process over with a second architect.  
239. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
240. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
241. See, e.g., Attia v. Soc’y of the N.Y. Hosp., 201 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the client 
only copied ideas when plaintiff’s allegedly appropriated work was “a series of architectural drawings 
and sketches to present th[e] concept” of a hospital on a platform over the FDR drive).  
242. See, e.g., Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding a triable 
issue of fact on infringement when the plaintiff’s allegedly appropriated work was a juried competition 
entry). 











designs that they create for clients.243 The standard client–owner contract 
published by the American Institute of Architects (“AIA”) and widely used 
in the field specifies that the copyright remains with the architect and is not 
assigned to the client.244 The client only receives a nonexclusive, no-fee 
license “for purposes of constructing, using, maintaining, altering and 
adding to the Project.”245 If the owner terminates the contract for 
convenience, the owner must negotiate a license from the architect in order 
to continue the conduct permitted by the license.246 
Clients sometimes argue that they have implicit, nonexclusive licenses 
to use the works that architects generate after they terminate the contract for 
convenience to construct the building they desire, provided that they pay the 
fees due to architects under the contract up to the time of termination. In 
gross, owners intuitively believe that they paid the architects for their 
designs, so the designs become to some extent the property of the owners. 
(Clients cannot argue that the implicit agreement was a wholesale 
assignment of a copyright because copyright assignments require express, 
 
243. Authorship, by default, vests in the party who actually creates a work. See Cmty. for Creative 
Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 738 (1989). The work for hire doctrine, which is an exception to 
this default, does not make the client the author because architects are usually independent contractors, 
not employees. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (2018). Clients sometimes argue that they are entitled to 
some form of authorship interest in a building design because the process of custom design is highly 
interactive and they are, in fact, parties who actually create building designs. As a factual matter, it is 
true that clients often work closely with architects and make substantive contributions during the design 
process. However, the clients’ arguments concerning authorship routinely fail as a legal matter. “Indeed, 
courts have uniformly held that absent unusual circumstances, if a homeowner who lacks architectural 
training provides ‘sketches,’ ‘instructions,’ or ‘input’ to a professional architect, then the architect—not 
the homeowner—is the author of the resulting blueprints.” Sorenson v. Wolfson, 96 F. Supp. 3d 347, 
363 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
244. AIA Document B101-2017, supra note 206, § 7.2.  
245. Id. § 7.3. Older versions of the AIA architect–client agreement granted owners less generous 
use rights. The 1987 agreement did not expressly grant any use rights. See SWEET & SCHNEIER, supra 
note 225, at 234; SABO, supra note 231, at 111. The 1997 agreement gave the owner a nonexclusive 
license to reproduce the documents for the purpose of building, using, and maintaining the project, but 
not for altering or adding to the project. SWEET & SCHNEIER, supra note 225, at 234.  
In addition to collecting more fees, architects seek to avoid exposure to liability for construction 
defects by preventing clients from taking their drawings to other architects to complete their designs and 
construct buildings. If a future architect fails to correct a design error prior to construction or uses a 
building design in an unforeseen manner, the initial architect may end up being dragged into the resulting 
lawsuit. See SWEET & SCHNEIER, supra note 225, at 233; SABO, supra note 231, at 111. The standard 
AIA architect–client agreement now releases the architect from liability and requires the client to pay 
the architect’s legal fees if an owner uses an architect’s plans without retaining the architect’s services. 
AIA Document B101-2017, supra note 206, § 7.3.1; SABO, supra note 231, at 124. 
246. The 2007 version of the standard AIA architect–client agreement departed from prior 
versions by providing for a licensing fee for the continuation of the owner’s use license if the owner 
terminates the contract for convenience or the architect terminates the contract due to the owner’s failure 
to pay fees due in a timely manner. Am. Inst. of Architects, Document B101-2007, Standard Form of 
Agreement Between Owner and Architect, § 11.9 (2007); see also ALLENSWORTH ET AL., supra note 
210, at 174–75; SABO, supra note 231, at 194–95. A similar provision was carried forward into the 2017 













written agreements, but nonexclusive licenses do not).247 Courts use a three-
element test to determine whether an author has granted an implied license: 
the potential licensee must request the creation of the work, the potential 
licensor must create and deliver the work to the potential licensee, and the 
potential licensor must intend that the licensee have a nonexclusive right to 
make copies or derivative works.248 The facts underlying architect–client 
infringement actions usually satisfy the first two factors, so the third, intent 
factor is usually the most important. In turn, a finding of an intent to grant 
an implied license commonly hinges on whether the architect and client 
envisioned a short-term transaction for a single phase of project delivery 
when they signed the contract or whether they were planning to work 
together for all phases.249  
This test for the existence of an implied, no-fee license dovetails 
perfectly with copyright’s role in defusing post-contract disclosure 
dilemmas. If the client hires the architect to perform only a single phase, say 
schematic design, the architect is assumed to have intended to grant the 
client a license.250 The concern over post-contractual client appropriation is 
reduced in this scenario because à-la-carte pricing for particular phases of 
the design-bid-build does not backload architects’ fees.251 However, if the 
client engages the architect for all phases, then the architect is assumed not 
to have intended to grant the client an implied license.252 Copyright provides 
the architect a remedy only in the scenario wherein the architect could 
hesitate to disclose because of a concern about eventually receiving back-
loaded fees. 
 
247. Transfers of ownership require exclusive licenses. 17 U.S.C. § 204 (2018). Nonexclusive 
licenses are not transfers of ownership. Id. § 201. 
248. Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558–59 (9th Cir. 1990). 
249. Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 516 (4th Cir. 2002). Courts 
also consider whether architects’ proposed contracts contain terms retaining exclusive rights and 
whether architects’ behavior manifests the belief that clients have nonexclusive licenses. Id. 
250. See Foad Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821, 827–28 (9th Cir. 2001); I.A.E., 
Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 774–77 (7th Cir. 1996). 
251. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
252. See John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 40–42 (1st Cir. 
2003); Nelson-Salabes, 284 F.3d at 514–17; Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 499–502 (6th Cir. 1998); 
Saxelbye Architects, Inc. v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co., No. 96-2766, 1997 WL 702290, at *3–4 (4th 
Cir. Nov. 3, 1997); cf. Francois v. Jack Ruch Quality Homes, Inc., No. 03-1419, 2006 WL 2361892, at 
*7–11 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2006) (denying summary judgment because of a factual dispute as to whether 
the owner had intended to use the architect’s services for all phases of the project). The presumption can 
be strong: one court found no implied license even when the work was incorporated into a restrictive 
covenant running with the land. John G. Danielson, 322 F.3d at 40–42. 











4. Alternative Legal Mechanisms for Defusing the Dilemma 
The previous Section focused on showing that copyright can resolve 
architects’ disclosure dilemmas. This Section argues, albeit more 
tentatively, that copyright is the best way to resolve them. That is, it argues 
that there are not alternative tools in the toolbox that could do the job more 
efficiently.253 The commonly considered alternatives to copyright as a tool 
for resolving information paradoxes are inapplicable in the context of 
custom architecture.  
Other forms of intellectual property do not offer architects enough 
protection against client appropriation to defuse their disclosure paradoxes. 
Utility patents do not provide effective protection for most architectural 
works,254 and design patents are costly to obtain in relation to copyrights.255 
Trade secrecy can overcome the disclosure paradox in some situations,256 
but architectural designs cannot be kept secret for long.257  
The bulk of the commonly considered mechanisms for resolving 
disclosure dilemmas other than intellectual property are not viable in the 
context of custom architecture, either. While “second-order” information 
that communicates the value of a work can sometimes be disclosed without 
disclosing the work itself,258 there is no such second-order information for 
architectural works. A professional norm against appropriation can facilitate 
disclosure,259 but strong norms among the heterogeneous collection of 
largely one-shot players in the building market who become architects’ 
 
253. Cf. Burstein, supra note 5, at 262–74 (considering options other than intellectual property for 
resolving information paradoxes). Copyright becomes a more attractive tool for resolving architects’ 
disclosure dilemmas if the building/drawing dichotomy limits its reach. See infra Section III.C. 
254.  Utility patents have historically protected spatial layouts embodying functional innovation, 
but only a small fraction of architectural works will qualify for protection. Collins, supra note 103, at 
1646–51.  
255.  Design patents can protect architectural designs. See Brainard, supra note 15, at 87–89; 
Cahn, supra note 15, at 117–20; Voorhees, supra note 15, at 84–87. They offer the most plausible 
alternative form of intellectual property for resolving architects’ disclosure dilemmas. However, they 
require an expensive application and examination process that few architects undertake for custom 
works, especially at early stages of the design-bid-build process.  
256. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 311, 336–37 (2008). 
257. Architects must coordinate with a large team of professionals. See FREDERICK, supra note 
213, at 21; LEWIS, supra note 211, at 197, 208. Clients frequently want to publicize designs to raise 
funds for, and public awareness of, their projects, and regulatory approval requires drawings to be 
deposited with local governments. LEWIS, supra note 211, at 204–06, 224–25, 244–46. 
258. Burstein, supra note 5, at 255–58; see also Barnett, supra note 5, at 801–02; cf. James J. 
Anton & Dennis A. Yao, The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting, 69 
REV. ECON. STUD. 513, 515 (2002) (considering a combination of partial disclosure and bonds to resolve 
disclosure dilemmas). 













clients are unlikely.260 Vertical integration eliminates the need to sell works 
as an information commodity,261 but requiring clients to take on architects 
as employees every time they want to pursue a custom building project is 
implausible.262 Two alternatives to copyright, however, do merit more in-
depth consideration: the laws of contract and tangible property.  
Absent any copyright, the architect and client could insert a clause into 
the architect–client agreement that attempts to replicate the effect of a 
copyright by prohibiting post-contract client appropriation. For example, 
the architect–client agreement could specify that the client will not use the 
architect’s building design, first, to construct multiple buildings or, second, 
to construct the first building if the owner terminates the contract for 
convenience or the architect terminates because the owner fails to pay the 
architect monies already due under the contract. Attempts to use contract 
law as a substitute for copyright, however, often leave architects without 
effective remedies because of contract law’s privity requirement.263 Under 
copyright, architects’ infringement suits can include not only clients as 
defendants but also the many other parties involved in a building project on 
the client side, including the client’s new architects, the contractor or 
builder, or even the banks that lend money to clients for the construction 
project. In contrast, under contract law, the architects’ suits can only be 
brought against clients. In some cases, the architect has no cause of action 
against the client at all. For example, the client may sell the parcel of land 
that is the site of the building project or title to that parcel may transfer in 
bankruptcy.264 If the new owner of the parcel appropriates the architect’s 
building design, the client who has a contractual bond with the architect is 
no longer in the picture at all. Privity means that the contract’s in personam 
rights cannot do what copyright’s in rem rights can do.265 
 
260. Setting aside professional developers, constructing buildings is not part of most clients’ 
ongoing business. See LEWIS, supra note 211, at 275.  
261. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 803–12; Burk & McDonnell, supra note 5, at 579, 587–88; R. 
H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 391–92 (1937). 
262. The transaction costs of keeping architects on the payroll would likely outweigh the 
transaction costs avoided by not engaging in a market transaction. See Burk & McDonnell, supra note 
5, at 583–90; Coase, supra note 261, at 395–97.  
263. Although the transactional theory focuses on copyright’s impact on transactional partners, it 
still recognizes the importance of copyright’s in rem rights, as opposed to contract’s in personam rights, 
as a way of going after entities who are not parties to the contract yet who stand in the shoes of 
information recipients.  
264. For examples of architectural copyright infringement cases in which architects sue parties 
who come to stand in their former clients’ shoes, see John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant 
Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2003); Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Holdings, No. Civ. B-98-
2226, 2001 WL 419002 (D. Md. Feb. 16, 2001), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 284 
F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2002).  
265. In addition, contracts governing the exchange of information, and especially yet-to-be-
developed information, are tricky because of “the difficulties of describing information precisely, 











Alternatively, and perhaps most simply, architects could demand fees 
that are not backloaded regardless of whether client appropriation occurs.266 
This change, however, might not be preferable to copyright—and especially 
copyright limited by the building/drawing dichotomy—for either the 
architects or the clients.267 For clients, the lower fees in the earlier phases 
are clearly advantageous because they shift financial risk onto architects.268 
Perhaps more surprisingly, backloaded fees also have benefits for architects 
(at least from the perspective of firms who do not yet know that they will 
not see a project through to building completion) because they increase the 
amount of work that clients will pay for. Backloaded fees reduce the costs 
that clients incur to start design work, meaning that clients will seek out 
design work when the risk of a project not being brought through to 
completion is greater. Architects may prefer having a larger quantity of 
work at a reduced fee (especially if the early-stage fees cover firms’ labor 
costs, even if they do not contribute to firms’ profits). Many less-established 
firms can benefit from unrealized projects because they fill out the firms’ 
portfolios and help to obtain future work.269  
The contractual solutions noted above are only possible once there is a 
contract in place, and they are therefore only helpful for resolving post-
contract disclosure dilemmas. Attempts to use copyright to resolve 
architects’ pre-contract disclosure dilemmas layer yet another problem on 
top of those already discussed: the courts need to find an implicit agreement 
for the client not to appropriate the architect’s building design without 
compensating the architect. Similar implied contracts already exist in 
 
evidentiary uncertainty, and the limitations of contractual remedies, to name a few.” Yelderman, supra 
note 5, at 1580. If copyright did not exist, how would a court determine whether a client used an 
architect’s building design? 
266. The contract could also eliminate clients’ rights to terminate for convenience or grant 
architects rights to a stipulated sum upon termination for convenience equal to the backloaded portion 
of the fees. The standard AIA architect–client agreement layers this latter provision on top of the 
architect’s ability to use copyright to prevent client appropriation of architectural works still under 
development. AIA Document B101-2017, supra note 206, §§ 9.6, 9.7 (specifying a termination fee that 
includes “the Architect’s anticipated profit on the value of the services not performed by the Architect”). 
As a stand-alone measure, this contractual provision raises the difficult problem of determining whether 
a client has used an architect’s work. How does a court determine whether the client has appropriated 
the architect’s building design without relying on copyright law? See infra note 272 and accompanying 
text. 
267. The access costs that copyright imposes on future architects must also be considered. 
However, these access costs are significantly reduced when the building/drawing dichotomy limits 
copyright. See infra notes 293–295 and accompanying text. 
268. Cf. supra note 237 and accompanying text (noting the many contingencies in the construction 
process). In addition, the time-value of money and the ability of clients to use the self-help measure of 
withholding fees upon unsatisfactory architect performance make the backloaded fees preferable to 
clients. 
269. LEWIS, supra note 211, at 272 (noting that even losing competition entries have value 













California in the entertainment industry.270 However, the basis of the 
implied contract is a professional norm among the information recipients, 
namely the studios, and it would be tricky, if not impossible, to find or even 
develop such a norm among the clients of custom architects.271 Another 
solution would be to move forward the point in time at which owners and 
architects sign agreements and effectively eliminate pre-contract 
disclosures. However, such agreements are costly to implement and difficult 
to draft and enforce.272 In addition, in a mirror image of the disclosure 
paradox, clients would be unlikely to consent to an obligation not to use any 
disclosed information for their commercial advantage without first knowing 
what the information is.273  
The law of tangible property, too, provides a possible alternative to 
copyright law as a means for architects to prevent, or at least obtain 
compensation for, appropriation of their building designs by clients. 
Architects refer to the physical drawings, computer files, and models that 
represent building designs as instruments of service.274 The standard AIA 
architect–client agreement establishes architects’ ownership of instruments 
of service.275 If clients terminate a contract for convenience, architects can 
demand that the clients return whatever instruments of service are in their 
possession, making appropriation more difficult.276 How can a client 
 
270. The seminal case is Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956). 
271. See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
272. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 797–800; Burstein, supra note 5, at 263; Merges, supra note 5, 
at 1489–95.  
273. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 797–800; Burstein, supra note 5, at 263; Merges, supra note 5, 
at 1489–95. Clients may have already conceived of the basic design that architects reveal, or they may 
learn of the same basic design from multiple architects. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 798; Burstein, supra 
note, 5 at 263; Lemley, supra note 256, at 337.  
274. Am. Inst. of Architects, Document A201–2007, General Conditions of the Contract for 
Construction, § 1.1.7 (2007) (“Instruments of Service are representations . . . of the tangible and 
intangible creative work performed by the Architect and the Architect’s consultants . . . . Instruments of 
Service may include, without limitation, studies, surveys, models, sketches, drawings, specifications, 
and other similar materials.”); SABO, supra note 231, at 295.   
275. In fact, it establishes ownership of instruments of service with the same clause that retains 
architects’ ownership of copyright. AIA Document B101-2017, supra note 206, § 7.2 (“The Architect 
and the Architect’s consultants shall be deemed the authors and owners of their respective Instruments 
of Service, including the Drawings and Specifications, and shall retain all common law, statutory and 
other reserved rights, including copyrights.”). However, absent any contractual clause establishing 
ownership, the copyright would belong to the architect as author but the instruments of service might 
belong to the client. SABO, supra note 231, at 111. But cf. SWEET & SCHNEIER, supra note 225, at 233–
34 (arguing that default ownership of the instruments of service is not clear-cut). 
276. The standard AIA architect–client agreement grants owners a use license to the architect’s 
instruments of service on the same terms that it grants owners a use license to the architect’s copyrights. 
The use license either ends or requires the payment of a fee upon termination of the contract. See supra 
notes 245–246 and accompanying text. Ownership interests in the physical instruments of service are 
distinct legal rights from ownership interests in the copyright in the architectural design fixed in those 
instruments, so the two need not be allocated in the same manner. SABO, supra note 231, at 111 











reproduce a design if she lacks access to a copy of the design? Fights 
between clients and owners over instruments of service are thus fights over 
legal ownership of sheets of paper and files on disks and hard drives as 
chattels.277 (More specifically, they are fights over use-rights in those 
chattels).278 However, fights over tangible things are means to the end of 
controlling the use of the design information represented on those things.279 
The idea of using ownership of instruments of service as a tool for 
controlling the client’s use of design information has deep roots in 
architectural practice. Disputes between clients and architects over 
instruments of service are as old as, if not older than, disputes over statutory 
copyright.280 Prior to 1997, the standard AIA architect–client agreement 
made special reference to ownership of “reproducible copies” of 
instruments of service, emphasizing that control over tangible documents is 
a means to the end of control over the flow of information.281 Revealing the 
path-dependent nature of the language in the standard AIA architect–client 
contracts, the allocation of copyright in architects’ architectural works is 
still today accomplished by clauses that expressly discuss instruments of 
service.282 
In the early part of the twentieth century, the primacy of architects’ 
interest in acquiring physical ownership of documents rather than retaining 
 
(“[O]wnership of the drawings and ownership of the copyright . . . are two distinct terms. One person 
can own the copyright and another own the drawings.”). But cf. SWEET & SCHNEIER, supra note 225, at 
330 (suggesting that vesting copyright authorship and instrument-of-service ownership to two different 
parties results in a “clash”). Having different owners of tangible copies and copyright interests is 
commonplace in copyright law. For example, a reader owns a tangible book, but the author or publisher 
owns the copyright. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018) (codifying copyright’s first sale doctrine).  
277. Emphasizing the chattel-like nature of instruments of service, one jurisdiction styled the 
cause of action brought against a user of architectural instruments of service to which he did not have 
use-rights as a claim for tortious conversion of the tangible documents. Williams v. Chittenden Tr. Co., 
484 A.2d 911 (Vt. 1984). 
278. SWEET & SCHNEIER, supra note 225, at 233. 
279. Id. at 234 (“[T]he prohibition against the client’s using the [instruments of service] for 
additions to or for completing the project can be looked on as a device to . . . make the client pay 
compensation if it replaces the original architect.”). The architect’s retention of ownership in instruments 
of service, and even the moniker “instruments of service” itself, is also a strategic choice for architects 
for another reason. By calling the drawings instruments of service and retaining ownership in them, 
architects reduce the chance of being pegged as sellers of goods, rather than professional services, and 
thus the possibility of a court finding implied warranties in the plans that increase architects’ liability 
for construction defects. See id. at 233; SABO, supra note 231, at 110–11; O’Dell v. Custom Builders 
Corp., 560 S.W.2d 862 (Mo. 1978).  
280. JOHN CASSAN WAIT, ENGINEERING AND ARCHITECTURAL JURISPRUDENCE: A 
PRESENTATION OF THE LAW OF CONSTRUCTION FOR ENGINEERS, ARCHITECTS, CONTRACTORS, 
BUILDERS, PUBLIC OFFICERS, AND ATTORNEYS AT LAW §§ 815–16 (1st ed. 1897) (discussing the 
ownership of corporeal plans while noting that the existence of statutory copyright for architects had not 
yet been decided). Architects have long enjoyed common law copyright in their building designs that 
lasted until publication. Id. § 816. 
281. Am. Inst. of Architects, Document B141-1987, Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner 
and Architect, § 6.1 (1987). 













the copyright in the building designs fixed in those documents was 
understandable. At the time, blueprints were the primary reprographic 
technology, and they required an original drawing to make a viable copy. 
Physical control over the originals (i.e., the “reproducible copies”) therefore 
afforded some degree of control over the flow of design information. In 
contrast, perfect digital copies abound in the contemporary era, making 
ownership of instruments of service less important and ownership of 
copyright more important. The architect’s ownership of instruments of 
service, for example, could not prevent a client from going to the local 
government building department and making a copy of any plans on file. In 
addition, ownership of instruments of service only becomes a significant 
deterrent if an owner considers terminating the architect late in the design 
process. The information embodied in the extensive set of construction 
documents cannot be retained in an owner’s head, and the cost of recreating 
the construction documents will be a very significant fraction of the money 
paid to the original architect to create the construction documents. In 
contrast, if the owner wishes to terminate early in the process during or at 
the end of the schematic design phase, then the owner can mentally retain 
much of the valuable information and take this information to another 
architect for refinement without physically taking the architect’s 
instruments of service.  
C. Optimizing Copyright for Its Transactional Justification 
The prior Section established that copyright can resolve architects’ 
disclosure dilemmas. This Section turns to the nature of the copyright that 
is best suited to do that work. Drawing protection alone optimizes copyright 
for the transactional theory. Abandoning the full, media-neutral protection 
offered by the AWCPA and embracing the building/drawing dichotomy 
leads to a win–tie result in the transactional theory’s cost–benefit tradeoff: 
it creates a larger public domain from which competitor architects can draw 
(a win on the cost side) without detracting from copyright’s ability to 
resolve disclosure dilemmas and facilitate transactions involving the sale of 
works as information commodities (a tie on the benefit side). 
The usual form of client appropriation entails clients who switch horses 
mid-stream: they take a first architect’s work produced during the schematic 
design, design-development, or bid documentation phase to a second 
architect for refinement of the work and realization of a building at a lower 
cost.283 For this form of appropriation, drawing protection alone resolves the 
 
283. See supra Section III.B.2. 











disclosure dilemma just as well as full, media-neutral protection does. 
Clients must reproduce works before the architect–client transaction has 
realized a building if they are to profit from the appropriation. Upon 
building completion, the client has already paid the architect all of the 
backloaded fees. Furthermore, she already has the building that she desires, 
so there is no economic motivation to copy.284 Clients who copy before 
building completion can only copy from works that are fixed in drawings,285 
and it is axiomatic that drawing protection protects drawings just as well as 
full, media-neutral protection does.286 Inversely, the privilege to lawfully 
 
284. If a client desires multiple building-copies of a work, she can, in theory, profit from lawfully 
copying a building. She can avoid paying the architect a licensing fee for reusing construction documents 
by reverse engineering the first building back into construction documents and using those new 
construction documents to build the subsequent buildings. This scenario in which clients can profit from 
lawfully copying from buildings should not undermine architects’ willingness to disclose their works 
during the architect–client transaction for three reasons. First, clients rarely want second copies of 
custom buildings. Multiple building-copies are far more common for stock works. See infra notes 314–
318 and accompanying text. Second, the client is unlikely to realize any cost savings. Copying 
construction documents is usually less expensive than reverse engineering custom buildings when clients 
want close copies, see infra notes 308–309 and accompanying text, giving clients strong incentives to 
negotiate licenses to reuse construction drawings. Third, and most fundamentally, this kind of 
appropriation does not allow the client to use a work without paying the agreed-upon price. The lack of 
building protection may, however, affect the market value of the architect’s work when clients construct 
multiple copies of custom buildings, and it therefore may have distributive consequences for architects 
and their clients. 
285. There are two sources, other than drawings, from which clients may copy before building 
completion. First, they may copy from three-dimensional scale models. Pre-AWCPA copyright likely 
protects scale models just as it protects drawings. See supra note 66. Regardless of whether pre-AWCPA 
copyright actually protects them, copyright limited by the building/drawing dichotomy should protect 
them to fully resolve architects’ disclosure dilemmas. Cf. infra note 321 and accompanying text (arguing 
that representations of the copies that fulfill consumers’ needs are copies in the development medium 
under a generic consumption-medium/development-medium dichotomy). Second, clients may copy 
from unauthorized buildings constructed by third parties. Assume that a client and an architect begin the 
design-bid-build process but their work stops after schematic design because market conditions shift. A 
third party could unlawfully copy the schematic design drawings, refine them into construction 
documents, and build a building embodying the work. The original client could then lawfully copy from 
the third party’s building, creating new schematic design drawings and proceeding with the remainder 
of the design-bid-build process. This scenario is empirically unlikely to arise for many reasons. (For 
example, demand for close copies of custom works is low, the time lag between the third party’s drawing 
copying and building realization is significant, and the marginal cost of constructing a building means 
that no third party will construct a building as a prototype to test its feasibility). However, even if clients 
were to copy from buildings in this manner on a regular basis, drawing protection alone would still 
provide enough protection to make architects comfortable with disclosing their works to clients. The 
third party is an infringer (assuming copying of protected expression), and the architect can obtain 
monetary damages to compensate for the client’s appropriation. She would just have to sue the third 
party rather than the client. Cf. supra note 265 and accompanying text (noting the benefits of using in 
rem rights to resolve disclosure dilemmas).  
286.  The expansive scope on the drawing side of the building/drawing dichotomy in cases 
alleging drawing-to-drawing copying is essential to the ability of pre-AWCPA copyright to serve its 
transaction-facilitating function. Drawing protection must extend to representational content; it must 
protect the very features of building designs that are not protected when they are fixed in buildings. 
Media-neutral protection for rendition expression alone is not enough. Cf. supra Section II.B 













copy from buildings is irrelevant to concerns about client appropriation 
because there are no buildings to copy at the time at which clients can 
benefit from appropriation.  
One possible wrinkle in the ability of drawing protection alone to fully 
resolve architects’ information paradoxes arises if appropriation occurs after 
construction documents have been completed. Under pre-AWCPA 
copyright, architects do not have an execution right with respect to their 
construction drawings.287 Clients can, in theory, hire a second architect to 
lawfully use a first architect’s construction documents during the bid 
oversight and construction administration phases because the building 
produced is not considered an actionable copy of the architectural work 
fixed in the construction documents. However, this loophole in pre-
AWCPA copyright is not large. Change orders during the construction 
process are almost inevitable, requiring the reproduction of plans with the 
modifications,288 and, even in the unlikely event of a construction project 
without change orders, multiple copies of the construction documents are 
essential on all but the smallest of projects.289 Although it may smack of 
indicting Al Capone for tax fraud, architects can successfully sue most 
clients who use their drawings to construct buildings under pre-AWCPA 
copyright on the basis of drawing copying. More fundamentally, a 
justification of the building/drawing dichotomy does not have to include a 
justification for the absence of an execution right. Copyright could easily 
adopt both the building/drawing dichotomy and an execution right. The two 
rules are conceptually distinct and compatible. The building/drawing 
dichotomy imposes media discrimination in subject matter, whereas the 
execution right eliminates media discrimination in rights.290 
 
alternative that also provides some protection to drawings without providing any protection to 
buildings). 
287. See supra notes 71–73, 132–135 and accompanying text. 
288. See supra notes 223–225 and accompanying text.  
289. Copies are essential for disseminating information to the multiple contractors and sub-
contractors in different building trades who need to work in concert. Cf. DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. 
Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184, 187 (M.D. Fla. 1962) (noting that “at least six . . . subcontractors were given 
complete copies of . . . architectural plans” to construct a single-family home). Requiring the 
independently owned companies to reference a single set of construction documents would be a 
coordination nightmare.  
290. Cf. supra Section I.A (distinguishing media discrimination in subject matter and rights); 
supra note 61 (discussing Professor Balganesh’s proposal to decouple media neutrality in subject matter 
and rights). The AIA argued for exactly this both–and combination—preserving the building/drawing 
dichotomy and adding an execution right—in the congressional hearings on Berne compliance. 1989 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 70, at 196–98. However, the AIA supported media-neutral 
architectural copyright in subsequent congressional hearings on the AWCPA. Architectural Design 
Protection: Hearing on H.R. 3990 and H.R. 3991 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., 
and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 111–12, 114 (1990). 











It is true that drawing protection alone does not protect, or thus 
incentivize, architects’ disclosures after a building has been constructed. If 
a first architect discloses a work fixed in an already-constructed building to 
a potential client and suggests that the potential client might want her own 
building-copy of the work, the potential client can lawfully appropriate the 
work by instructing a second architect to copy the first architect’s 
constructed building.291 In this scenario, however, the transactional theory 
sees no harm in permitting the copying because the architect does not face 
a disclosure dilemma. The public nature of the building means that the 
disclosed work was already known, or at least readily knowable, to the 
client. The architect’s disclosure is not what enables the appropriation; the 
appropriation could readily occur even without the disclosure, so there is 
little hesitation to disclose.292 Furthermore, there is no concern about an 
architect electing not to allow a building to be built to avoid making the 
work known to the public. Architects cannot make money without allowing 
their designs to be realized as buildings. 
Moving to the other side of the dichotomy, the absence of building 
protection reduces copyright’s access costs. Most importantly, it reduces the 
dynamic costs of copyright’s access restriction and thus lowers the tax that 
copyright imposes on the next generation of creators.293 Architects and 
architectural historians openly acknowledge the importance of historical 
and contemporary works as “precedent”—a familiar term in legal circles—
and the use that Modern, Postmodern, and contemporary architects make of 
precedent to inform their designs.294 The loose copying that occurs when 
architects draw from precedent can readily be accomplished through 
building copying: massing, spatial flow, materiality, façade patterns, 
organizational arrangements, lighting schemes, and even some construction 
details, just to name a few, are all elements of architectural works that are 
on full display in buildings. Furthermore, buildings are readily available to 
architects as references. Photographs of buildings circulate in architectural 
 
291. The building may not disclose all of the details that the drawings do.  
292. In other words, a transaction in which a client licenses a right to construct a second copy of 
an already-constructed building is not a sale of a work as an information commodity as this Article 
defines the phrase. See supra text accompanying note 193.  
293. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. The absence of building protection also decreases 
copyright’s static costs. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. However, this reduction is less 
significant for two reasons. First, it is costly to engage in slavish, literal copying via building copying. 
See infra notes 308–309 and accompanying text. Second, demand for literal copies of custom 
architectural works among parties other than the clients to whose tastes and needs the works are 
customized is low. See Collins, supra note 19, at 43–44.  
294. ROGER H. CLARK & MICHAEL PAUSE, PRECEDENTS IN ARCHITECTURE: ANALYTIC 
DIAGRAMS, FORMATIVE IDEAS, AND PARTIS (4th ed. 2012). As the AIA Handbook states in its 
discussion of design precedents, “[i]t is common for architects to familiarize themselves with the design 
of buildings that deal with similar issues to stimulate solutions for their own design problems.” AIA 













journals and on the internet. The building/drawing dichotomy permits this 
loose copying to proceed without the costs of licensing or the chilling effects 
of potential litigation.295 
In gross, the building/drawing dichotomy sculpts copyright to fit the 
transactional theory by leaving a medium in which a work can be fixed 
beyond the reach of copyright protection and allowing the economic 
truncation of copyright term when the public gains access to copies in that 
medium.296 In an initial phase before the fixation of the work in a building, 
copyright is strong. Protected drawings are the only copies of the work that 
exist and thus the only copies from which copying can occur. In the later 
phase after the fixation of the work in a building, copyright is much weaker. 
The ability to lawfully copy works from buildings saps drawing protection 
of its economic importance.297 This economic truncation gives copyright 
economic heft throughout the time window when it is needed to defuse 
disclosure dilemmas but not thereafter when its transaction-facilitating role 
has played out.298 Ratcheting down the economic strength of copyright 
protection after building construction provides an unalloyed social good 
under the transactional theory.299  
 
295. It is not clear how much of the loose copying that is prevalent in architectural practice today 
is close enough to constitute infringement under the AWCPA. Limitations on copyright scope—such as 
the originality requirement, the idea/expression dichotomy, and the absence of protection for 
functionally required elements—might permit architects to lawfully engage in this loose copying even 
if buildings were protected subject matter. In its initial congressional hearings on Berne compliance, the 
AIA testified that building protection would cause architects to alter their creative process, draw less 
source material from buildings designed by other architects, and repeat their own designs more regularly. 
U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and 
Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 732–34 (1987) (letter from Dale R. Ellickson, 
AIA); cf. supra note 290 (noting that the AIA argued in favor of preserving the building/drawing 
dichotomy in congressional hearings on Berne compliance). 
296. Economic truncation of term is a familiar concept, if not a familiar term, in copyright 
economics. For example, the generation of a competing work partially truncates copyright term as an 
economic, but not legal, matter. Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 212, 238–39 (2004).  
297. This is the crux of the argument against media discrimination in subject matter under the 
market-buffer theory. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. There is no second, weaker phase for 
unrealized or “paper” projects.  
298. One could argue that the better way to sculpt copyright to the transactional theory is to 
truncate copyright term as a legal matter upon the construction of a building. Cf. infra note 340 and 
accompanying text (distinguishing legal and economic defeasance of copyright). However, full-term 
drawing protection provides a benefit under the market-buffer theory by increasing the cost of slavish 
copying. See infra notes 308–309 and accompanying text.  
299. In contrast, the effect of truncating copyright term is never a categorical welfare gain under 
the market-buffer theory. An extra increment of copyright term, prospectively applied, always increases 
expected profits for some authors, and thus gross ex ante incentives, at the margin. However, the net 
effect of truncating copyright term can be a net welfare gain under the market-buffer theory once 
copyright’s costs are considered. Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 255–56 (2003) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (noting reasons why the present value of an additional increment of copyright term decreases 
as the increment moves further into the future).  











Another way to understand how the building/drawing dichotomy sculpts 
copyright to fit the transactional theory is to note that it targets copyright on 
architects’ clients rather than their competitors.300 As a legal matter, the 
dichotomy does not transform copyright into an in personam contractual 
right that is only good against clients; drawing protection remains an in rem 
right good against the world. But, as a practical matter, drawing protection 
curbs copying by clients more strictly than it curbs copying by competitors. 
Competitor architects who want to borrow from earlier works can copy from 
buildings, albeit with a time delay. Clients who want to appropriate works 
cannot. They must copy when copying from drawings is their only option. 
The building/drawing dichotomy shapes architectural copyright so that it 
gives architects more of a leg up in disputes with clients than it does in 
disputes with competitor architects.301  
D. Building Protection and the Incentive to Create 
The previous Section established that the elimination of building 
protection optimizes copyright in custom architecture for the transactional 
theory, but it did not address the question precedent of whether the 
transactional theory should be what shapes copyright’s contours. If building 
protection were to solve a public goods problem and generate a net social 
benefit under the market-buffer theory, then the transactional theory alone 
should not be copyright’s polestar. This Section therefore sketches historical 
and theoretical reasons to believe that building protection generates minimal 
benefits under the market-buffer theory and that the building/drawing 
dichotomy is good policy under a pluralistic, utilitarian justification for 
copyright that considers both the incentive and transactional theories. If 
there were significant incentive benefits from restricting competition in the 
building, then the categorically beneficial win–tie result of eliminating 
building protection would devolve back into an indeterminate win–lose 
result under a pluralistic, utilitarian theory. 
Historically, architectural creativity did not suffer before the enactment 
of the AWCPA in 1990 when copyright denied architects protection for 
their buildings. Architectural critics and historians do not note a burst of 
 
300. Under the transactional theory, copyright’s principal goal is to curb copying by transactional 
partners. To quote Rob Merges’s framing of intellectual property’s transaction-facilitating role, “while 
property rights are indeed good against the world,” a transactional theory of intellectual property 
emphasizes copyright’s impact on “one crucial slice of the world—negotiating partners—which has 
been overlooked” because the market-buffer theory is intellectual property’s dominant utilitarian 
justification. Merges, supra note 5, at 1496.  
301. In some suits, a first architect sues a second architect when a client serves as a go-between 
and takes the first architect’s work to the second architect for refinement and execution. These suits 













creativity in custom architecture that correlates with the adoption of the 
AWCPA. Nor was there a long-simmering complaint among custom 
architects before the AWCPA that a free-rider problem was squelching 
innovative design or jeopardizing their professional livelihoods. In fact, not 
only did the American Institute of Architects not actively lobby for the 
building protection granted by the AWCPA, it initially testified that 
building protection would be detrimental to architects’ welfare.302 (It was 
instead Congress’s decision “to place the United States unequivocally in 
compliance with its Berne obligations” that drove the legislative process 
leading to the AWCPA).303 This is a notable departure from the usual 
political economy of copyright reform in which rights holders push for 
stronger rights,304 and it is highly suggestive. Although Congress should 
hesitate to let authors set the ceiling for copyright strength out of concerns 
about self-dealing, authors’ satisfaction with weaker rights is a more reliable 
indicator of the absence of a public goods problem.  
Why didn’t the absence of building protection in copyright lead to a 
public goods problem in custom architecture under pre-AWCPA copyright 
and its building/drawing dichotomy? The answer rests on two distinct 
arguments about the effects that drawing protection, even without building 
protection, has on creative architectural production. One resonates with 
copyright’s competition-restricting role under the market-buffer theory and 
the other with its transaction-facilitating role under the transactional theory. 
Assuming that, absent copyright, custom architectural designs suffer 
from a public goods problem, drawing protection alone mitigates the 
problem, albeit not to the same extent that full, media-neutral protection 
does. It still alters both the timing and nature of competitors’ copying. 
Drawing protection forces competitors to wait until after the construction of 
a building to reproduce a work, so it provides a limited period of market 
exclusivity in the form of a first-mover advantage for creative architects.305 
Given the length of the sequential design and construction processes under 
design-bid-build,306 forcing competitors to delay copying until after a 
building has been built delays copying by competitors for months for small-
 
302. See supra note 290. The AIA did request building protection during the congressional 
hearings that led to the 1909 Copyright Act. STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
LIBRARIAN’S CONFERENCE ON COPYRIGHT 11, 3d Sess. (Mar. 13–16, 1906) (testimony of Mr. Glenn 
Brown, AIA). 
303. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 12 (1990). Whether building protection is needed for Berne 
compliance remains an open question. 1989 COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 70, at 101–40. 
304. JESSICA D. LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22–34 (2001). 
305. First-mover advantages are more commonly associated with trade secrecy than with 
copyright. Lemley, supra note 256, at 330; cf. infra notes 337–342 (noting the parallels between 
development-medium copyright and trade secrecy). 
306. See supra Section III.B.1. 











scale projects and years for large-scale projects. Drawing protection thus 
provides a kind of “hot design” protection—a slow-motion version of the 
“hot news” protection of misappropriation under International News 
Service v. Associated Press.307 Drawing protection also increases the cost of 
slavish, literal copying.308 While tracing blueprints, photocopying drawings, 
and printing new copies of electronic files are inexpensive ways to make the 
plans needed for slavish building copies, reverse engineering a building into 
a set of construction documents through building copying is costly. Many 
of the details needed to produce the construction documents cannot even be 
discerned from visual inspection of a building. When copying uses 
buildings as source material, it is more expensive to produce an identical 
copy than a loose copy, providing incentives for competitors to mix their 
own original contributions in with any expression that they copy. Looking 
at a building and deciding that a roof should have a similar wavy 
appearance, a façade should have a similar window pattern, or a disposition 
of spaces should have a similar spatial flow is much easier than reproducing 
those building features exactly.309  
These arguments that drawing protection alone restricts competition in 
the market for copies of custom buildings are technically correct, but they 
miss the bigger point: there is no severe public goods problem in custom 
architecture in the first place.310 Architects doing custom work do not 
require profits from the sale of multiple building-copies of their works to 
recoup their creativity costs. They recoup each project’s costs from the 
client fees on the front end, collecting these fees in full upon the realization 
of the first building in which the work is fixed.311 Copyright does not need 
to play the competition-restricting role that the market-buffer theory scripts 
for it on the back end. The case for copyright protection for buildings is 
 
307. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).  
308. Public goods problems are less severe when the gap between the author’s creativity costs and 
the costs of copying is smaller. Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics 
Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 66 (2005). 
309. The fact that identical copies are cheaper to produce than looser copies inverts the 
conventional assumption in intellectual property scholarship that closer copying is less costly.  
310. Cf. Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1226 
(1996) (arguing that architects had sufficient incentives to create before the AWCPA). 
311. See Bucher, supra note 15, at 1269–70; Daniel Su, Note, Substantial Similarity and 
Architectural Works: Filtering Out “Total Concept and Feel,” 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1851, 1856 (2007); 
Raphael Winick, Note, Copyright Protection for Architecture After the Architectural Works Copyright 
Protection Act of 1990, 41 DUKE L.J. 1598, 1606 (1992). Why clients are willing to pay for the full 
creativity costs associated with their designs—that is, why they don’t demand a discount based on the 
expectation of back-end licensing revenue—raises an interesting question. Music copyright would not 
be needed either if listeners were willing to commission musicians to write songs and pay all of their 
creativity costs, but listeners are rarely willing to commission musical works. Why is custom architecture 
different? The author explores this question at length in other work. Collins, supra note 19 (arguing that 
client fees that cover architects’ creativity costs arise from a combination of the economics of 













therefore weak under the market-buffer theory because custom architects 
have sufficient incentives to produce creative works without it.312  
However, this fees-are-enough argument does not mean that copyright is 
irrelevant to the business model through which architects recoup their 
creativity costs. To the contrary, copyright is critical to ensure that architects 
can collect client fees. This is precisely what copyright does under the 
transactional theory: it prevents clients from appropriating architects’ works 
without paying architects after architects disclose their works. Perhaps 
counterintuitively, copyright achieves the end goal that is usually associated 
with the market-buffer theory (fostering creativity), not by playing the role 
scripted by the market-buffer theory (restricting competition in the market 
for buildings), but rather by playing the role scripted by the transactional 
theory (ensuring architects get paid when they sell their works as 
information commodities).313 Drawing protection provides enough 
protection for copyright to play its transactional role and provide architects 
with incentives to create.  
 
312. In the related context of fine art, William Landes and Richard Posner argue that “[t]he overall 
case for copyright protection of works of art is weaker than that for copyright protection of most other 
expressive works” because “[t]he main source of the artist’s income . . . typically comes from the sale 
of the work itself [i.e., the first copy crafted by the author] rather than from the sale of [additional] 
copies” or reproductions. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at 254, 257. Amy Adler drills down on this 
argument by suggesting that the value of authenticity is what allows the artist’s income to flow primarily 
from the sale of the first (or original) copy. Amy Adler, Why Art Does Not Need Copyright, 86 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 313, 329 (2018). Architects do not sell buildings, nor is authenticity likely as important 
in architecture as it is in fine art. Nonetheless, the custom-architecture argument parallels the fine-art 
argument in that architects’ main source of income has been realized upon the construction of the first 
copy of a building. 
313. This insight may be counterintuitive because the market-buffer theory is so dominant in 
intellectual property scholarship and so strongly associated with incentives to create works that the 
transactional theory is often defined in the negative as a theory that does something other than provide 
incentives to create works. See, e.g., Burstein, supra note 5, at 245 (stating in the patent context that the 
transactional theory “is aimed not at providing incentives for invention . . . but at reducing the costs of 
exchanging critical information”); see also id. at 246 (describing the social benefit of intellectual 
property under the transactional theory as a static benefit that is independent of the dynamic benefit that 
patent provides under the market-buffer theory). This definition by exclusion of the social benefits that 
transactional copyright can produce is unduly narrow. Copyright can generate incentives for creative 
production by facilitating transactions, such as the architect–client transaction, in which the author 
discloses an early-stage work and, in return, the information purchaser agrees to pay for the author to 
produce a more fully developed work. Whether the post-disclosure conduct that these transactions fund 
is a continuation of the conception of a work (akin to “invention”) or the development of an already 
conceived work into a good that consumers want (akin to “innovation”) lies in the eye of the beholder. 
Cf. id. at 237–38 (discussing the invention–innovation distinction). Similarly, whether funding for the 
post-disclosure conduct provides ex ante or ex post incentives, Lemley, supra note 52, at 130, hinges on 
the point in time at which one deems the initial conception to be complete—a time that is difficult to 
identify in the iterative evolution and gradual refinement of an architectural work. 











E. Stock Architecture and Copyright Tailoring 
The previous Section argued that the building/drawing dichotomy is 
good policy for custom architecture under a pluralistic, utilitarian 
justification for copyright that considers both the incentive and transactional 
theories. A word of caution about the implications of this conclusion for a 
proposal to return to the building/drawing dichotomy of pre-AWCPA 
copyright, however, is important to note. The normative arguments 
presented in this Article focus exclusively on custom works, but 
architectural copyright also protects stock works.  
Custom works are designs that architects craft to suit the tastes and needs 
of specific, known clients. Custom design is synonymous with architecture 
to the extent that the works produced by the architectural profession define 
architecture. Most professional architects make their livelihood through 
custom design.314 The money that clients spend on constructing custom 
buildings is the leading indicator of the economic health of the architectural 
profession.315 Custom design is what is recounted in nearly all books 
describing the nature of the task that architects perform, whether those 
books are handbooks for seasoned professionals or explanations for 
laypersons curious about what it means to be an architect.316 The vast 
majority of the works that gain recognition as high-quality, creative works 
within the profession result from the custom design process.317  
Yet, significant swaths of the built environment produced over the last 
several decades have resulted from a stock-design process in which 
architectural works are designed on a speculative basis to appeal to a mass 
audience. Most importantly, a large portion of the market for single-family 
residential homes in developer-driven suburban subdivisions—which, in 
turn, is a significant sector of the construction industry as a whole—consists 
of stock designs repeated, sometimes in mirror images, up and down the 
streets.318  
 
314. The developer-driven market for single-family homes sidelines architects. Robert Gutman, 
Two Questions for Architecture, in ARCHITECTURE FROM THE OUTSIDE IN: SELECTED ESSAYS BY 
ROBERT GUTMAN 239, 241–42 (Dana Cuff & John Wriedt eds., 2010); ROBERT GUTMAN, THE DESIGN 
OF AMERICAN HOUSING: A REAPPRAISAL OF THE ARCHITECT’S ROLE 8, 14, 18–19, 56 (1985). 
315. The American Institute of Architects measures the economic health of the architectural 
profession by charting national spending on nonresidential building, which is almost exclusively custom 
work (excepting commercial trade dress). AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, FIRM SURVEY REPORT 5 (2016). 
316. See LEWIS, supra note 211, at 196–321; AIA HANDBOOK, supra note 212, at 654–88. 
317. Robert Gutman, U.S. Architects and Housing: 5 Relationships, in ARCHITECTURE FROM THE 
OUTSIDE IN: SELECTED ESSAYS BY ROBERT GUTMAN, supra note 314, at 227, 232 (noting that stock-
plan designers “occupy the same status within the [architectural] profession that ‘ambulance chasers’ 
occupy in the legal profession or that ‘abortionists’ once held in the medical profession”). 
318. PAUL L. KNOX, METROBURBIA USA (2008) (describing the homebuilding industry and the 













Even if the building/drawing dichotomy is the optimal copyright regime 
for custom architecture, the existence of stock-design, single-family homes 
complicates the argument in favor of turning back the clock on architectural 
copyright. The economics of custom architecture and stock architecture do 
not fit the same mold. The fees from the first consumer to pay for a stock-
plan house are unlikely to cover the designer’s full creativity costs, and the 
argument that building protection does not provide significant benefits 
under the market-buffer theory loses its traction when applied to stock 
works. Building protection for stock-plan homes could, in theory, provide a 
social benefit by restricting competition in the market for single-family 
homes and ensuring sufficient incentives for the production of creative, 
quality designs. Assuming that the same copyright regime will govern both 
custom and stock works, more analysis is needed to seal the case for 
returning to the building/drawing dichotomy.319 Whether building 
protection promotes investment in creative designs for stock, single-family 
home designs and, if it does, whether that incentive benefit is greater than 
the access costs that building protection creates for both custom and stock 
works, are questions that lie beyond the scope of this Article.320 
IV. THE TEMPLATE FOR JUSTIFIED MEDIA DISCRIMINATION 
The previous Part zoomed in on the specifics of creative production in 
custom architecture to reveal the hidden wisdom of the building/drawing 
dichotomy. This Part zooms out to examine the extent to which that hidden 
wisdom generalizes to other types of works. It identifies a three-condition 
template for potentially justified media discrimination in copyright’s 
subject matter.  
First, there must be a factual basis for a consumption-
medium/development-medium dichotomy. The work at issue must be fixed 
in different media at different points in its lifecycle. It must be fixed in a 
development medium when it is being refined and commercialized and then 
 
319. In theory, one could draw a line between custom and stock works and adopt the 
building/drawing dichotomy for the former, but not the latter. However, this micro-tailoring of copyright 
would require the kind of easily-gamed distinction that makes the administrative costs of individualizing 
copyright to a particular mode of creative production overwhelm the benefits of achieving right-sized 
protection. See Carroll, supra note 28, at 1424–30.  
320. The author explores these questions elsewhere. Collins, supra note 19, at 41–43. The 
incentive benefits of building protection for stock works is likely small. In fact, it would be quite ironic 
were the case for the persistence of building protection for all architectural works to rest on the incentives 
for creativity that building protection has generated in stock-plan homes, given the dearth of creativity 
in our developer-driven, suburban subdivisions over the last quarter century. Id. The costs of building 
protection are likely significant, especially in light of recent trolling activity involving copyrights on 
single-family homes. Id. 











in a consumption medium when it is later being made available for public 
use and enjoyment. For example, audiovisual works have specs, 
screenplays, and storyboards as development media, and film and video as 
consumption media. Similarly, musical works are often developed in the 
form of sheet music and consumed through phonograms.321 The factual 
basis for the dichotomy exists whenever audiences desire particular sensory 
experiences or functional artifacts, authors use representations of those 
experiences or artifacts to develop the works, and the representations are 
not substitutes to the consumers for the experiences or artifacts. 
Second, copyright protection for the work must play a welfare-enhancing 
role under the transactional theory. Authors must face disclosure dilemmas 
when they sell their works as information commodities.322 In addition, 
copyright must be capable of resolving these disclosure dilemmas.323  
Third, copyright protection for the work fixed in consumption-medium 
copies must generate a net cost under the market-buffer theory. That is, the 
ability of competitors to freely copy from the consumption medium must 
not lead to a public goods problem or the underproduction of creative 
works.324  
When these three conditions are satisfied, a consumption-
medium/development-medium dichotomy may be good policy. Just as 
eliminating building protection does, eliminating protection for works fixed 
in the consumption medium creates a two-phase right that is economically 
strong during work development and commercialization and weak once 
commercialized copies of the work are available on the market.325 In turn, 
 
321. There is no dichotomy as a factual matter if the development and consumption media are 
identical, such as when a clay sculptor develops works through working studies in clay. 
322. See supra Section III.B.2. There are no disclosure dilemmas to resolve if authors do not sell 
their works as information commodities prior to commercialization, such as when authors self-publish 
novels.  
323. See supra Section III.B.3. Copyright cannot resolve disclosure dilemmas if commercially 
significant uses of disclosed works do not require copies that fall within copyright’s scope regardless of 
the media in which the copies are fixed. For example, copyright does little to resolve disclosure 
dilemmas when the primary value of a work lies in the ideas or facts that it conveys. See supra notes 
239–242 and accompanying text.  
324.  Some scholars argue that there may be sufficient incentives for creativity in fields currently 
within copyright’s ambit, such as software, absent copyright’s restrictions on competition. See Stephen 
Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer 
Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970); Pamela Samuelson, The Uneasy Case for Software Copyrights 
Revisited, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1746 (2011). Other scholars highlight that creativity flourishes in 
some of copyright’s “negative spaces.” See KATE DARLING & AARON PERZANOWSKI, CREATIVITY 
WITHOUT LAW: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 249–69 (2017); KAL 
RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS 
INNOVATION (2012). 
325. The public availability of a commercialized copy plays the same role in the generic 
consumption-medium/development-medium dichotomy that the construction of a building plays in the 
building/drawing dichotomy: it marks the downshift in copyright’s economic importance. See supra 













this two-phase structure leads to a win–tie result in the tradeoff between 
costs and benefits under a pluralistic, utilitarian justification for 
copyright.326 
The tie on the benefit side follows from protection for the development 
medium alone doing just as good a job of resolving authors’ disclosure 
dilemmas as protection for all media does.327 Authors do not face disclosure 
dilemmas in transactions that occur after consumption-medium copies are 
available on the market,328 so transactional copyright only needs to be 
concerned with providing protection during the pre-market phase of a 
work’s lifecycle when the work is still undergoing refinement and 
commercialization. In this early phase, works are only available to the 
public in the form of development-medium copies, making protection for 
the development medium equivalent to protection for all media as a 
practical matter. Furthermore, the availability of a consumption-medium 
copy, and thus the downshift in copyright’s economic importance, will not 
occur so soon that it will undermine authors’ interests. Authors will not 
produce or authorize consumption-medium copies until they have a binding 
contract for full payment in place,329 and making unauthorized 
consumption-medium copies requires infringement, providing the author a 
remedy for appropriation.330 In sum, the privilege to lawfully copy from 
 
protection upon a work’s authorized commercialization. 17 U.S.C. § 113(c) (2018) (limiting 
reproduction rights when “a work [is] lawfully reproduced in useful articles that have been offered for 
sale or other distribution to the public”). 
326. See supra Section III.C.  
327. Condition three establishes that protection for the consumption medium does not provide any 
benefits, so the argument only examines the benefits—or, more precisely, the lack of benefits—from 
building protection under the transactional theory.  
328. Disclosure dilemmas only exist when work purchasers do not know, or cannot readily gain 
knowledge of, the work that the author is selling. See supra notes 198–199 and accompanying text. 
Copies of works fixed in the consumption medium are usually self-informing in that they give their 
possessor knowledge of the work.  
329. Authors must exercise care when making and displaying prototypes, which are copies in the 
consumption medium, during the commercialization process. Cf. supra note 285 (noting that prototypes 
were not a concern in custom architecture). 
330. The author may have to sue someone other than an appropriating transactional partner to 
obtain that remedy. See supra note 285. The likelihood of unauthorized copies of buildings was low due 
to a number of architecture-specific factors. Id. The likelihood of unauthorized copies in the 
consumption media in other fields is likely higher.  
The legal assertion that making the first consumption-medium copy without the author’s permission 
entails infringement assumes that copying from a development-medium copy and into a consumption-
medium copy constitutes infringement. That is, it assumes that copyright grants authors the equivalent 
of the execution right in architectural plans that pre-AWCPA copyright did not grant. See supra notes 
71–73, 132–135 and accompanying text (noting that pre-AWCPA copyright did not grant an execution 
right). This assumption is plausible because the consumption-medium/development-medium dichotomy 
is conceptually compatible with granting authors exclusive rights to make consumption-media copies 
from drawing-media copies. See supra note 290 and accompanying text. Saying that a copy is not 











consumption-medium copies that the consumption-medium/development-
medium dichotomy grants to the public does not interfere with copyright’s 
ability to play the role that the transactional theory scripts for it.  
The win on the cost side arises because downsizing copyright from full, 
media-neutral protection to protection for only the development medium 
reduces access costs. After commercialization, the public’s ability to copy 
from the consumption medium reduces the tax that copyright imposes on 
both literal copying and creative adaptation. Competitors can wait until after 
commercialization and copy in a time-delayed manner, but transactional 
partners who seek to participate in the commercialization process and whose 
potential appropriation creates authors’ disclosure dilemmas cannot. 
The point of identifying the three-condition template is not to identify 
the subject matters that are the closest cousins of custom architecture, such 
as custom-designed useful articles. Rather, the point is to test the limits of 
generalization and probe the outer boundary of the contexts in which media 
discrimination in copyright’s subject matter may be good policy. The 
template should not be taken to suggest that media discrimination in subject 
matter should become the new normal. It is not clear how many categories 
of authorial production satisfy the three conditions as an empirical matter. 
Furthermore, tailoring copyright—whether by imposing media 
discrimination in subject matter or by pulling the more conventional policy 
levers of scope and duration—can generate significant administrative costs 
that must be included in the welfare calculus.331 Nonetheless, it is interesting 
to note that the template reaches well beyond custom architecture. In fact, 
two of the most salient features of the building/drawing dichotomy in 
architectural copyright turn out not to be limitations on the template’s 
generalizability.  
First, although the origins of the building/drawing dichotomy are 
intimately intertwined with concerns about the costs of copyright protection 
for functional works,332 the template identifies the possibility of a 
consumption-medium/development-medium dichotomy in subject matters 
that do not raise functionality concerns. For example, consider a 
municipality that puts out a call for artists to produce public art in the form 
of a request for proposals.333 The municipality commissions the chosen 
artists, so artists can recoup their creativity costs without any restrictions on 
 
protected subject matter does not require also saying that making a consumption-medium copy by 
copying from a development-medium copy is not infringement.  
331. These costs are higher when identifying the subject matter that is to be governed by different 
rules requires drawing distinctions that are complex or jurisprudentially unstable. Carroll, supra note 28, 
at 1424–30.  
332. See supra Section II.C. 
333. See LYNN BASA, THE ARTIST’S GUIDE TO PUBLIC ART: HOW TO FIND AND WIN 













competition for consumption-medium copies (condition three).334 Artists 
commonly develop public art in media other than the medium in which the 
copy eventually installed in the public place is fixed (condition one). 
Lighting, mosaics, glass, textiles, steel sculpture—artists develop all of 
these artworks in alternative media that are less costly, smaller in scale, and 
more easily manipulated in the studio. Finally, artists who submit proposals 
in response to requests therefore face disclosure dilemmas that copyright 
can solve (condition two). Artists may hesitate to disclose their works to the 
municipality because the city could appropriate them by taking them to 
manufacturers to produce the copy to be installed in the public place and 
cutting out the artist’s fee. However, being understandably hesitant to 
commission an artist without knowing the artist’s proposal, the municipality 
is likely to demand disclosure before payment. Protection for only the 
development medium can resolve the disclosure dilemma without 
generating the access costs of full, media-neutral copyright, even though 
there are no functionality concerns.335  
Second, although customized architecture usually results in the 
production of a single copy of a work in the consumption medium (i.e., a 
single building), the consumption-medium/development-medium 
dichotomy can also be good policy for commoditized works that are 
commercialized through multiple consumption-medium copies. To 
appreciate this point, consider again a variant of the hypothetical sketched 
above in which a doll designer seeks to sell a doll design to a 
manufacturer.336 Sketches of dolls—development-medium copies—and the 
dolls themselves—consumption-medium copies—are not interchangeable; 
children will not be content playing with the sketches (condition one). The 
doll designer faces a disclosure dilemma when selling the work to a 
manufacturer that copyright can resolve (condition two). Finally, assume 
that there are sufficient incentives to create and commercialize dolls absent 
copyright protection for the dolls themselves because, for example, some 
combination of a first-mover advantage, branding, and profits from the sale 
of complementary goods provides enough restriction on competition, and 
thus enough profit, to offset the author’s creativity costs (condition three). 
 
334. If the public agency were to rely on merchandizing rights in the commissioned work to fund 
the commissioning, then condition three would not be satisfied.  
335. There is one way in which the functionality concerns raised by architectural copyright 
differentiate the building/drawing dichotomy from most other consumption-medium/development-
medium dichotomies. Most of the dichotomies depart downward from run-of-the-mill copyright by 
eliminating protection for the consumption medium. However, it is possible to conceive of the 
building/drawing dichotomy as departing upward by augmenting protection for the development 
medium. See supra notes 150–152 and accompanying text. 
336. See supra notes 196–197 and accompanying text.  











Development-medium copyright alone resolves authors’ disclosure 
dilemmas just as well as full, media-neutral protection does, but it generates 
significantly reduced access costs. 
The doll hypothetical is a good vehicle for highlighting the parallel 
between copyright that only protects the development medium and trade 
secrecy for self-informing goods. Like development-medium copyright, 
trade secrecy for self-informing goods provides robust protection that helps 
to resolve disclosure dilemmas337 but that only lasts until a commercialized 
good embodying the protected information is put on the market.338 Once the 
goods/works are made available to consumers, neither regime guarantees 
market exclusivity, apart from a first-mover advantage.339 For example, a 
doll design could receive effective protection either under development-
medium copyright or as a trade secret only until, at the latest, the time at 
which dolls that can be played with become available and competitors can 
copy the design from the marketed dolls. However, development-medium 
copyright and trade secrecy fail to provide effective protection after 
commercialization for different reasons. While trade secrecy is a legally 
defeasible interest, development-medium copyright is an economically 
defeasible interest.340 The two regimes also differ in their utility to the rights 
holders because development-medium copyright reacts to sunlight better 
than trade secrecy does: it can retain its economic importance even after the 
copyrighted work becomes publicly known. Copyright protection for only 
the development medium is thus more valuable than trade secrecy as a tool 
for overcoming disclosure dilemmas in situations in which the protected 
 
337. Trade secrecy is widely recognized as a tool for resolving disclosure dilemmas. See Lemley, 
supra note 256, at 336–37. The parallels in the policy justifications of trade secrecy and development-
medium copyright are perhaps unsurprising because each one hybridizes in rem and in personam rights 
in different ways. Trade secrecy imposes obligations on strangers in some cases, but it involves rights 
that are only good against contractual partners in most cases. Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade 
Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241 (1998). Development-medium 
copyright is always good against strangers in a legal sense, but transactional partners feel the brunt of 
its restrictive impact. See supra notes 300–301 and accompanying text. 
338. Trade secrecy only protects information that is not generally known to, or is not readily 
ascertainable by, the public. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS 
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1985). It permits competitors to reverse engineer marketed goods. Kadant, Inc. 
v. Seeley Mach., Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 19, 37–38 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). Thus, the marketing of a self-
informing good usually makes the information embodied in the good ineligible for trade secrecy 
protection. Vacco Indus., Inc. v. Van Den Berg, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 602, 611 (Ct. App. 1992). 
339. Compare supra notes 305–307 and accompanying text (noting that drawing protection 
provides a first-mover advantage for custom architecture), with Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. 
Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965) (calibrating trade secrecy remedies to compensate for 
a first-mover advantage). 
340. A defeasible interest is “[a]n interest that the holder may enjoy until the occurrence of a 
condition.” Defeasible Interest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). Trade secrecy is a legally 
defeasible interest because the subject matter is no longer protected once a self-informing product hits 
the market. Development-medium copyright is economically defeasible because the marketing of a self-













information must become publicly known prior to commercialization. For 
example, regulatory approval could require disclosure,341 or authors might 
benefit from publishing their early-stage works to send out a beacon-like, 
one-to-many broadcast and allow transactional partners who are efficient 
commercializers to bring themselves to the authors’ attention.342  
CONCLUSION 
Media neutrality in subject matter is a bedrock principle of contemporary 
copyright law.343 This Article identifies a sound policy basis for departing 
from that principle and embracing media discrimination in subject matter 
instead. In some contexts, copyright’s primary function is not to restrict 
competition in the market for copies of works and augment profits but rather 
to resolve disclosure dilemmas and facilitate pre-commercialization 
transactions that involve the sale of works as information commodities. In 
these contexts, adopting media discrimination in subject matter, and 
protecting works when they are fixed in a development medium but not 
when they are fixed in a consumption medium, preserves copyright’s 
benefits while reducing its costs.  
This justification of media discrimination in subject matter provides an 
alternative normative foundation for the building/drawing dichotomy of 
pre-AWCPA copyright as applied to custom architecture, the dominant 
mode of design in the architectural profession. The dichotomy protects 
architecture’s development medium (drawings) but not its consumption 
medium (buildings). It is good policy because, in the context of custom 
design, copyright’s principal function is to facilitate the architect–client 
transaction and prevent clients from appropriating architects’ works without 
full payment, not to tamp down on copying by competitors in the market for 
multiple copies of buildings. 
 
341. Trade secrecy would not be an effective tool for resolving authors’ disclosure dilemmas in 
either the custom architecture or the public art scenario discussed above. See supra notes 256–257, 333–
335 and accompanying text. 
342. See Kitch, supra note 5, at 278–79; Kieff, IP Transactions, supra note 5, at 735–36. 
343. The only historical exception to media neutrality arose as a way of limiting the reach of 
copyright’s denial of protection for three-dimensional, utilitarian articles. See supra Section II.C.  
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